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Martin Versfeld (1909–1995) is one of South Africa’s 
greatest philosophers, appreciated by academics and activists, 
poets and the broader public. His masterful prose spans the 
tension between disquiet and joy. Detractor of the violent trends 
of modernity, a critic of apartheid from the first hour, he was 
among the first philosophers of ecology. At the same time he 
celebrated the generosity of the world and advocated an ethics 
of simplicity, drawing on mediaeval theology and Eastern 
wisdom. His philosophy offered food for thought in dark times 
of the 20th century, as it still does for us in the 21st century.
This first book-length study on Versfeld is an invitation to think with 
him on justice and exploitation, cultural difference and human 
nature, religion and the environment, time and connectedness.
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BETWEEN JOY AND DISQUIET: 
PHILOSOPHISING IN DARK T IMES
Martin Versfeld (11 August 1909–18 April 1995) is generally recognised as one 
of South Africa’s greatest philosophers. Professor of Philosophy at the University 
of Cape Town from 1937 to 1972, he was an inspiring lecturer and a stimulating 
author. Among his students, who became well-known themselves, are Athol 
Fugard, Richard Turner, Breyten Breytenbach, Adam Small, Jane Carruthers, 
Jeremy Cronin and Augustine Shutte. His influence stretched beyond the sphere 
of students and professional philosophers to activists, authors of literature and a 
broader public readership. A critic of apartheid from the first hour, he was also 
the first to introduce the study of oriental wisdom to South African academia, and 
among the first philosophers of ecology. One simply cannot bypass this figure of 
South African intellectual life. His writing career (1935–1990) coincided with 
one of the darkest times1 of twentieth-century world history, and because he came 
through this era with his moral and intellectual integrity intact, the contemporary 
reader would want to explore the stakes that he had to deal with as a philosopher. 
How did he, as a professor of philosophical ethics and political philosophy, cope 
with the demands of this situation? Which strategies of reflection were available 
to him? How did he understand the strategic options of reflection open to him? 
How did he identify the difficulties of his task and how did he negotiate his way 
through them?
1 I allude to the title of Hannah Arendt, Men in dark times (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1968). 
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Two major concerns justify studying Versfeld today. In recent years, events at 
universities have again demonstrated that in South Africa, as much as elsewhere,2 
our history is a domain of stakes and struggles, not a reliquary of ideas. Intellectual 
life is undergoing rapid change, as is indeed the society on which people try 
to reflect. We need to work constantly through our history and submit our 
diverse heritage to critical assessment. By doing so, we orientate ourselves in the 
present, albeit by destabilising our views. Hence the importance of intellectual 
history. Correspondingly, the first justification for this book is to do justice 
to this important figure and his thought by submitting his work to careful, 
scholarly analysis. This study is part of a broader research interest in South 
African intellectual life,3 and I hope that it will make a modest contribution to 
alleviating the relative paucity of studies on intellectual history in South Africa. 
In metamorphosed ways, the questions that preoccupied Versfeld are still with us.
That is already the second motive for writing this book. It is about 
Versfeld’s philosophical concerns – many of which are still ours today. What 
is a human person? How is one to understand the relation between generality 
and particularity? How does one deal with the failures of one’s own cultural 
traditions? Is it possible to make oneself at home in the modern world without 
destruction of human lives and the environment? The chapters are designed 
not only to present Versfeld’s views (on modernity, literature, social diversity, 
injustice, the relation between intellectual traditions, etc.) but to engage critically 
with his ideas from today’s sociopolitical and scholarly perspective. Only through 
proper critique can Versfeld remain our contemporary.
2 Cf. Mahmood Mamdani, “Between the public intellectual and the scholar: Decolonization 
and some post-independence initiatives in African higher education,” Inter-Asia Cultural 
Studies 17, no. 1 (2016): 68–83; Ernst Wolff, “Decolonizing Philosophy. On the protests in 
South African universities,” Books and Ideas, published 15 May 2017 (original French version 
published 28 October 2016), http://www.booksandideas.net/Decolonizing-Philosophy.
html.; Harriet Swain, “Students want their curriculums decolonised. Are universities 
listening?”, The Guardian, 30 January 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2019/
jan/30/students-want-their-curriculums-decolonised-are-universities-listening [last access: 6 
February 2020]. 
3 Cf. Ernst Wolff, Mongameli Mabona. His life and work. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
2020; E. Wolff, “Adam Small’s shade of Black Consciousness,” in Philosophy on the border. 
Decoloniality and the shudder of the origin, ed. Leonhard Praeg (Pietermaritzburg: University 
of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2019), 112–147; E. Wolff, “Four questions on curriculum 
development in contemporary South Africa,” South African Journal of Philosophy 35, no. 
4 (2016): 444–459; E. Wolff, “Anatomie van ’n teologiese ideologie. Die Hervormde Kerk 
se steun aan die Apartheid ideologie” [Anatomy of a theological ideology. The Reformed 
Church’s support of the apartheid ideology], Historia 51, no. 1 (May 2006): 141–162.
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A number of traits of Versfeld’s thought make it particularly apt to stimulate 
reflection on these contemporary questions. He was a severe critic of modernity, 
without being a conservative traditionalist. A scholar of ancient Greek philosophy, 
mediaeval philosophy and modern European philosophy, he had a strong 
command of the Western philosophical heritage and could engage creatively and 
critically with it. Yet, he gradually became aware of the narrowness of this form 
of open-mindedness and consciously strove to adopt elements from Indian and 
Chinese philosophy. The fruit of this endeavour is a philosophical anthropology 
that is enriched by a kaleidoscope of influences. The suggestive force of this 
work is of acute relevance to contemporary debates in the academic politics of 
intellectual traditions. Furthermore, Versfeld’s thought remains poised between 
the critique of political atrocities and celebration of the natural environment for 
which we have to care. Finally, his persistent experimentation with discursive 
forms stimulates reflection on how ideas are or should be conveyed, about the 
grounds of validity for any truth claim.
Versfeld’s name is synonymous with a philosophical celebration of life, 
coupled with a critique of political injustice, exploitation of nature, and 
consumerism. This tension between joy and disquiet is arguably the most salient 
trait of his work. This difficult marriage is also a primary reason why his work 
is – despite its masterful prose – more difficult to interpret than a superficial 
reading would lead one to believe. This book aims to advance the interpretation 
of Versfeld’s work. It is not intended as a substitute for it, but to invite those who 
have not yet read Versfeld to take up his books, and for those who have, to reread 
and restudy them attentively.
For this purpose, I have brought together a number of studies that clarify 
different aspects of Versfeld’s work. Some chapters are devoted to themes in his 
work, and others to specific books of his, or to his work as a whole. Without 
claiming that the book covers it all, the chapters are certainly representative 
of the largest part of Versfeld’s work. This is the first monograph on Martin 
Versfeld.4 There is a host of important things that one may want to do in such a 
4 Helpful texts for situating Versfeld intellectually are Jonathan Allen, “A Competing Discourse 
on Empire,” in South Africa, Greece and Rome: Classical Confrontations, ed. Grant Parker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 235–261; Andrew Nash, “Marxism and 
dialectic, from Sharpeville to the negotiated settlement,” in The dialectical tradition in South 
Africa (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 159–184, here 159–164; Hennie Rossouw, 
“Die kuns van die lewe is om tuis te kom. Gedagtes oor die filosofie van Martin Versfeld,” 
Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe 36, no. 1 (1996): 11–20; W.A. de Klerk, “Marthinus Versfeld: 
mens en denker,” Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe 23, no. 3 (1983): 178–186; W.A. de Klerk, 
“Marthinus Versfeld: die man en sy denke,” Tydskrif vir Letterkunde 4 (1966): 62–72. 
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volume. Besides, the material is extremely rich. Still, Rome was not built in a day. 
For this book, I have decided to focus mostly on Versfeld’s work – a substantial 
part of the book consists of an immanent reading. Certainly, this includes some 
historical and intellectual contextualisation, but this is not the main thrust of 
these chapters.
The major part of the book was written by myself and consists either of 
essays published elsewhere5 (translated and improved where needed) or written 
for this volume. In addition, three co-authors have filled in important gaps in 
my competence. To Ruth Versfeld, Paul van Tongeren and Kobus Krüger, my 
sincerest gratitude. Antjie Krog and Marlene van Niekerk gave their support to 
this project in poetic form. Why this is so fitting for this book I discuss later, but 
I would already like to thank these writers here.
The chapters have been arranged in three parts: introductions, studies and 
conclusions.
Together, the first two chapters serve as a presentation of Martin Versfeld. 
They help to orientate the reader to Versfeld’s life (Chapter 1 is written by one of 
his daughters, Ruth Versfeld) and to his writing (Chapter 2).
The second part traces the development of Versfeld’s thought, by zooming in 
on a number of his books, selected from the early, middle and late periods: Oor 
gode en afgode (Chapter 3), Our Selves (Chapter 5) and Pots and Poetry (Chapter 
7). The other contributions to this part of the book each develop a specific issue 
that came up in these three studies. Thus, the exploration of Versfeld’s earliest 
work reveals an unexpectedly positive appraisal of Nietzsche – his relation to 
Nietzsche is examined by Paul van Tongeren in Chapter 4. The presence of 
insights from Eastern thought, clearly foregrounded in Our Selves, raises the 
5 Where I reproduce older texts I have not thought it necessary to erase my traces. I decided 
to maintain the original form of the texts, rather than to iron out the history of their 
composition, which would have required completely rewriting them. However, I have made 
small improvements where needed and I have added cross-references where applicable. 
With thanks to the relevant publishers, I used the following texts: “Poiesis. Oor maaksels 
en hul wêreld na aanleiding van Versfeld se Pots and Poetry,” Tydskrif vir Letterkunde 48, no. 
1 (2011): 206–215 [Chapter 7]; “Grasping the truth from where we are,” introduction to 
the re-edition of Martin Versfeld, Our Selves (Pretoria: Protea, 2010), 7–39 [Chapter 5]; 
“Selfkennis, verstandigheid en inkarnasie. ’n Interpretasie van Versfeld se Oor gode en afgode,” 
LitNet 7, no. 2 (2010): 257–279 / “Selfkennis en verstandigheid in ’n tyd van politieke 
raserny,” introduction to the re-edition of Martin Versfeld, Oor gode en afgode (Pretoria: 
Protea, 2010), 7–40 [Chapter 3]; “Die neukery met verval en herstel in Versfeld se storie van 
die appelboom,” Koers 74, no. 3 (2009): 539–542 [inserted into Chapter 7] and “Sanctus 
Marthinus laudator philosophicus,” Fragmente 4 (1999): 87–101 [Chapter 9]. 
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question of the profile of Versfeld’s reception and use of Eastern wisdom in 
general. Kobus Krüger deals with this question in Chapter 6. The poems of 
Marlene van Niekerk and Antjie Krog6 – Chapter 8 – complete the meditation 
on poiesis in the preceding chapter.
In conclusion, I offer two readings of Versfeld’s work as a whole, two views 
written twenty years apart. While not uncritical, the first reading is more 
appreciative, written as it were at the guru’s feet. Still appreciative, the second is 
more critical, written in the spirit of the “philosopher as vulture” (an image that 
Versfeld advanced).
There are some minor overlaps between chapters. I have decided to retain 
these to maintain each chapter’s autonomy. The reader may indeed read any 
chapter on its own.
I thank Rika Opper for draft translations of Chapters 3, 7 and 9, and 
Christiaan Naudé for copy-editing the manuscript. To Mirjam Truwant, Annemie 
Vandezande, Beatrice van Eeghem and their colleagues at Leuven University 
Press, again my deep-felt recognition.
Christof Heyns – specialist of human rights law, United Nations Special 
Rapporteur, member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee and a 
very amiable colleague – was acquainted with Versfeld in his youth. I discussed 
this book project with him some years ago already and, when the manuscript was 
accepted for publication in March 2021, asked him to write an endorsement for 
the cover. He readily accepted, but unexpectedly passed away a few days later on 
28 March. I would like to pay tribute to him here.
I have characterised Versfeld’s work as situated in the tension between joy and 
disquiet. This book will be a success if it could facilitate its readers’ participation 
in this joyous celebration of life and ignite in them the disquieting concern for 
the atrocities of our own time.
Ernst Wolff
Leuven, June 2020
6 The four poems of Antjie Krog, “Sunday lunch”, “the founding principle of generosity”, 
“to feed someone” and “convivium”, come from her volume Synapse, translation by Karen 
Press (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 2014), 26, 43, 44, 80–82. I thank the publisher for 
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“FERTIL IZER TO THE LAST”  
–  B IOGRAPHICAL SNIPS
By Ruth Versfeld  
– with thanks for contributions from other family members
“A loafer all my life”, is how Martin Versfeld, my father, described himself in his 
honorary graduation ceremony speech at the University of Cape Town in 1987. 
He did indeed spend many hours in the armchair he had made for himself – a 
simple, wooden structure with curved arms and a chequerboard of broad leather 
straps across the seat and back. It sat in his study at Blyde Huis, a double-storeyed 
Victorian house built in 1840 in Rosebank, Cape Town. This was to be the house 
where he and his wife, Barbara, lived from 1945 until his death in 1995. Their 
nine children grew up here, and Martin would often rattle off the list until he 
reached the name of the one he was looking for … “Joan, Adie, Cathy, Ursie, Dirk, 
Ruth, Molly, Tinie … no, no I mean Balie.”
It was from his armchair that Martin did all his writing and much of his 
conversing. He had no typewriter and a hatred for ball-point pens. Instead he had 
a writing board and a pencil, kept sharpened with his ever-present pocket knife. 
Nothing was ever erased, though he did cross out or add the occasional word.
Many visitors came to Blyde Huis, passing through the squeaky wrought-
iron gate, up the rough path under a huge magnolia tree to the wide front steps 
and the never-locked front door. The study was the first room on the left, a large 
room lined with books with the limerick volumes on a top shelf, ostensibly out 
of the reach of children. On the mantelpiece above the fireplace stood a crucifix 
along with, in later years, a statue of Buddha. If Martin was not here, he could 
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usually be found cooking in the kitchen or wandering the rambling garden, often 
with company.
Martin had many friends: neighbourhood children, poets and academics; 
Scrabble companions, mountaineers and farmers; local beggars, teachers and 
former students; priests, infidels, along with, heaven forbid, judges and lawyers. 
For the sit-in-the-study visitors, Barbara seldom had time nor the inclination to 
be the tea-making wife. We children watched and commented, often irreverently, 
as “fans of the guru” traipsed from the study through to the kettle in the kitchen. 
Having said that, my brother, Dirk, recalls that 
sitting in the study when Dad was with his friends was incredibly 
important to me. It was about friendship, and this must have been 
deeply comforting to me. This has guided my life and my way of being 
with my own friends and their children – I hope [to give] some of that 
same sense of pleasure and security.
Sunday evening was the time for student visitations with Martin, who from his 
armchair read extracts from books and his latest pencilled writings. But much 
of his teaching came through aphorisms and casual remarks such as, “I hope he 
doesn’t end up a mere academic,” or “So damnably the suffering elect. Virtue – 
Bah”, or “Potatoes are pure poetry … so is good prose” and “People who think 
Western thought and art superior to that of the East are only half educated.” He 
loved these sessions and his students clearly did too. They kept coming back.
Denis Cowen, a frequent visitor to his study and friend from 1935 until the 
time Martin died, notes that
although I know Martin better than I know Barbara, I actually know 
more about Barbara’s antecedents than Martin’s – a subject on which he 
was always surprisingly reticent, however hard or subtly one might try 
to draw him. Perhaps he set little store by such things. Perhaps he did 
not consider it worth the time and effort to find out … but speculation 
on the subject is, so it seems to me, unnourishing.
I too, recall him saying that one learns more about a person by watching how he 
peels an orange than by studying his family tree.
Marthinus Versfeld was one of two children. His younger sister was Alma. 
Their parents were Anna Gertruida (born Le Roux) and John Henry Versfeld. 
“Ouma” Anna was a warm and welcoming woman with a brightness in her eyes. 
She was of French Huguenot descent. Her ancestors fled from France in 1685, 
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at the time of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes when Calvinist Protestants 
were no longer allowed to practise their religion in the predominantly Catholic 
state. (This adds interest to Martin’s conversion from Calvinism to Catholicism 
some 260 years later).
“Ouma” Anna’s family belonged to a Dutch Reformed Church congregation 
in Tulbagh, a small town in a mountainous part of the Western Cape. Her 
father farmed in the area. Anna herself was a staunch member of the Dutch 
Reformed Church all her life, ensuring her children attended church services 
as well as Sunday school and spent what was left of their Sundays “bettering” 
themselves and reading books with a “good moral tone” rather than having 
fun. Both Marthinus and Alma resented this, and my father would tell us of a 
sentimentally illustrated book he won at Sunday school and stuffed down a drain 
en route home.
Anna’s mother was known in Tulbagh for her nursing skills and had a 
formidable knowledge of indigenous plants and herbal medicines which she 
passed on to her daughter. Ouma in turn imparted both the knowledge and 
values of the goodness and power of nature to her children. Marthinus likewise 
was quick to apply pads of linen soaked in blousalie (blue sage) over a wound 
or to make a brew of wildeals (wormwood) if any of his children admitted to a 
stomach ache. He also had a reputation for feeding his family “weeds” from the 
garden. Some saw this as deprivation but we thrived.
One of ten children, Anna Le Roux trained as a primary school teacher and 
got a post some distance away in the Little Karoo town of Barrydale. Here she 
lodged at “Rose Cottage”, the home of the Versfeld family. John Henry Versfeld, 
whom she later married, had an only sister, Hilda, who taught at the same school.
John Henry was the middle son and his mother, we were told, favoured 
his older and younger brothers. He probably suffered from depression most of 
his life. At the time Anna was lodging with his family he was a law student and 
doing brilliantly. However, he then became deaf after a bout of illness, possibly 
meningitis or simply a severe cold. This, in those days, ruled out his wish to 
become a lawyer and restricted him to the deathly boring job of “Registrar of 
Deeds”.
John Henry Versfeld married Anna le Roux in 1908. His was the Dutch 
side of the family originating from the Netherlands in the early 1700s and with 
relatives in the Cape west coast upcountry regions of Darling, Malmesbury and 
Piketberg. There were also familial connections with branches of the Smuts, Gie 
and Duckitt families. The Versfeld web spread from the farm Groote Post west of 
the Cedarberg Mountains to the farm of Klaassenbosch in the Constantia valley, 
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across to Caledon in the Overberg district, through Swellendam and Riversdale 
and on east to Knysna.
Marthinus Versfeld was born on 11 August 1909. Christened “Marthinus” 
in the Dutch Reformed Church, he kept this name but used “Martin” more and 
more as time went by. He and Alma grew up with their parents at 12 Camp Street, 
a double-storeyed, semi-detached house in Gardens, Cape Town. Marthinus had 
an upstairs room that led onto a balcony that commanded a fine view of the face 
of Table Mountain, a place he roamed from boyhood to old age. His father had 
a love of the outdoor life, often taking his family for walks along the “Firepath” 
(now Tafelberg Road) and the “Pipe Track” which contours the skirt of Table 
Mountain.
The family later moved to a larger house with a bigger garden in Hofmeyr 
Street, also in Gardens. This house they named “Tradouw” after the route through 
the Langeberg Mountains linking Barrydale to Suurbraak in the Overberg. Anna 
and John Henry would have enjoyed outings in this area when Anna lodged with 
the Versfelds in Barrydale.
Martin’s love of carpentry no doubt also stemmed from his father. The two 
shared a cramped workshop in the basement of their Hofmeyr Street home. Here 
they made bankies of black stinkwood and witels (white alder) along with bigger 
yellow wood tables, bookshelves and other useful pieces for the house. This fine 
feel for wood has been passed on to my generation and particularly to my brother 
Tinie (Martin), who started working wood with his father in the workshop at 
Blyde Huis and is now a craftsman himself.
It seems that John Henry became increasingly frustrated and gloomy with 
age. Denis Cowen recalls Martin telling him that his father “yearned to spread 
his wings in the competitive world of affairs, but was prevented by his deafness 
from getting out of the civil service rut”. Martin, as a schoolboy, had to deal with 
his father’s breakdowns and suicidal threats. He also successfully nursed both his 
parents when they contracted the Spanish Flu of 1918.
Martin matriculated from South African College Schools (SACS) and 
went on to study at the University of Cape Town. One could have expected 
him to study entomology as he was keen on the natural sciences and had already 
developed a deep interest and knowledge of goggas. However, he initially selected 
law, as his father had done, but then discovered that philosophy was a lot more fun.
For postgraduate study, Martin went to Glasgow University in Scotland 
where he garnered his PhD in 1933. A major revelation during his PhD studies 
was his discovery, under the guidance of A.A. Bowman, of mediaeval philosophy, 
particularly the writings of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. He was dismayed 
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that the narrow Protestantism of his University of Cape Town education had 
omitted this period of Western thought. He dutifully completed his PhD on 
Descartes, but no longer admired the thinking of that style of philosophy.
In 1942 Martin met and married Barbara Barry. He was a junior lecturer in 
ethics at the University of Cape Town while she was an undergraduate student. 
Barbara also had ancestral roots in the Overberg that ran through Swellendam to 
the south coast. Hers was an English-speaking, Church of England family while 
Martin’s was Afrikaans-speaking and Dutch Reformed. Their families generally 
supported opposite sides in the Second Anglo-Boer, or South African, War at 
the start of the twentieth century. Martin’s father and a friend, for example, 
climbed Lion’s Head one night during this war and erected a “Vierkleur” – the 
Transvaal/Boer flag. It has to be said that Barbara’s great-uncle John X. Merriman, 
then Treasurer General of the Cape in the ministry of J.P. Schreiner, was accused 
of being “Pro-Boer” in the British House of Commons as he appealed for the 
prevention of the Second Boer War. Merriman even lost his seat in Parliament 
for a period because of his anti-war sentiments. Both families had a rebellious 
element, which Martin and Barbara each took on in their pacifist ways.
Within a couple of years of their marriage, Martin and Barbara together 
converted to Catholicism, a move of which neither the Dutch Reformed Church 
nor Barbara’s family approved. However, this was an exciting and uplifting time for 
them both as reflected in a letter from Martin to Simon Bisheuwel, a psychologist 
friend who had challenged him on the need for organised religion: “the function 
of the church is to present to us the Divine Values in the form in which they are 
visible to merely human eyes”. The writings of Catholic philosophers including 
Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson (both of the Thomas Aquinas tradition), 
Cardinal John Henry Newman and South Africa’s Monsignor F.C. Kolbe clearly 
aided them in looking upon the Divine. G.K. Chesterton was another oft-quoted 
influence. I’m interested to discover that of all these professed Catholics, only 
Gilson was born into a Catholic family.
Later, and while essentially staying in that faith, Martin broadened his 
interests to include Eastern thought, especially Zen Buddhism. So, for example, 
in 1979 his essay “The Yin and the Yang in Christian Culture” was published 
in his collection Our Selves. Pots and Poetry, a 1985 collection of essays which 
includes “Plato and Confucius” where once again he draws parallels between 
Western and Eastern thought. I’m sure these ideas were brewing all along and 
remember, from the time I learnt to read in the early 1960s, trying to decipher 
the word “Upanishads” on the spine of one of the many books on his shelves. In 
1988 Martin took enormous satisfaction in the publication of his Die Lewensweg 
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van Lao-Tse, a translation into Afrikaans of the Tao Te Ching, authored by the 
ancient Chinese philosopher and poet Lao Tzu. He always said that philosophers 
peak at eighty. He was seventy-nine at the time!
This was also about the time when my brother Tinie had a discussion with 
his father about atheism. The old man explained that he was not brave enough 
to have no faith. Christianity as illuminated by the great Catholic thinkers, he 
said, appealed to him because it offered redemption from the terror of history. 
History did indeed plague him.
As a child I had little comprehension of what it was my parents did. When 
asked, my father’s response would go something like, “Well, it’s something like 
a blind man in a dark room looking for a black cat that isn’t there … and finding 
it!” I remember my Sub-B (grade two) teacher going around the class asking our 
parents’ occupations for a list she was compiling. I was seven years old. When it 
was my turn, I proudly announced that my father was a carpenter, and my mother 
a secretary. (At the time, my mother was going to “the office” to do paralegal 
advisory work for transgressors of the pass and other apartheid laws.) My sister 
Ursie once explained what her father did with the words, “Sometimes he sits and 
thinks, and sometimes he just sits.” I’m sure my parents would have approved of 
both accounts!
Although he never served on any of their “stodgy” committees, Martin was 
an active and respected member the Mountain Club of South Africa (MCSA). 
He was first introduced to MCSA activities as a schoolboy at SACS, then 
situated on Government Avenue in a building now used by University of Cape 
Town’s Michaelis Art School. SACS had its own mountain club through which 
Martin and his friends opened many climbs on both the front and back of Table 
Mountain. They also joined countless MCSA meets. From the age of thirteen 
Martin kept careful record of these expeditions with descriptions:
One has to go up perpendicularly doing back and foot work for perhaps 
30 feet. One must now walk astride of the crack for some distance. My 
hobnails, having worn down and being therefore very slippery, afforded 
no grip. There being a big drop below, the situation was, to say the 
least, uncomfortable. Climbing up a few feet we hit off to the left and, 
passing through a passage under the rock, we came out a few feet below 
the summit of the mountain at 1.20pm. […] We had grub at the top 
of Porcupine Ravine. Flegg made a villainous stew, and while he was 
eating it we told him horrible stories to make him feel sick. (Blinkwater 
Needle, Table Mountain – 1924)
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From this time on, Martin and friends made numerous excursions to the Boland 
and Cederberg mountains. He recorded these trips in a series of diaries, startling 
in their purely factual nature with names, times, routes and cuisine carefully 
recorded. However, these trips inspired other writing, such as Die berge van die 
Boland, which he and “Oom Bill” (W.A. De Klerk), a close climbing friend and 
intellectual soulmate, penned together for publication in 1947.
Martin remained a traditional rock climber, saying that the new generation, 
including his own son Tinie, had “more gym chalk than ink on their fingers”. In 
1991 he was asked to deliver a speech at MCSA Centennial Memorial Service 
held at Maclear’s Beacon on the summit of Table Mountain. He started:
I am amazed at being here. The honour is almost too much for me, 
especially when I remember that I am standing where my fellow 
member, and fellow philosopher, Oubaas Smuts, once stood. In 1923 
at the unveiling of this memorial I was present as a schoolboy – the 
reward of our class for carrying up cement – listening to Smuts’ speech 
of dedication.
Martin was also a keen fisherman, mostly on the Cape Peninsula and mostly in 
the company of another soulmate, Leon “Bubi” Meyer. As with his mountain 
trips, Martin kept diaries with mostly dry and detailed records of fishing spots, 
weather conditions and catches. His greatest joy was hooking a galjoen, but these 
catches became further and further apart as galjoen were an increasingly scarce 
resource. People often asked him whether he contemplated philosophical ideas as 
he gazed for hours into the unrewarding sea, to which he would respond, “Bah, 
I was fishing!” He liked simply to be in the present.
Another passion was his garden at Blyde Huis in Rosebank. Many an hour 
was spent standing gazing at this and that, often – until he dropped the habit – 
with pipe in hand. I was away from South Africa during the 1980s, and my father 
was a regular correspondent, often sending descriptions of the garden:
As you stand in the front door you will see in the middle of the fairway 
a globular bush of brilliant purple shimmering with bees. Behind it a 
patch of lettuce, and to the left verdant beds of carrots, turnips, broad 
beans and coriander. The arums are coming up in the usual spot, and 
below are improved rockeries.
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The garden was also a source of nourishment for yet another of Martin’s loves, 
cooking. This is best explained using his words: “When you take the lid off the 
tureen, you should in fact be opening a window onto a garden.” Martin took 
great pride in producing pots of food for his family along with guests, lodgers 
and those who happened to pass by at meal times. We had a large dining table, 
which he made, but this was for many years made even larger when a ping-pong 
table board was placed on top. Barbara would stand forbearingly over the big, 
black pot serving rounds to hungry mouths while Martin lapped up the praise.
A favourite family memory is of the time Martin served one of his rare baked 
galjoen, stuffed and garnished with pickings from the garden. With his usual 
flourish, he opened the cover of the baking pan only to reveal his mislaid pipe 
lying on top of the fish. Guests that night were none other than Lady Luyt and her 
husband, Sir Richard, the University of Cape Town vice chancellor at the time.
In 1947 Martin purchased a property, then a poor and run-down farm, 
called Diepte van Ellende (“Depths of Despair”). The property was essentially a 
wild piece of mountainous land in the Kouga Mountains of the Langkloof. He 
renamed it Lentelus (“Spring Joy”). Barbara recalls this time:
Over the next few years Martin travelled up every winter and summer 
vacation to get our two-roomed cottage built – always with the help of 
a student friend … and some local labour – first the foundations had to 
be laid, trenches were dug and many rocks laboriously rolled down the 
hillside … Then the bricks had to be made in a mould, mud and cement 
… Once the foundations were laid, the bricks were cast, another major 
operation, and the walls started to rise … at last the roof beams were 
in place … Three big steps led up to the front door and the floor was 
stamped earth … Now came the furnishing – a long pine table with a 
long bench for each side, still extant, a set of four metal bunks we were 
given … salvaged from the wreck of a Union Castle steamer in Table 
Bay, around 1920. These bunks had metal railings to prevent passengers 
from rolling out in rough weather, very suitable for young children.
And young children there were in increasing numbers. Following Joan, Adie and 
Cathy there was now toddler Ursie who
arrived with delight and ran round and round the long table shouting 
“Oh Daddy it’s loverly” over and over. Year after year we came from 
mid-December to mid-January and again most years in July – although 
I missed out at the end of ’52 as Dirk was about to arrive … Ruth joined 
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the mob 15 months later and there were still three to come (Molly, 
Tinie and Balie). The saga continued and we all loved it, only missing 
1965–1966 when we were in the USA.
Lentelus was to remain an anchor for the family and a huge number of friends. 
As the long summer holidays approached we would start preparing with Martin 
packing his suitcase weeks in advance. He often pointed out that although we 
never had a car, we at least had a place to go to. (Martin never learnt to drive and 
we would never have fitted into one vehicle anyway.) We travelled to “The Farm” 
by overnight steam train, usually booking two compartments, which bedded 
six each, and a coupe for another three. Friends came along too. Tin trunks of 
supplies such as bully beef, spaghetti and tinned peaches were loaded into the 
guard van at the back, while bedding rolls and baskets of padkos came to our 
compartments of green leather. The dining car was out of the question for meals, 
although I recall the rare ice-cream treat in that teak-clad coach. “Coke” was never 
on the menu, with Martin spitting out the words, “I’ve drunk Coca-Cola on two 
occasions in my life – and I remember them both”.
The train went through Mossel Bay and George before climbing so slowly 
over the Montagu Pass that passengers could run alongside the train, helping 
themselves to the watsonia flowers that grew in profusion alongside the tracks. 
We disembarked at Camfer station on the other side of the pass and then took 
an old railway bus as far as Avontuur, where a local farmer would collect us in his 
bakkie. Martin would worry about the logistics and costs of all this but it was our 
mother, Barbara, who really did the work.
Ann Harries, one of our friends on such a trip, recalls how tough these rough 
and otherworldly holidays sans taps, electricity or washing facilities could be on 
Barbara:
As the holiday continued, I began to observe vulnerabilities in the 
Versfeld parents. I once saw Barbara display her true feelings when she 
thought no one was looking. It happened when I was curled up in my 
top bunk (grudgingly given to me as a guest by the children) enthralled 
by the recently published The Lion, The Witch and The Wardrobe 
which I’d found in a pile of random literature. Barbara had cleared 
the table, done the washing-up and was now sweeping the dusty floor 
(the children usually helped to an extent with these tasks but had all 
gone out with Martin on a bug-catching expedition which I’d declined 
to join). Suddenly she threw down her broom and shouted: Bugger 
housework! Bugger babies! Bugger Martin! and collapsed sobbing on a 
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chair. I climbed down from my bunk, picked up the cast-down broom, 
and began sweeping.
Martin’s Klip en klei (Stone and Clay) essays (1968) are inspired by Lentelus, 
which was unbelievably formative for us all. He and Barbara both enjoyed people 
and especially young people. “The Farm” became a place where they could enjoy 
friends and their families together and, in time, make an essential contribution 
to the raising of their grandchildren. We would have river expeditions, fishing, 
swimming and camping under the stars. We collected mushrooms and explored 
Bushman caves. Martin and his sons hunted for the pot, often subjecting Barbara 
to cleaning a gamey dassie or rock rabbit.
Our father had a deep love for the land and instilled this love in all of us. My 
brother Dirk recalls Martin’s descriptions of the cultivated Italian terraces he had 
admired when taking a break from his Glasgow studies. Together they attempted 
to create a similar citrus terrace on the stony hillside alongside the little Lentelus 
cottage. I could not agree more with Dirk when he says, “The farm remains our 
parent and our single touch point. I feel that as long as we have the farm we are 
not orphans”.
1966 was the year that we missed out on the farm as Martin and Barbara 
took their six youngest children on sabbatical leave to South Bend, Indiana, in 
the United States. It was an unforgettable journey: we took a Union Castle liner 
from Cape Town to Southampton in England and then the SS United States, a 
huge ship that had been used for troops in World War Two, across a very bumpy 
Atlantic Ocean to New York. From here we took a flight to Chicago and another 
to South Bend, home to Notre Dame, a Catholic university that admitted only 
men and nuns as students. It seemed nuns were counted as gender-free! Notre 
Dame was also known for its mighty American football team. It did, however, 
have an interesting philosophy department – to my father only attraction.
Our year in the United States may have been fun for us children, but it was 
not for our parents. Martin battled and so, as a consequence, did Barbara. He 
found the food synthetic and missed bread with texture and wine with flavour. 
Summers were hot and humid, winters icy and the Indiana landscape was entirely 
flat. I recall my father’s return from a fishing expedition along the river that ran 
through the town. He disdainfully tipped a sack full of small, bony fish into the 
basin. We did our best to clean and eat some but they tasted of mud. He told 
us how he had seen a hand moving with the flow above the surface of the water. 
Convinced it was a corpse, he had tried to hook it. It flopped over – a plastic 
glove in a polluted river.
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When he returned to the University of Cape Town, Martin had to submit his 
sabbatical report for the year. He simply wrote, “Went fishing”. This was typical 
of his attitude to the formalities of academia. Never in all his time at University 
of Cape Town did he attend a faculty meeting. His colleagues in the philosophy 
department had to pick up the pieces. One such colleague was Professor Andrew 
Murray. Prof. Murray also served the South African government as an adviser 
and expert on communism. He was never a family friend. He did, however, get 
Martin out of a couple of tight spots: first being when he posted himself some 
“Communist literature” from the United States and second when he ordered 
himself a “wok from Sui Hing Hong”. Murray explained to the authorities that 
the literature was for academic research and that the wok was not a weapon of 
mass destruction but a cooking utensil.
Reading and music were of paramount importance to Martin. He would say 
that he read Robinson Crusoe at the age of four. His sister, Alma, in her memoirs, 
recalls what a library their house was:
Marthinus and I were given the Arthur Mee My Magazine, and the 
Children’s Newspaper to build up our general knowledge. We had just 
about all the Rider Haggard books … Then Conan Doyle’s Sherlock 
Holmes Books, the Boy’s Own Annual given to Marthinus … also 
Harmsworth’s Wonders of the Past and his series on Natural History – 
all about goggas and animals. … The Oubaas would also read to us from 
Jock of the Bushveld, one of his favourite books, and from Outa Karel’s 
Stories, by Sanni Metelerkamp. The Ounooi would read the Beatrix 
Potter stories to us.
The list goes on, with the books named written mostly in English. There would 
not have been many books in Afrikaans available when Martin and Alma were 
children. Afrikaans only became an official language in 1925, until which time 
Dutch was taught, but not spoken, in schools. English reigned in the classroom 
and on the playground. During the childhood of John Henry and Anna Gertruida, 
Afrikaans-speaking children caught speaking Afrikaans at school were forced to 
wear placards reading “I must not speak Dutch at school”. (There was no word for 
“Afrikaans” at that time.) Their generation was never comfortable with reading 
Afrikaans, having been brought up on the Dutch Bible. When Martin was 
studying in Scotland he and his father had a great correspondence – all in English.
As children we were read to extensively. I particularly remember our father’s 
delight in Rudyard Kipling’s Just So Stories and Arthur Ransom’s Swallows and 
Amazons series, now in the possession of his great-grandchildren. Homer’s 
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Odyssey flew over most of our heads, but he took great pleasure in the reading. 
We were also raised on the Bible, with selected blood-thirsty readings from the 
Old Testament, including the tale of Judith seducing Holofernes and then cutting 
off his head.
Martin was no great connoisseur of the modern novel and seldom acquired 
new books for general reading. He preferred to read and reread those he had 
on his shelves. Rudyard Kipling and Thor Heyerdahl were favourite authors. 
Charles Darwin’s Voyage of the Beagle was much loved. King Lear was an almost 
annual event, with Shakespeare play-readings as a variant on his Sunday evening 
discussions.
Martin would often quote long passages of poetry – Tennyson, Coleridge, 
Wordsworth and others. Many of the Afrikaans poets were close to his heart. To 
quote from a letter he wrote to me in 1986: 
End of a quiet day, a good deal of which I spent reading Leipoldt, with 
whom I have so much affinity. You don’t know a people until you know 
their poetry. I’m sick of people who know all about “the Afrikaner” and 
can’t quote a line. Poets are the only begetters and preservers of their 
people.
Old friends of Martin recall how he would whistle Bach on mountain walks. On 
his death one of his granddaughters, Shirley Apthorp, published a newspaper 
article entitled, “Oupa tapped life’s memory”. She describes the gramophone 
which, like his armchair, had its place in his study:
a prized possession, dark wood carved in ornate Gothic arches and 
polished to a high sheen. […] My grandfather’s hands shake as he tries 
to fit the needle into its socket. It’s an old cane needle, which he has 
just laboriously trimmed with special scissors […] He keeps an open 
box of 78 records, each in its yellowing sleeve, catalogued in neat blue 
fountain pen lists. Bach, Mozart, Sibelius, Elgar; more Bach. […] “This 
is an excellent machine, when it’s working properly.” He is scrutinising 
the dusty interior of his gramophone again. “And,” turning to his 
collection, “there are some magnificent things in there. But it doesn’t 
matter. I’ve got them all inside me, here.” He taps his head. “Every note 
of every one of them.” And he shuffles out of the room, oblivious to 
Elgar’s melancholy chords, humming a Bach violin concerto.
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Martin often said that for every organiser one needed two disorganisers. A 
favourite fable was about a crocodile who lies in bed hypnotised by the orderly 
pattern of flowers on the wallpaper. He is persuaded to go out and see the 
wild profusion and confusion of his wife’s flower garden and, shocked by this 
lawlessness, returns to his bed and wallpaper, where he smugly becomes paler 
and paler and sicker and sicker.
As Martin grew older he stopped seeking out that invisible black cat. A great 
fan of Friedrich Nietzsche, he marvelled more at the insoluble and disliked the 
compartmentalising of ideas. He couldn’t stomach sermons, woolly thinking or 
dogmatism. To those calling themselves feminist, fundamentalist, imperialist, 
socialist, capitalist or whatever, he would simply say “Bah”. He would no doubt 
have said “Bah” to anyone calling him a existentialist although this is what I 
say he essentially was. However, labelling was not beyond him: “Voter” was his 
ultimate insult to Nationalists of the time. Until the first democratic elections of 
1994 neither of our parents had ever voted. A “whites only” ballot box was not 
for them. Come 1994, Martin put his mark next to the Green Party.
No one could have called Martin a “political activist” in the sense that this 
term was used in the apartheid years. He certainly did not march the streets or 
speak the language of anti-apartheid activists. Barbara, his wife, did this and 
more. She was a member of the Black Sash and Dependents Conference, an 
organisation that ensured the families of political prisoners were provided for 
and afforded opportunities to visit incarcerated family members. Our house 
was both a “railway station” of people passing through and a “safe house”, where 
activists on the run could hide from the security branch and enjoy anonymity. 
(We only learnt their real names later.) Martin was clearly quite proud of all this, 
keeping a running commentary and writing letters to me such as this extract from 
28 August 1985:
This has been our sort of Day of the Barricades. We don’t really know 
yet what has occurred or is occurring, but the govt. and police are in a 
sort of fury of fear. Well, I’ve seen this coming for a great many years. 
Ego-phenomenon! […] I am very seriously convinced that Original Sin 
is the lust for power.
Martin, like his father, suffered from depression, although less so, to my memory, 
in his later years than when I was a child. He had a major depressive episode 
in early 1959, resulting in months of hospitalisation in the psychiatric ward at 
Groote Schuur. During this time Barbara gave birth to their eighth child. Martin 
later saw this illness as a turning point in his philosophical thinking.
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I recall how unsettled he could be, suffering terrible nightmares, and strutting 
back and forth, unable to communicate with any of us. This depressive gene was 
passed down to some of his children, notably Cathy, who committed suicide 
at the age of twenty-three. This brought deep sadness to the whole family, my 
parents only reaching a level of peace within themselves some twenty years later. 
This was when their eldest son, Adrian, became ill with cancer. During his illness, 
Adie spoke and wrote about what it was to face death in a way that somehow 
brought resolution to our loss of Cathy. Adie died in 1992.
In early April 1995 our paterfamilias had a stroke that left him partially 
paralysed, without speech and bedridden. It was clear that his life was drawing 
to a close and the best we could do was to care for him as he lay in his study at 
home. He was surrounded by family, including three-year-old twin grandchildren 
Adrian and Xavier, discussing the hole they were going to dig to put him into. 
(A twinkle in his eye told us that he enjoyed this exchange!) From here Martin 
could enjoy the magnolia tree casting shadows across the window and a garden 
posy of pink nerines on the sill. This was butterfly season, with a profusion of his 
favourite autumnal black butterfly outside. He watched a pupa on a twig placed 
at his bedside, and particularly enjoyed being shown a picture book of butterflies.
Martin would often look towards a piece of calligraphy that had always hung 
on the wall next to this bed. It had been beautifully executed by Joan Tebbutt, a 
Scottish artist with whom he had a close friendship through much of the 1930s 










Anyone who has read Martin Versfeld’s work will recognise his fascination 
with the concept of beauty, as opposed to reason, goodness or truth, and most 
particularly with the beauty of the divine.
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For me, it is significant that these are the words he watched to his last. Martin, 
despite his protestations that people are essentially good, had always recognised 
the barriers of the ego and obstinacy to humility in himself and in humanity at 
large. He had, through the sacred and profane, reached long and hard towards 
beauty as that which is proportioned, harmonious and complete.
In a typical swipe of humour, he suggested his gravestone be inscribed with 
the words: 
Here lies Martin Versfeld
Safe in the bosom of Mother Earth






WHAT WAS VERSFELD DOING 
WHEN HE WAS DOING 
PHILOSOPHY?
Having provided a character sketch of the man in the previous chapter, the 
present chapter similarly aims to characterise Versfeld’s writings. Everything will 
be done to escape two kinds of reading for which he himself repeatedly expressed 
his allergy: generally, simplifying the complexity of the author and, particularly, 
exaggerating the author’s beauty – in other words, writing a hagiography. To 
demonstrate my commitment to this cause, I will give a few reasons for not 
reading Versfeld today. Thereafter a number of salient traits of his writing will be 
examined. Each dimension of his work suggests a possible response. One quickly 
realises that there is not just one Versfeld and that the attempt to find the one, 
simple and obvious way of receiving his work will necessarily end in frustration.
1. On the warts
I admit that there is a pressure cooker in our kitchen and that I often use it. 
There! I have made my confession, I am purged of my guilt, 
I can see both sides of the question. (FT 94)
We have to love Augustine, tares and all. (ACCG 103)
The biographer must sketch the warts. (ACCG 35)
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The Roman rhetoricians recommended that one start a plea with a captatio 
benevolentiae – an introduction to capture the goodwill of the audience. I shall 
do so here, but in a somewhat circuitous way – namely, by evoking what seems 
to me dispersed blots of irredeemable ideas in Versfeld’s work. Admittedly, this 
strategy runs the risk of chilling the enthusiasm of the eager reader. However, I 
reckon that my wager will pay off: rather start with “a little candid explanation” 
(MP 3), than face the accusation of hiding the blemishes. Presented here, then, 
are a number of concessions to the philosopher’s critics, not an encompassing 
philosophical assessment of his entire work – this will come out in the subsequent 
chapters of the book. I will, as it were, speak about the warts, before I examine 
the whole warthog.
I have another reason for proceeding in this way. A great number of 
people have grown to love the work of Versfeld; fewer have really read him. By 
confronting them straightaway with unfortunate and often unknown blots on his 
work, I hope to offer them a shock by which to discover and learn to appreciate 
Versfeld a second time.
These blemishes are diverse. A few reflect social prejudices, others are 
gargoyles of Versfeld’s own making.
1.1. Spots of prejudice
There is no obstinate exercise of prejudice in Versfeld, but it seems fair to report 
on those rare or isolated instances I know of. Likewise, it would be unfair not to 
contrast these lapses with his explicit ideas.
The gender-sensitive present-day reader will find some regretful turns of 
phrase. Apart from the formerly accepted use of “man” for “humanity”, there are 
some places where Versfeld demands too much of readers’ generosity. I think of 
the way he translates virtu (virtue) into manliness (manlikheid, e.g., GA 56). True 
enough, this is a historical equivalent for virtus and the etymology of the word 
is “vir” (man), but if the argumentative context doesn’t require this translation, 
why not simply use “virtue”? Let it be said that I cannot remember having seen a 
recurrence of this practice beyond the 1948 book. A long decade later came the 
following passage in a commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s theory of knowledge: 
“Contemplation is the most masculine of activities, and there is something 
not feminine but effeminate in a theory of knowledge and of language that 
makes philosophy the housemaid of the special sciences.” (MP 143) Versfeld, or 
Versfeld rendering Aquinas? Not clear. But even then, such a passage calls out 
for relativising commentary. And I’m not sure that the manoeuvre by which the 
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philosopher dresses himself up in the mediaeval feminine imagery of a housemaid 
suffices to redeem him. At the same time, his work is not devoid of true gender 
reversal, for instance when, in Pots and Poetry, he happily replaces the Pauline 
theological pair of Adam and Christ with Eve and Mary (PP 2).1 This reversal 
has an anthropological flip side, which consists of problematising the essentialist 
gender duality (cf. PO 212–213). We are thus far from justified to generalise this 
point about gendered expression, as if we were dealing with a crude paternalistic 
writer.
I recall one occurrence of a homophobic slur. Describing a public celebration 
by followers of the goddess Cybele in Carthage in the time of Augustine, Versfeld 
summarised this as a “faggot parade” (“moffie-optog”, RM 13). One does not 
oblige Versfeld to sympathise with this historical practice; one does expect of him 
to mind his tongue. Or to be consistent with his better self: a slightly different 
version of the same discussion simply does not contain this slur (cf. GCG 9–10).
But one has to be careful with this author. I am thinking of the exceptional 
and curious case of “Nordwand of the Vierge Maigre. Report on the international 
Alpine expedition”, written for The Journal of the Mountain Club of South Africa. 
Exceptional, because it is intended as a humoristic sketch and has no direct relation 
to his philosophical work; curious, because I do not know how to take it. In this 
sketch is a fictive character, who may be a black South African farm worker and 
who is given the name Adoons (a name formerly frequently given to baboons). 
It starts off badly! However, some doubt is left as to whether it is not perhaps 
a real baboon.2 Furthermore, the other characters of this fictive expedition are 
portrayed in the most stereotypical ways (an Algerian, a Frenchman, a German 
and a Brit). Burlesque humour? Finally, the Adoons figure turns out to be the 
hero of the story. Reversal of stereotypes or a humoristic confirmation? Difficult 
to assess. It is surely ill advised to write a piece today that remains so ambiguous. 
However, whatever we make of this, we will see later how opposition to all sorts 
of racial discrimination was a central tenet of his developed sociopolitical critique.
Without claiming to have presented an exhaustive catalogue, I have made the 
case against the infallibility of the philosopher. At the same time, we have seen 
in each case that the cited points are in contradiction with the intellectual stance 
defended explicitly in his work.
1 Or his ideas about gender “balance” in mediaeval thought, cf. PO 212–213.
2 The issue is even more complex, if we consider a later remark that evidently also applies to 
himself: “Personally I believe in a God who is the Origin of everything. It requires great 
originality to make a baboon into a man of the church” (NA 2nd ed. 78).
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1.2. Gargoyles
Surely, I have to acknowledge that in labelling some of the author’s ideas as 
monstrosities, I give only my own view. However, I expect that not many 
contemporaries will contradict me on the following.
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Versfeld early on advocated a Christian 
science; his ideas are formulated in GA (ch. V) and even extended into PO 
(chapters 10 and 11). Yet, one has the impression that Versfeld himself came to 
new insights: in Rondom die Middeleeue (On the Middle Ages) he claims that the 
“mediaeval spirit” made modern science possible, without itself being that science 
(RM ch. VII). Furthermore, in The Perennial Order and Rondom die Middeleeue 
he works out a vision of the unity of faith and science – a unity he sees figured 
in the work of Mgr Kolbe (MP ch. 5). However, the idea of Christian science 
fades in his thought. That is, except in the sense of claiming at the end of his life 
that science has to be rooted in wisdom, where wisdom is equivalent to theology. 
However, in the same breath, he rejects the “dreadful efforts to theologise the 
sciences, so that we have a ‘Christian mathematics’, ‘Christian biology’ and so 
forth” (ACCG 55).
This point can help us identify and understand a number of Versfeld’s 
monstrosities, which, like gargoyles, are planted in the sacred world of the church, 
yet extend into the secular world. One finds him writing without a wink about 
angels3 (RM ch. II; GCG ch. II and III and in ACCG ch. IX on Augustine’s 
doctrine of the angels), yet it is not clear if he expects his readers to subscribe to 
their real existence.4 He can seemingly celebrate pope, emperor and divine social 
order (PO 223, 2255 – less clearly in RM 121–122), yet politically he nurtured 
not the least desire to restore theocracy. With a sharp, ironising tongue, Versfeld 
could critique contraception (MP 204–205), yet later, with equally acute wit, he 
struck out at opponents of contraception: “I have heard some Catholic objections 
to birth control which would make you picture God as someone sitting with 
a paper bag filled with little prefab souls, complaining about the shortage of 
3 Cf. Michel Serres, La légende des anges (Paris: Flammarion, 1993). On other secularising 
receptions of “angelology”, see Sybille Krämer, Medium, Messenger, Transmission. An Approach 
to Media Philosophy (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015), 87–96.
4 E.g., in Persons 71 angels are only “functions”, namely of transmitting messages; see his quite 
demythologising way of dealing with “daemons” in GCG 23ff; ACCG ch. X.
5 However, that pope and emperor stood under the law, according to mediaeval legal doctrine, 
is recalled in PO 220.
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apartments for them” (NA 2nd ed. 786). On occasion, he vehemently critiqued 
travelling (PP 41; NA 2nd ed. 36–38), and still, his own first experience of foreign 
countries was an inexhaustible intellectual and personal resource.7
This list can be extended, but it is not my intention to draw up a comprehensive 
compendium of strange ideas in Versfeld’s work. Even this short excursion suffices 
to confirm that there are reasons why some readers may, at some places, be repelled 
by his work. However, more importantly, the cited points give us a starting point 
from which to appreciate an author who continued to pursue the improvement of 
his own thought. As little as one should transfigure this author into an infallible 
version of himself, so little may one reduce the hog to his warts.
There! I have recognised the blemishes, I’m above suspicion, I can see both 
sides of the question.
2. From autobiography to enigma
factus eram ipse mihi magna questio, I became a great puzzle to myself. 
(Augustine, cited in Sum 16)
The reader who has survived the paragraph above can now take pleasure in 
meeting the man himself. For reasons that I will explain below, Versfeld frequently 
found it fit to introduce himself to his readers. This never amounted to a full 
autobiography (hence the value of the contribution of Ruth Versfeld in Chapter 
1). The closest he got to this was a presentation he gave on “Why I Became a 
Catholic”8 and an essay of intellectual autobiography, published in Sum under the 
title “Descartes and me. Truth and Things” (Sum 13–24). But the most enjoyable 
way to make the acquaintance of Martin Versfeld is to listen to his own voice.
6 “Ek het al Katolieke besware teen geboortebeperking gehoor wat jou God laat voorstel as 
iemand wat met ’n kardoes vol prefab sieltjies sit en oor die tekort aan woonstelle vir hulle 
kla.”
7 See references in next footnote.
8 The original title is “Waarom ek Katoliek geword het”. A copy is held in the Versfeld Archive at 
UCT, file 59, and lengthy citations thereof are available in W.A. de Klerk’s article “Marthinus 
Versfeld: die man en sy denke,” Tydskrif vir Letterkunde 4, (1966): 62–72.
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The opening paragraphs of his 1985 book Pots and Poetry read as follows:
Allow me to introduce myself. I am a professor of philosophy who, I am 
pleased to say, would be disowned by most schools of philosophy in the 
English-speaking world. I believe a young man once said of me that I 
wrote good essays but was no philosopher. I suppose what he meant was 
that I wrote intelligibly. I have always felt a certain affinity with Socrates, 
who was my superior also in this, that he never wrote at all. And one 
of the things I have learnt from him is that it is the ordinary which is 
extra-ordinary, that philosophy is a descent to the earth, and that “this 
is a good stew” may be a statement carrying more weight than some of 
the sentences in Hegel which I have not breath enough to quote. That is 
why Callicles could object: “You keep talking about food and drink and 
doctors and nonsense: I am not speaking of these things.” Or again: “By 
heaven, you literally never stop talking about cobblers and fullers and 
cooks and doctors, as if we were discussing them.”
I must admit that to earn my living as an academic I often battened 
on the higher unintelligibilities, but I have since endeavoured to amend 
my ways by speaking of such things as food and houses and cooks and 
builders. I am still fascinated by the problem of what I mean when I say: 
this cabbage is green; but I cannot dissociate it from the question: how 
shall I cook this cabbage?, nor from the statement: this is a good cabbage 
bredie. The eidolon of an Epicurean Socrates appears to me and says: 
Friend, what do you mean by a good stew, or, for that matter, a good 
cook? I grow more and more interested in the higher obviousnesses, 
and aspire to understand a remark of A.N. Whitehead’s, that it requires 
a great mind to take an interest in the obvious. (PP 1)
Marvellous. Perhaps, but one should not be fooled by the playful prose. Later 
in this book, we will see how Versfeld situated himself as a kind of neo-Thomist 
with a particular affection for Augustine. Although he always wrote well, one 
should not underestimate how severely he was sometimes afflicted by the 
philosophical malady of unintelligibility. And it is simple retrospective fantasy 
to claim that he contracted that illness as though in a workplace accident – he 
wrestled with hardcore philosophy with all his guts! Yet, as a description of what 
Versfeld aspired to increasingly from his midlife, this claim is not inaccurate, and 
one has to concede that he succeeded quite well in his pursuit of the virtue of 
clarity.
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At the centre of his self-presentation is the profession of the philosopher. Let 
us zoom in on this dimension of his self-understanding by listening to what he 
had to say about philosophy in his 1971 inaugural lecture “The Socratic Spirit”:
I suppose that in an inaugural lecture a man should declare himself, and 
tell his colleagues and the public how he stands towards the subject 
which he has been called upon to profess. For better or worse they 
should be given a chance of sampling their acquisition. Not that I can 
tell you anything new. I have been here a long time, and a prophet is 
honoured indeed when he is honoured in his own country. For this I 
thank you.
I must confess at once that I do not know what philosophy is. This 
sometimes embarrasses me before the innocence of students, but not 
before those who have come to realise that the things by which we live 
are the things about which we know least. We do not know what life 
is, or what knowing is, or what truth and goodness are. Or if we do 
know we can’t say, like St Augustine who confessed that he knew what 
time was until he began to think about it. Philosophy seems to be one 
of those primordial things by which we are all tinctured, of which we 
cannot get rid however hard philosophers themselves have tried, and of 
which the most varied, and at times, the most fantastic ideas have been 
entertained.
Perhaps the reason for this is that philosophy is so eminently 
concerned with itself. Physics is not primarily concerned with itself but 
with bodies, mathematics with the abstract properties of figures and 
numbers, rather than with themselves. When they got worried about 
themselves they share the embarrassment and become philosophical. 
Philosophical thought must ask itself what philosophical thought is. 
Thought about thought becomes philosophical thought. And the fact 
that the nature of thought is itself a problem suggests that the problem 
is insoluble. (Persons 1)
This view of his discipline could rightfully be claimed to reflect the outcome of 
a career in teaching and research in philosophy (he gave the inaugural address 
after more than three decades at the University of Cape Town, shortly before his 
retirement). But we have to recognise it for what it is. First, these words are not 
a rejection of philosophy, but a philosophical position – the remainder of his 
inaugural address shows this clearly. It is the fruit of many years of hard work. 
Second, this position requires continued exploration and examination, as is 
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unambiguously witnessed by the fact that he kept writing until very late in life. 
Versfeld is, as he later claims of the mystics, “talkative” (ACCG 25), because he 
wants to acquire and share wisdom.
Understanding this position requires inspection of his books. Or at least of 
Versfeld as their author. And hence we take another step back to the first chapter 
of the 1960 volume The Mirror of Philosophers, entitled, “Wherein this book 
looks at itself ”:
I happen to be a South African of bourgeois and peasant origins, with 
a fair education, a bald head, and the usual crop of financial worries, 
family felicities, political headaches, and duties obstructive to writing 
with which the human race is pretty generally acquainted. I have no 
interest in writing a book to prove that I haven’t a body, or that marriage 
is miserable, or that philosophy has nothing to do with the emotions. 
I want to present a book which is philosophical precisely in being 
somewhat autobiographical, and somewhat disjointed because I am a 
human being, interested in being, and somewhat involved in my own. 
Only thus can I hope to achieve an objective unity of presentation. I 
shall then be in the illustrious company of Plato and Kierkegaard, who 
didn’t pretend to finish what they hadn’t, and of St Thomas, who had 
the grace to say at the end of his life that the Summa looked like rubbish 
to him. Further, I can but I won’t write in the language of those who 
would like to pretend that they have never read a modern detective 
novel. After all, philosophy is partly an attempt to tear the mask from 
the criminal at our own hearts. We have to do with an inside job, a being 
indoors. Life and writing is clues and vestiges.
I am therefore going to tell you how I came to hold certain things, 
and when I said them, and this in the contingent form in which I said 
them. I shall do this by sometimes prefacing a section with an account 
of its raison d’être, not with any hope of achieving the unity of a system, 
but rather with the intention of confessing the imperfect unity of a 
life. I have something to say not because I am a noumenal ego or the 
spokesman of the Idea, but because I am a man with a name and a 
telephone number. I want to speak as a South African, because only 
thus have I anything to say of any general interest. (MP 2–3)
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We learn something quite essential from this: the autobiographical dimension 
of his work9 – the extension of which is his very recognisable style – is not a 
redundant addition or stroke of self-indulgence. It is the mark of an author who 
knows himself to be situated and knows that he has something to contribute 
to the treasure of human wisdom only insofar as he is willing to think through 
his own particularity. That this is stated upfront, in a book in which Versfeld 
confronts his own reception of the “perennial order”10 with the most important 
philosophers of his day, says a lot. It is not a celebration (or a denigration) of his 
own person, it is simply his primary orientation in the domain of speculative 
thought. Or as I will explain below, he attempted to write about the truth from 
where he was (see Chapter 5).
Now, it is essential to understand that this point of orientation is not at all an 
unmovable basis of certainty. On the contrary, in “Descartes and Me. Truth and 
Things” (Sum 13–24), the essay of intellectual autobiography of the same year 
as The Mirror of Philosophers (1960), Versfeld describes his own development as 
a departure from the Cartesian certainty of a thinking ego – his doctorate and 
first book having been An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes11 – and a turn to 
the bewildering question that he is to himself. Augustine’s words, repeatedly cited 
by Versfeld, “I became a great puzzle to myself ” (Sum 16, similarly Sum 221), 
captures this central point of orientation to an uncertainty or a not-knowing. 
By placing his own thought in this Augustinian spirit after a tradition that 
remains true to the foundational metaphysics of Descartes and his successors, 
Versfeld became a “post-modern” philosopher (Sum 20) in a sense quite different 
from Lyotard.12 As he says elsewhere: “One can’t be modern unless one isn’t” 
(MP 5).
In this line of inquiry, starting in the mystery that one is to oneself, we 
have to understand Versfeld’s interest in philosophical anthropology “as first 
9 I say “dimension” because, apart from evidently autobiographical passages like those cited, 
he relates his own experiences and activities on many pages. Klip en klei and Food for Thought 
abound in examples.
10 The metaphysical order – mysteries and all – of human, cosmic and divine existence.
11 On this subject of a critique of the Cartesian ego, see especially An Essay on the Metaphysics 
of Descartes, 165–170.
12 See also PO 205 where, speaking in 1954, Versfeld considers it “clear that the ‘modern period’ 
is drawing to a close”. (Besides, I am not sure that this typological simplification would 
convince a good scholar of Descartes.)
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philosophy”.13 This primacy of reflecting the human is echoed in a number of 
the titles of his books, notably Our Selves, Persons or Sum (I am). Connecting 
a certain kind of philosophy with the peculiarities of his own existence paved 
the way to an examination of the conflicting forces at work in each person and 
likewise in each kind of “person writ large”, such as societies and civilisations 
(PP 70): the real, mysterious, vulnerable, generous self versus its dominating, 
subjugating and grabbing deformations. But the relation between these two 
possibilities remain a puzzle, the “clues and vestiges” (as in the citation above) of 
which require painstaking examination. The self-assured claim to know the first 
self may already be a first act of collaboration with the second.
3. Genre – Or, how to do things with words
As is evident from Versfeld’s self-presentations, he considered himself a 
philosopher. Factually, he was obviously a university professor of that discipline. 
Yet, we would do well not to hastily conclude that his writings form a uniform 
block of philosophical reflection. This has to be questioned in different ways over 
the course of this section of the chapter. I start with the question of genre and 
discursive strategy.
Two of Versfeld’s books can safely be classified as non-philosophical. Die berge 
van die Boland (The Mountains of the Boland) (1947), a book on mountaineering 
in the Western Cape region, written with W.A. de Klerk, and Die buitelewe (Life 
Outdoors) (1970), which, like the first, is a practical guide on how to make the 
best of expeditions in nature. They may be non-philosophical, but they provide 
some background of Versfeld’s concern for nature, or “creation” as he would often 
prefer to say, and ecology.
Forming a bridge to his philosophical writings is Klip en klei (Stone and 
Clay) (1968) – one of his most popular books. As the table of contents reveals, 
this book contains descriptions and ruminations on house building, angling, 
carpentry and hunting – scenes from country or holiday life. But the book ends 
with a critical essay on patriotism in which many central themes of his philosophy 
13 “Philosophy ought to start with anthropology in the Continental use of the term. What 
comes first is not theory of knowledge, but the problem of the being of man [sic]” (OS 2nd 
ed. 74.). This idea has been advanced more recently by Ernst Tugendhat, “Anthropologie als 
‘erste Philosophie’,” in Anthropologie statt Metaphysik. (Munich: Beck, 2007), 34–54.
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and religious convictions are mobilised. This book also makes apparent Versfeld’s 
predilection for the form of the essay.
In fact, a close inspection of his major publications quickly reveals this. 
Versfeld’s only monograph in the strict sense is his published doctoral dissertation, 
An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes (published in 1940). He made some 
effort to consolidate the unity of his 1954 The Perennial Order. However, as one 
advances through this book the difference in argumentative approach (either 
philosophical or theological) becomes striking, and each chapter could well be 
read on its own. This is even more the case in The Mirror of Philosophers (1960), 
and thereafter Versfeld simply embraced the genre of the essay.
As we saw above, Versfeld argued in 1960 for an explicit correspondence 
of thought and form: if his thought emanates from his “disjointed” (MP 2) life, 
then his thought naturally will take on a somewhat disjointed form. But this 
self-stylisation of his reflective work, as announced in The Mirror of Philosophers, 
does not even determine the form of that same book until the last chapters, and 
in the later books even this urge to provide an apology, “in which the book looks 
at itself ”, is abandoned. In short, in the bulk of his work, Versfeld presents as an 
essayist.
Even so, one has to distinguish between different genres of his work. On 
the basis of different epistemic orientations, one can identify reflections of 
theological nature next to, and sometimes intertwined with, his philosophical 
work (more will be said about this below, §4). His philosophical work consists 
of introductions, translations, historical work (more on these later, §5) and 
independent reflections – of which some are more technical and others more 
playful.
One should not be fooled into taking instances of apparently light-hearted 
prose as merely directing his thought to a broader readership. The celebration 
of beauty in descriptive passages or in poetic exclamations, the condensation of 
connections in the form of aphoristic-like claims, his surprising connection of 
apparently disparate things, and recourse to humour comprise the fibre of his 
textual practices, of his persuasive strategies, without being reducible to either 
philosophical or theological reasoning. Thus, before writing off these texts as 
essays for mere amusement, one first has to ponder. How many ways are there of 
convincing people? Whom did he want to convince of what? And why would 
a philosopher of his erudition, as demonstrated in his more voluminous works, 
bother to write in these other ways?14
14 Cf. KK 42: “Perhaps there is some similarity between poets and philosophers, or rather, some 
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My hunch is that this writing practice was informed by a lot of hard thinking 
about the meaning of his own practice and context. This resulted in a host of finer 
persuasive strategies, which requires the critical sceptic not to read such texts only 
through the logician’s lens, but also with the analytical tools and sensitivity of 
scholars of literature. And then, on another level, many of these later essays may 
simply be read for the fun.
With this first glimpse of the textual kaleidoscope of Versfeld’s writing 
behind us, let us turn to another aspect thereof, the theological.
4. Theology: A portrait of the philosopher as an odd fish
That men ignorant in all arts, without rhetoric, logic, or grammar, plain 
fishers, should be sent by Christ into the sea of this world, only with the 
nets of faith, and draw such an innumerable multitude of fishes of all 
sorts, so much the stranger, in that they took many rare philosophers! 
(Augustine, cited in GCG 126 and KK 79)
Although the pervasiveness of Christian ideas in Versfeld’s thought would not 
appeal to all readers, one should not precipitately reach the verdict that this 
preoccupation is philosophically untoward.15 The first reason to reserve judgement 
is because a part of the society for which he wrote has been, and even today 
remains, attached to the Christian faith. Given the fact that Versfeld, insofar as he 
spoke as a Christian to that society, strove for both an informed articulation and 
a critical view of that faith, I am not sure from which position one could require 
philosophers, since some of them just want to obscure [vertroebel] language, while others want 
to make their language so clear and unambiguous that they have nothing to say, because the 
things that are worthwhile to speak about are obscure [duister].”
15 One should recall here Alain de Libera’s insight that the “Christian” Middle Ages may have 
tolled the bell for the ancient philosophical schools, but did not do so before they stuck the 
epithet “philosophy”, inherited from those schools, to Christ and to the love of God and by 
so doing paved the way for a thousand years of transmission and appropriation of ancient 
philosophy by Christian theologians. See De Libera’s inaugural address at the Collège de 
France, “Où va la philosophie médiévale? Leçon inaugurale prononcée le jeudi 13 février 2014” 
(Paris: Collège de France, 2014), https://books.openedition.org/cdf/3634, § 18 [last access 
20 May 2020]. This is not to underplay the importance of the Islamic transmission, the 
influence of which on later mediaeval Europe is consistent with both De Libera’s claim and 
Versfeld’s own religious openness.
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his rigorous abstinence from speaking his believer’s mind in philosophical texts. 
(Neither would I, contrariwise, know on which basis one could compel people of 
religious persuasion to do their coming-out in philosophical writing. But that is 
another question.) This leads directly to a second – in my view, decisive – reason, 
which is that it would be an act of violent ingratitude to discard summarily a form 
of thought that provided the light in which the author made accurate judgements 
in dark times (see the section on apartheid below, §6, and Chapter 3, §3 on forms 
of sociopolitical violence more generally).
It seems to me much more judicious to distinguish from the outset two 
possible readings of Versfeld’s work – namely, one with theological intent (which 
would include his philosophical argumentation) and one with a narrower, 
philosophical intent (in which the significance of theological ideas will have to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis). Admittedly, this distinction is a creation – a 
gargoyle? – of my own making, and I am not sure that it would have sat well with 
Versfeld. But it has the advantage of fending off the incorrect impression that 
one may enter the land of Versfeld’s thought only on a visa of faith. As true as it 
is that Versfeld (at least in his earlier work) subscribed to the oneness of human 
intelligence and could thus accommodate a happy cohabitation of philosophy 
and theology, he made it equally clear that when he philosophised, he made an 
appeal to public reason (throughout his work from GA onwards; this question is 
explicitly dealt with in MP ch. 7). In my reading, I will recognise his theological 
thought, while aiming to offer a philosophical interpretation. In this way, I leave 
it to the religiously gifted and the religiously tone-deaf16 readers to decide for 
themselves what is to be done with Versfeld’s theological voice.
If we now spread open the philosopher’s texts in front of us, we can only 
be struck by the gradual, but persistent, change of attitude with respect to faith 
reflected in them. To appreciate Versfeld’s thought, one has to be sensitive to 
the variations in his intimate convictions. Let me briefly comment the range of 
shadings. 
We know that he was brought up in a Calvinist home, but that he stopped 
practising religion during his student years (cf. De Klerk 1983, 178; Sum 14; 
Chapter 1, above). A major event was his encounter with his Glasgow supervisor, 
Archibald Bowman, whom Versfeld praises as a creative, Christian philosopher. 
In the dissertation on Descartes’s metaphysics, which Versfeld completed at 
16 This image is taken from Max Weber (his expression was “religiös unmusikalisch”). Cf. Dirk 
Kaesler, “Religiös unmusikalisch. Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Jürgen Habermas zu 
Max Weber,” literaturkritik.de 6 ( June 2009), https://literaturkritik.de/id/13142 [last access 
20 May 2020].
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that time, there is not much about religious conviction – only commentary on 
Descartes’s metaphysical God-talk. Yet, in the critical conclusion of this book, 
the appearance of names such as Thomas Aquinas and Jacques Maritain hints at 
the turn that its author was to complete on return to South Africa. Marthinus 
Versfeld became indeed an odd fish: an Afrikaans17 Catholic. There are places in 
the world where being Catholic may be the traditionalist way of least resistance. 
The least one can say is that South Africa, and in particular the Afrikaans section 
of it in the 1940s, was not one of them.
Only after An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes did Versfeld burst forth 
with the fervour of a neophyte. The result is found in the 1948 book Oor gode 
en afgode (On Gods and Idols), which will be examined in detail in Chapter 3. 
Neither here, nor in the other books into the 1960s, does Versfeld shy away 
from including apologetics in his philosophy. As far as its theological voice is 
concerned, the first book emphasises more the sociopolitical significance of the 
community of believers (e.g., its anti-imperialism, anti-discrimination). On the 
other hand, The Perennial Order (1954) and The Mirror of Philosophers (1960) 
are more bent on clarifying the metaphysical basis and character of theological 
claims.18 In this regard, his allies are not Luther, Kierkegaard or Chestov, but 
Kolbe, Newman, Chesterton and, of course, Augustine and Aquinas.
But from the 1960s, one notices a gradual easing of the tone and a growing 
porosity to other religious traditions (which, nevertheless, can be found in his 
very early texts). When, in Our Selves (1979), he hits back at “some superficial 
fools who write books on apologetics” (cf. OS 2nd ed. 248), it is not sure that his 
own earlier self can dodge that blow. And as if to inflict the coup de grâce, he later 
insists that “there are works of Catholic apologetics of the very recent past which 
claim to provide all the answers, falling very far short of the wisdom of the sage 
in Chuang-tzu (22.1) who said: ‘We come nowhere being near right, since we 
have the answers’” (ACCG 18).
The result is a serious ambiguity that hovers over every joyful statement 
of faith. And Versfeld fully realised this – for example, when he expressed in 
frustration that 
17 To be sure, the relation between Afrikaans and English in the man himself was more complex 
than this simple statement. For those readers who don’t know, the dominant religious 
orientation among Versfeld’s Afrikaans contemporaries was Calvinism of Dutch stock.
18 For the relation between faith and reason, see e.g., MP 244–247; GCG 14, republished in 
ACCG 40.
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[t]o be a Christian cannot possibly mean to conform to a type or to 
coincide with the paradigm case. And if you are asked by anybody with 
such an idea in the back of his mind, whether you are a Christian, it is 
intensely embarrassing. You may say no, not because you are Judas, but 
because you are trying not to be. (OS 2nd ed. 111) 
This ambiguity in his mind must have been picked up fairly early by others, 
because he was invited to address the “Heretics Club” of the University of Cape 
Town, an event about which he reports in The Mirror of Philosophers (MP 14 
and MP chapter 3).19
The bridge between the two extremities of his outlook seems to be the 
changing articulation of the relation between the secular (in the sense of the 
ordinary or mundane) and the miraculous. Versfeld hints at this when, quite late 
in his life, he claimed that “[t]he secular is the miraculous” (FT 89). The curious 
path by which he came to this conviction will occupy us later (cf. Chapter 10, §4). 
Looking from this pinnacle over the changing landscape of his earlier thought, 
this statement could, earlier in his career, reflect his views on a metaphysical 
aesthetics of the whole of reality; later on, this opens to an aesthetic view of 
life with a negative theological twist. The contemporary reader has to remain 
attentive to this ambiguity stuck, as it were, between secularising the sacred and 
sacralising the secular.
But even then, the last word has not been spoken, because there remains 
another climax of his self-reflexive irony: “True religion finds itself comic” 
(PP 91), he claimed with pontifical certainty. And to hammer home the point 
he confessed: 
I think I can understand why Chesterton could say that the Fall of Man 
was funny, and why I was once moved to say that the Redemption is 
excruciatingly funny. What could be more absurd than spiking God to 
a tree, or God dirtying his nappies? It is a sign of love that we find the 
loved one absurd. (PP 92)
Having given an impression of how Versfeld spoke to the theological ear, let us 
now turn to the different keys of his philosophical voice.
19 The original is in the UCT Archive, folder 134.
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5. Polyphony of philosophy: Introductions,  
liberal translations, historical work
Reports have it that Versfeld was an excellent and appreciated lecturer.20 It is true 
that his published work reflects a continuous pedagogical concern. Nothing is 
further from his intention than mystification. Most of the time, at least. His 
writings are alive with the desire to clarify debate, with respect for student and 
colleague alike, with love for the subject, with desire for truth and insight, with 
faith in human reason within its limits; all these point to the importance of 
extending philosophical discussion to new authors and presenting older ones in 
an accessible way to young philosophers.
This generous spirit animates many of his publications. Rondom die Middeleeue 
(On the Middle Ages) is an introduction to themes of mediaeval thought and 
intellectual and cultural life. Versfeld’s lifelong love for Plato is reflected in an 
introduction and translation of the Symposium21 and an introductory companion 
to the Republic.22 Later, he tried his hand at a liberal translation of Lao Tzu’s Tao 
Te Ching.23 One can hardly fail to note that the majority of Versfeld’s writings 
that were originally published in Afrikaans are of an introductory nature, and 
conversely, the majority of his translations and introductions are in Afrikaans.24 
But this is no rule, since one has to add to this list of introductory works A Guide 
to the City of God (1958),25 St Augustine’s Confessions and City of God (1990) 
20 See for instance Jane Carruthers, “Men in my (historical) life,” Historia 52, vol. 2 (2007): 
269–272, here 270–271.
21 Marthinus Versfeld, Plato. Die simposium of die drinkparty (Cape Town: Buren, 1970).
22 Marthinus Versfeld, ’n Handleiding tot die Republiek van Plato (Cape Town: Buren, 1974).
23 Marthinus Versfeld, Die lewensweg van Lao-Tse (Cape Town: Perskor, 1988). This rendering 
is quite liberal, because knowing no classical Chinese, he had to base this “translation” on 
other translations.
24 At this point, I can observe a peculiar fact. In his second overview of Afrikaans philosophy, 
the disgraced A.H. Murray has a short discussion of Versfeld’s work. See “Die Afrikaanse se 
wysgerige denke,” in Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, ed. P. de V. Pienaar (Cape Town: 
Nationale Boekhandel, [1947] 1968) 183–189, here 186. However, in Pieter Duvenage’s 
Afrikaanse filosofie (Bloemfontein: SUN Press, 2016), Versfeld is named in the orienting first 
chapter (and implied to be an Afrikaans philosopher), without substantial attention given to 
him in the rest of the book. Neither author contemplates the meaning of the use of English 
in the majority of Versfeld’s (academically, at least) most important studies.
25 This book is still cited as an authoritative reference by Christoph Horn, “Augustinus, De 
civitate Dei (ca. 413–427),” in Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Ein Handbuch, 4th edition, 
ed. Manfred Brocker (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, [2006] 2012). 
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(a curious combination of renewal and reprise of the 1958 book, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 10, §1), as well as the translation of Hulsbosch’s God’s 
Creation.26 Furthermore, Versfeld had an explicit objective to introduce Eastern 
wisdom to South African readers, while appropriating it in his own thought. 
That is why there will be a chapter devoted to this matter later in this book (cf. 
Chapter 6). Finally, stretching beyond the more philosophical texts are other 
works of initiation, namely the guides to the outdoors (mentioned above27) and 
a not-unphilosophical book on cooking, Food for Thought (1983).
As one may expect, a lot of Versfeld’s historical and introductory work 
is centred on mediaeval thinkers. He puts this scholarly interest of his into 
perspective by explaining that studying mediaeval culture in general 
is easier now than it would have been two generations ago. Recent 
scholarship has shown that the obscurity of the Dark Ages has existed 
chiefly in the minds of their detractors. It has been the better assured 
of a hearing now that it is becoming abundantly clear that the “modern 
period” is drawing to a close, so that we, increasingly detached from its 
fundamental motives, can more clearly see its nature and origins. (PO 
205) 
Whereas The Perennial Order is not presented as a study of mediaeval thought 
on which Versfeld draws, the book evidently is constructed on it (as is witnessed 
by the aforementioned A Guide to the City of God and Rondom die Middeleeue). 
As prevalent as the desire to introduce and initiate is throughout his work, one 
should again remain circumspect. Take Versfeld’s last book,28 St Augustine’s 
Confessions and City of God, again as an example: it contains as many retractions 
of the author’s previous points of view as it introduces ideas from his own later 
philosophy, for example, comparisons and borrowings from Eastern wisdom or 
remouldings of his ideas on science and theology. In short, there is at least as 
much Versfeld as Augustine in it. And what a reviewer wrote about A Guide to 
the City of God captures quite accurately what Versfeld strove for in his reception 
of Augustine and mutatis mutandis other philosophers too:
26 Ansfried Hulsbosch, God’s Creation: Creation, Sin and Redemption in an Evolving World, 
trans. Martin Versfeld (London and Melbourne: Sheed and Ward, [1963] 1965).
27 Marthinus Versfeld and W.A. de Klerk, Die berge van die Boland (Stellenbosch: Kosmo, 
[1947] 1965) and Marthinus Versfeld, Die buitelewe (Cape Town: Buren, 1970). 
28 Sum was published a year later, but is a collection of works published earlier.
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One can perhaps best characterize Mr Versfeld’s approach by contrasting 
it with that of a historian. Roughly speaking, the main difference is that 
Mr Versfeld writes as one who himself knows what Augustine is talking 
about, while the historian must write as one who knows only what 
Augustine and his contemporaries say.29
In light of his critique of modernity – that will occupy us below (cf. Chapter 3, 
§§3 and 5, Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, §2) – expositions of modern philosophers 
were essential to the thesis he was arguing.30 We have already seen that Versfeld’s 
first book, the published version of his thesis, was a work on the metaphysics 
of Descartes.31 Rousseau is taken as a major opponent in Oor gode en afgode, 
Marx32 in Beweging uitwaarts and Persons (1972). His most important book 
in this respect is The Mirror of Philosophers, which contains longer expositions 
on and debates with numerous modern and contemporary authors, including 
Comte, Darwin, Dostoyevsky, Eddington, Feuerbach, Hegel, Heidegger, Hobbes, 
Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Rousseau, Sartre and Spinoza (but 
also with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle). A surprising companion and opponent 
is Nietzsche. At least one of Versfeld’s earliest lecture series at the University of 
Cape Town was on Nietzsche,33 and it is striking how frequently Versfeld sides 
with him – perhaps contrary to what one would have expected. This is the reason 
for the chapter devoted specifically to the relation between the two philosophers 
(cf. Chapter 6).
But his work in the history of philosophy was not motivated only by polemics. 
There is a form of modernity that Versfeld did not reject; in fact, he learned it 
from Aquinas and tried to practise that lesson:
29 F. Edward Cranz, “Reviewed Work(s): A Guide to the City of God by Marthinus Versfeld,” 
Speculum 34, vol. 4 (1959): 696–697, here 697.
30 This is described in “Descartes & me. Truth and things,” Sum 13–24.
31 It is quite remarkable that Routledge republished the book three quarters of a century later: 
Marthinus Versfeld, An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes (London: Routledge, [1940] 
2016).
32 On Versfeld’s reading of Marx, see Andrew Nash, The Dialectical Tradition in South Africa 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 161–164.
33 Cf. manuscripts in UCT Archive, file 60. When working on this material, I had the impression 
that it dated from the late 1930s. Regrettably, it was not possible to pursue an inquiry into 
this matter. It is certainly from before 1951.
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Philosophy is a way of being in the present, and what impresses one 
about St Thomas is his modernity. He knew the ancients but he 
also read and assimilated all the newest stuff. The man who is like St 
Thomas, analogically speaking, is not the man who, against the saint’s 
own warning, has been bludgeoned by his authority, but your man 
who is up in Hume, and Kant, and Nietzsche and Heidegger, and who 
speaks to his contemporaries in a manner relevant to their experience. 
(MP 256–257)
Hence, Versfeld thought it was constructive to debate authors whose approaches 
or conclusions he did not share. Knowing that he would completely reject the 
work of Leon Chestov, he still presents the longest chapter of The Mirror of 
Philosophers as “a small service [of ] making [Chestov] more available” (MP 
220). Likewise, he does not hesitate to declare his proximity to phenomenology 
where relevant. But when he agreed, he also incorporated and this is true for any 
philosophy he may have studied. He had a critical mind and did not shy away 
from making fun of what he rejected in philosophy, but overall he was a generous 
and grateful reader.
6. Apartheid and other empiresque behaviour
As is the case with each of the aforementioned aspects of Versfeld’s work, one has 
to remain cautious in characterising its political side. The reader who searches 
here for a theory of democracy or of representation, an elaboration on protest 
and violence in politics, explanations of how people tend to relate to others as 
friends or foes, or a treatise on the emancipatory virtues of discursive rationality34 
will be disappointed. Versfeld once designed a book that would have been called 
Towards an Existential Political Philosophy,35 but this project was abandoned. 
However, one would miss the target by a wide margin if one concludes that we 
are dealing with a unworldly celebrator of private life.36 The same turn away 
from a bodiless cogito to a situated human (discussed above) brought Versfeld 
34 But see Versfeld’s discourse ethics, MP ch. 7.
35 The complete typescript of this book is in the UCT Archive, file 68. 
36 I am formulating just the reverse side of Andrew Nash’s legitimate description of the limits 
of Versfeld as political thinker – cf. Andrew Nash, The Dialectical Tradition in South Africa, 
163.
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thoroughly under the impression of the sociopolitical situatedness of people. The 
same authors with whose help he started to explore this fundamental fact also 
helped him to appreciate the stakes of the world in which he lived. The result is a 
philosophy in which sociopolitical concerns are discussed in numerous chapters 
and, by the way, all of the chapters of Towards an Existential Political Philosophy 
were published elsewhere.
In the following chapters, a number of elements of his social and political 
thought will be examined. Allow me to serve them in concentrated form, as an 
aperitif. Early on already Versfeld recognised the vanity of unqualified praise of 
Western modernity. His work is marked by a critique of modernity, of modern 
societies, of modern modes of relation between people and between people and 
the natural environment. It was not too difficult to find support for this critical 
view in the monstrous history of the Second World War. However, he considered 
the imperial desire to endure much longer (throughout modern history) and 
reach further; in fact, in particular as far as the southernmost tip of Africa.
Correspondingly, his work is permeated with implicit and explicit references 
to the ambient political system that was contemporaneous with nearly his whole 
writing life. Apartheid society is unambiguously diagnosed as “a racialist capitalism 
exacerbated by our industrial and technological revolution, which justifies itself 
by a scriptural literalism” (Persons 11). Yet, Versfeld was not a writer of anti-
apartheid tracts, and he never drafted a systematic exploration of the constitutive 
and factual violence of this system. His critique of the apartheid state is intricately 
enmeshed with other elements of social critique and his aforementioned broad 
critical view of Western civilisation. This is the reason why his opposition to 
apartheid appears in many guises. Often, it is mentioned almost in passing. 
Elsewhere, as in the early Oor gode en afgode, his critique is more to the point (cf. 
Chapter 3, §3). Sometimes it is the overall “logic” of racial discrimination that is 
exposed, but sometimes he ironises about the details of apartheid legislation. Let 
me illustrate this variety of critical approach with two examples.
In an essay on “Our Rapist Society”, his irony takes aim at the racial separation 
of residential areas and forced removals. The trigger is the evacuation of District 
Six37 in Cape Town, but we see how it is linked to a broader social critique:
37 A mixed residential area from which inhabitants were forcefully removed during the later 
1960s to the early 1980s.
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Our big-money economy has been a waste economy, resting on the 
rape of nature. You cannot waste nature without wasting man, and 
you cannot rape nature without raping man. That should be the basic 
consideration of the conservationist.
Perhaps this is the point at which I should advert to the rape of 
District Six, part of which is to be devoted to a technikon,38 so necessary 
to the maintenance of the rapist society. District Six is divided from the 
Foreshore39 by a road curiously called a freeway. One wonders on which 
side freedom lies. Like many other lovers of Cape Town I feel strongly 
about the Foreshore development. In fact it has come to look to me like 
the creation of the non-city, the scene of our cannibal revels. […] Well, 
death is already creeping upon the Foreshore by the shifting of home-
life elsewhere. The shops have lost customers because the latter have 
been apartewoonbuurted40 elsewhere. The well-padded mausoleum 
of the Nico Malan41 has, by the freeway, been separated from one of 
Cape Town’s main centres of humanity, humour and drama: District 
Six. People were living there, and death couldn’t bear the sight of it. 
(PP 34–35)
This text is rather typical of the associative form of thinking found in many of 
the later texts. But one could find a systematically argued justification of the 
principles on the basis of which he rejected apartheid, such as in his paper “On 
Justice and Human Rights” of 1960. His plea concludes as follows:
If these rights belong to every man whatever his race and colour and by 
virtue solely of his being made for the truth, their preservation is the due 
of every man to every man. This prescribes that the means employed 
may not include trickery, outrage, lies or robbery. Justice is colour-
blind, and requires for its realisation that we should see, beyond the 
contingencies of biology and history the image of truth in every man, 
which often in spite of himself is striving for expression in a common 
world. These contingencies are relevant as the material in which justice 
must be realised. But one could make no greater mistake than to mistake 
38 Cape Technikon, later renamed Cape Peninsula University of Technology.
39 A part of Cape Town developed on land claimed by pushing back the natural shoreline.
40 A verbal neologism from “aparte woonbuurte” – i.e., racially separated residential areas. 
41 The Nico Malan Theatre Centre (renamed the Artscape Theatre Centre) was opened in the 
1970s as the seat of the Cape Performing Arts Board and premier performing arts centre in 
the region.
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the matter for the form, that is, to give justice a racial expression instead 
of giving race a just expression. This applies impartially to black, white, 
and yellow since as justice is man’s universal due, the doom of injustice 
done also works impartially upon all. What we have to do with is a 
law of human nature which extends to its metaphysical roots. It is a 
prescription to human wills before it is a prescription by them, and as 
such is as unalterable as the law of gravity.42
More about this will be said later in the book (cf. especially Chapter 3, §3 and 
Chapter 10, §§2, 5 and 7). The same intellectual tools that help him to dissect 
apartheid also serve to examine other social pathologies: interpersonal violence, 
exploitation, discrimination and environmental destruction.
7. A note on celebration
Yet, Versfeld’s view is limited neither to critique nor to an articulation of despair. 
We find a major line of his thought that is devoted to celebrating that which 
is threatened. Hence, the pervasive tension that is characteristic of his work: 
the tension between joy and disquiet, to which I refer in the Preface. We find a 
celebration of individual singularity coupled with the critique of political injustice, 
a lauding of nature as the flip side of his critique of ecological destruction, a call 
to creative action in the service of others amid a view of social decay (on decay, 
see Chapter 7, §2; on celebration, see Chapter 10, §§4 and 6).
8. On its most intimate lesson
Provided one takes the term “negative” in the sense it has in “negative theology”, 
it would be accurate to claim that there is a strong current of the negative running 
through his work. For despite his concerted efforts to obtain insight and despite 
being quite “talkative” in his writing, there remains something thoroughly true 
to the Socratic spirit.
42 Cf. Versfeld, “On justice and human rights,” Acta juridica 1 (1960): 1–10, here 10.
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This “something” we may call a negative anthropology, in the sense that 
the central question of understanding ourselves starts with, and reverts to, an 
unfathomable mystery.
Likewise, there is something negative in his theological voice, as can be heard 
in the following train of thought: 
St Thomas could rise to saying that his writings looked to him like 
stable litter. I know of no Papal pronouncements declaring them to be 
stable litter. On the contrary, they come to be imposed as the correct 
word game. Thus we get Thomists and Augustinians and Advaitins, and 
– God help us! – Christians. (ACCG 26)43
There is something “negative” about his celebration of life, as one can read in a 
moving passage of his last years:
I spent this morning tidying. “Mucking out” would be more appropriate. 
My old study is just like my head: disordered and too much filled with 
the past although a stack of present-day paper floods me with the daily 
mail. […] New books? They float past like leaves on a dam, pushed by 
the Northwind in autumn. Accounts and requests – O Lord!
So well, muck out! Pull the wastepaper basket closer and stuff 
paper recklessly in it and just beware of the devils who stand ready to 
move into the clean house. A human being’s normal conscience is like 
a river in which all kinds of things wash past: petals, rags, banana peels 
and the trembling reflections of the birds and the willows. It is one’s 
own fleetingness and one has to learn to distance yourself from it and 
to deepen yourself in something below it.
It occurs to me that I am moving on in years. The day will come 
when I will have to leave everything and step out of the room of the 
world. One has to leave a few things now, just for exercise. To untie 
yourself from things is a good old advice. Otherwise they depart on 
their own, and that is what hurts. If you throw away the Bible too in 
43 And this is not only a trick of his last days. Elsewhere, he referred to Aquinas, who “said of his 
greatest work: Mihi videtur ut palea. He said this after he was illuminated by mystic insight 
and it is usually translated as: this looks to me like chaff. What did he mean by chaff ? Palea 
would be called Mist in German, that means the straw that is placed in a stable to make it 
easier to remove everything again. There is a German expression: Du redest Mist, which refers 
to this kind of straw and it is this kind of straw that a Mediaeval monk would have had in 
mind. We have to return to the stable where the Word was born” (KK 26).
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the basket, it may be the proof that you have learned its most intimate 
lesson. If you arrive at the gates of heaven with the Bible clutched in 
both hands, you may perhaps not be able to ring the bell. One can touch 
the new life only with open hands. (NA 2nd ed. 29–30)
Finally, there is something “negative” in his own writing, of which the increasingly 
playful prose is no accidental expression. Indeed, he would drive a playful irony 
against himself in an un-Augustinian kind of confession: “I have fought a long 
duel with seriousness. That is why there is no need to take me seriously” (PP 90).
9. Conclusion
In this chapter, I hope to have illustrated the complexity of the work of Martin 
Versfeld – diverse in its foundations and discursive practice, driven by an eagerness 
to learn and advance and by a generous impulse to share. How his difficult 
combination of joy and disquiet found philosophical expression in the dark times 








PRACTICAL REASON IN A T IME 
OF POLIT ICAL MADNESS
This chapter is an interpretation of Versfeld’s early book, Oor gode en afgode 
(On Gods and Idols) (1948). The aim of the chapter is to reconstruct the most 
important arguments of the five separate essays in the book and to explain the 
relations between them. The golden thread of philosophy of practice and political 
philosophy is highlighted and exposed together with the central notion of the 
“practical reason” (prudence, or prudentia). I will explain how the notion of 
“incarnation” subtends prudence and how the entire complex, through the 
formation of “self-knowledge”, contributes to the orientation of a person in the 
world. For the young Versfeld, this orientation stands in tension between the 
decay of Western civilisation and the urgency to respond to it with a radical 
ethics. The content of Oor gode en afgode is further interpreted by situating it 
within the broader development of Versfeld’s work, by clarifying it with the 
(mostly) unpublished material from the Versfeld archive, and by commenting 
on some aspects of the existing history of the interpretation and reception of 
the book. Although the main aim of the chapter is to clarify the content, in 
conclusion a number of lines of questioning for further critical reading of the 
book are suggested.
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1. Introduction: Self-knowledge in a period of  
political madness
Oor gode en afgode is a book of dramatic intensity. The entire text is characterised 
by the tension between the decay of a particular form of cultural and political life 
and the urgent necessity of taking a decision regarding a new orientation to life:
The urgency of our times and all-encompassing effect of current events 
on each one of us forces us to make a personal choice. Which kind of 
behaviour has more value: to destroy or to be destroyed? To regard your 
neighbour first and foremost as a fellow human being, or as an enemy? 
To suppress your intelligence and humaneness for the sake of victory, or 
not? You cannot avoid the choice. (GA 99–100, also 71, 103)
This discussion of destruction, neighbours and enemies, and humaneness in 
jeopardy must immediately be heard with the morbid resonance given to it by 
the political catastrophes of the twentieth century. If the author presents these 
events to encourage intense, renewed reflection on life and a resolute decision 
to orient one’s life in a different direction, it is because he himself had already 
made this choice.
Versfeld, who had lost his sympathy with the church during his student years, 
developed a renewed interest in the Christian faith during his doctoral studies in 
Glasgow (until 1934) and during his first few years as a lecturer in philosophy at 
the University of Cape Town (from 1935). Anyone who reads Oor gode en afgode 
will be in no doubt that, given the exceptional historical events that humankind 
experienced during the twentieth century, the appropriate life choice, according 
to Versfeld, would be in favour of the Christian faith, and more specifically its 
Catholic variety. However, it should be equally clear to the reader that Versfeld’s 
passionate criticism of culture and politics should not be seen as concerned with 
simplistic moral lessons; he takes issue with his era on a much more radical level. 
In a letter addressed to a certain Revd Conradie ten years before the publication 
of Oor gode en afgode, Versfeld wrote:
It is quite terrifying that so much is said in Synod about mixed 
bathing, girls who smoke, the virtues and vices of the bioscope, and 
other more or less unimportant issues; but nothing is said about the 
fundamental philosophical concepts that are supposed to play a role 
in the development of our civilisation. The real dangers threatening 
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the Church go unnoticed. There is a painful lack of theological 
competence.1
This fiery statement not only makes it possible for us, with regard to the idols 
mentioned in the title of the book, to immediately eliminate some of the “usual 
suspects”, but also provides a clear indication of the register that Versfeld hopes 
to find in his book. The most stubborn problems have to be addressed at the 
most fundamental level – the level referred to in his letter as “the fundamental 
philosophical concepts that are supposed to play a role in the development of our 
civilisation”. This concept-directed – or philosophical – approach is important 
because of a prevailing misplaced belief in a narrow segment of rationality that 
forms an integral part of the crisis. During a radio discussion on “War against 
superstition”, which was broadcast on 18 March 1945, Versfeld explained:
Blinded by the conviction that if we are “in favour of science” 
[wetenskaplikgesind], we are protected against the suspicion that there 
may be something basically wrong with our Western way of life. But the 
evils that had led to the two world wars and the atrocities committed 
during those wars cannot be regarded as the temporary sickness of a 
healthy body. How do we see the burning of witches compared to the 
lethal gassing of the Jews, or the auto-da-fé, compared to the liquidation 
of political opponents? The Socratic appeal to “know yourself ” is once 
again accepted as valid and we ask ourselves whether we are not perhaps 
subject to an even greater extent than our fathers by misconceptions 
and superstitions. Is this period of development not perhaps a period 
of spiritual darkness? And is the war against superstition not perhaps a 
war against many of our most favourite convictions?2
Socrates’s appeal, “Know yourself !”, is the urgent appeal that Versfeld hears from 
the confusing times in which he writes. To know yourself, you have to know your 
era; you have to be aware of the convictions that you hold, which may have been 
handed down to you; you have to know which mental abilities you will use to 
1 The letter, dated 30 August 1938, is kept in the Versfeld Collection in the Archive of the 
University of Cape Town Library (to which further references will be made as follows: UCT 
Archive, file 102, quotation from p. 11 of the letter). It is clear that at the time when he wrote 
this letter, Versfeld was already far removed from the Dutch Reformed Church in which he 
had grown up, but he had not yet joined the Catholic Church. He would eventually do this 
in 1943.
2 UCT Archive, file 107, quotation, p. 3.
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respond to the Socratic appeal to improve your insight into yourself; you have to 
know the reasons for your personal decisions.
But what is the connection between this urgent appeal and “gods and idols”? 
2. “Gods” and “idols”
Oor gode en afgode is a collection of five essays that were not originally preceded 
by an introduction. Nowhere does the author give us a clear idea of what the 
general theme or purpose is; rather, he wastes no time before he starts working. 
The confusing title is the only hint that the reader is given regarding the content.3 
I refer to the title as confusing, because the plural “gods” [gode] is often regarded as 
synonymous with “idols” [afgode]. What would we expect to find in a book titled 
On Dogs and Hounds? What is the meaning of the “and” in On Gods and Idols 
[Oor gode en afgode]? The reader will also notice that Versfeld postponed as long 
as possible explaining what he means with idols. Furthermore, if it is so important 
to talk about idols that they are mentioned twice in the title, it is strange that the 
first mention of a deity in the book is the reference to a God written resolutely 
with a capital letter and who exists only in the singular (GA 3). To complicate 
matters even further, in particular for those among our contemporaries for whom 
it has become difficult to count as far as this One, Versfeld still reminds his readers 
in the first chapter that, according to Augustine, “[w]hen you start counting the 
Trinity, you depart from the truth […]. In a certain sense, it is not supposed to 
be reasonable [redelik4]” (GA 31). That it counts as reasonable whether a person 
utters the big three-letter word or not will be discussed later, but we cannot simply 
assume that all readers will have sympathy for the eradication of idols.
3 In the foreword to a collection of essays titled A Saraband of the Sons of God (compiled in circa 
1971), which was, however, never published in that format, Versfeld wrote: “I have always 
regarded the title of books as crucial. I have friends who write books and then struggle to 
find a title, but with me things work the other way round. I become enamoured of a title, and 
have no rest until I have constructed the book that belongs. This implies that the title has the 
validity of an image, and this immediately brings me into trouble with my fellow philosophers 
because they do not see the relevance of imagination to intellect” (UCT Archive, file 155). If 
this remark may be applied to Oor gode en afgode, from twenty years earlier, it might explain 
the obscure nature of the title.
4 Probably “rational” is intended, because the term “reasonable” is reserved for a specific service 
– see discussion below.
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In the case of gods and idols, we have a different situation: Versfeld is not only 
able to count them – there is a whole list of them throughout his book – but they 
lend themselves to normal, rational investigation. So important are these gods 
and idols and their whereabouts in Versfeld’s assessment, that the title states that 
the book is about them.
One might well ask why Versfeld would choose the title Oor gode en afgode 
for a book that deals with something totally different – namely, the urgency 
of choosing a suitable way of life. Perhaps it was because it is only when we 
confront our idols that we become most aware of the urgency of the choice that 
needs to be made. This surmise becomes credible when we consider the fact 
that Versfeld’s idols are not “mixed bathing”, “girls who smoke”, “the virtues and 
vices of the bioscope” or “other more or less unimportant issues” highlighted 
by a bigoted puritan cultural conservatism, but the glorification of one’s own 
over-refined emotions5 in politics (GA 54), certain states (GA 59), in particular 
the militarised nation state (GA 162), certain views on community (GA 78), 
the disproportionate desire for and love of certain things (GA 152ff.), and 
capitalism and the hoarding of money through the exploitation of others (GA 
159). It should be noted that all Versfeld’s idols are either political offences, or 
the supporting of social infringements. By giving his book the title On Gods 
and Idols, Versfeld agrees with Van Ockham: “[O]nly the first commandment is 
absolute; the others are occasional rules” (GA 55). All the other ethical principles 
are dwarfed or reduced to occasional rules by the command: “You shall not serve 
any of these socio-political gods before Me!” 
5 This claim is not clear. Versfeld’s depiction of emotions in Oor gode en afgode is undeniably 
negative; however, it appears as if this negativity was motivated by his political concerns. An 
illustration of what he might have had in mind can be found in the letter he wrote to the 
editor of Die Spantou in August 1940, in which he expresses his disapproval of the Afrikaners’ 
“self-adoration” and “self-pity”, which he describes as idolatry (Letter in UCT Archive, file 
19).
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3. War, exploitation, racism. Critique of social and  
political violence
Although Versfeld, inspired by Augustine and Toynbee, views gods and idols 
together with holiness and sin as “fundamental historical concepts” (GA 150),6 
it is clear that, when referring to them, he has specific historical phenomena 
(rather than vague, moralising speculation) in mind. If one considers the era in 
world history during which this book was written (a period of approximately 
ten years prior to 1948), our initial impression of idols as a dull, world-foreign, 
fanatical term fades and we find ourselves in the midst of dramatic events on 
the international and national scenes that demand radical decisions about our 
attitude towards life.
Three aspects of this historical-political context of “the current political 
madness” (GA 64) deserve to be highlighted as excellent illustrations of the 
accuracy of Versfeld’s critical insight.
1.  On the reverse side of Versfeld’s pronounced pacifism during World War II, 
we have the theme of war, which occurs throughout Oor gode en afgode. He had 
no illusions about the extensive and radical nature of war:
Today a war can only be waged “successfully” by encouraging a 
totalitarian mental state of mind. This requires the abolition of 
democratic institutions, the censoring of news, the suspension of 
rational objectivity, free discussion of conscientious objections, the 
conscription of lives and properties, the increase in violence and fraud; 
6 In his unpublished autobiographical text, Versfeld states that “[i]n philosophy I have a 
preference for Plato, Augustine and Thomas [Aquinas], but for Augustine in particular. Our 
generation is saddled with the problems of time and history, and what Augustine taught me 
was the Christian interpretation of history and the role of the Church in the unfolding of 
time. These problems were greatly exacerbated by the war” (“Waarom ek Katoliek geword 
het …” [“Why I Became a Catholic …”], UCT Archive, file 59, p. 8). The exact date of this 
text is unknown. Parts of the text can be read in De Klerk, “Marthinus Versfeld: die man en sy 
denke”. Following the death of Toynbee, whose thinking is described as neo-Augustinian (GA 
134), Versfeld wrote a newspaper article about him, which included an important comment: 
“As mentioned many years ago in my booklet Oor gode en afgode, Toynbee should be counted 
among those who reacted to three centuries of Cartesian rationalism” (“Toynbee het gesoek 
na die betekenis van die geskiedenis” [“Toynbee searched for the meaning of history”], Die 
Burger, 27 October 1975, in UCT Archive, file 195. This is an implicit reference to GA 134).
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in short, the heyday of exactly those attitudes that have the most 
destructive effect in a civilisation. To suggest that a war could be waged 
for the sake of civilisation is therefore contradictory. All wars diminish 
civilisation [onbeskawend]. Brutality can only be overthrown by acting 
in a way that shows the way to another world. (GA 102)
War is therefore more than an armed conflict between countries – the Second 
World War was a war waged inside different countries between a small and weak 
moral minority and the power of states that had replaced the conscience and the 
place occupied by God (GA 100). However, war is in fact only the explosion of 
the powers that are, under normal circumstances, boiling in the modern nation 
state. The direct relationship between the “national, centralised, all-powerful 
state” and “the atomic, independent individual” results in “a tendency to absorb 
the individua into the body of the state, which leads to the development of that 
strange modern beast, the conscripted, regimented person who joins the masses 
in their battle cry demanding freedom and self-expression.”7 Whence the urgency 
of a decision in favour of a way of life that can counteract this continuation of 
war by using different, non-violent means.
2.  The urgency of the need to take such a decision features prominently in an 
equally central theme in Oor gode en afgode, namely Versfeld’s concern about 
exploitation. His point of departure is that exploitation is the result of the fact that 
the accumulation of wealth has been made the highest good of a society (GA 73), 
and that this political fact has taken on the scope of a global imperialism (GA 71). 
Versfeld agrees with Plato when he points out that if the accumulation of material 
wealth is indeed the highest aspiration, all other things become subordinate to 
that aspiration. This necessarily means that the spiritual becomes subjected to 
the material, which results in some people being exploited by others. There are 
two forms of exploitation:
First, the labour of some is exploited by others. They are treated like 
tools and their happiness, health, family relationships, etc. are either 
ignored, or treated with selfish premeditation. Second, their value 
as consumers is exploited. Consumers are encouraged to use those 
products that will ensure the maximum profit for their producers 
without giving any consideration to whether they will derive any real 
7 Quotations from pp. 1–3 of Versfeld’s radio presentation titled “Die mens as sosiale wese” 
(“The Human Being as a Social Being”) of 12 March 1944 (UCT Archive, file 107).
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benefit from what they consume. The result is that the value of human 
life is generally diminished, which then leads to the recklessness which 
manifests itself in subsequent wars. (GA 73–4)
Thus the imperialist capture of nature with a view to its commercialisation 
gradually leads to the “exploitation of human nature, to man’s alienation from 
himself, his denaturalisation in his own environment” (GA 129, also 88). In other 
words, it leads to the imperial conquest of the human being. For this reason, one 
cannot expect any modernist optimism about progress from Versfeld.
3.  The exploitation and conquest of people, however, follow patterns according 
to which certain groups are largely on the receiving end. It is in this regard that 
we hear Versfeld speaking about racism in 1948:
The whites accelerated their own exploitation through their exploitation 
of other races. Their ingenuity in the use of transport and explosives 
placed them in a position to use non-whites8 as means for their own 
purposes. (GA 129)
According to Versfeld, this state of affairs can be explained by the narrowed 
understanding of human nature and the fatal linking of a race or nation to an 
inescapable destiny (GA 94); the temporarily contingent is elevated to become 
the decisive. In South Africa, however, racism is practised incoherently, as Versfeld 
asserted in a letter to the editor of Die Burger in 1939:
To the lack of originality that forces us to imitate [na te aap] the 
German example to solve racial problems, we have to add the blindness 
that prevents us from seeing, with German clarity, that the oppression 
of the church is a logical accessory.9
In other words, those who purposefully maintain a consistent racist understanding 
of humankind and racist politics must necessarily view the Christian doctrine, 
according to which all people have intrinsic value, as a repulsive obstacle.
8 At the time of writing, the term “non-white” still served as an alternative to racist phraseology.
9 Die Burger, 13 January 1939 (quoted from the text in the UCT Archive, file 102, p. 2). This 
claim did not simply fall from the sky. A report titled “Germany – New Holy Land. ‘ABC of 
the Heathen’ Published”, which appeared in the Cape Times on 11 February 1935, a cutting 
of which is preserved in the Versfeld archive (UCT Archive, file 195), relates the rise of an 
official Germanising paganism and the supersession of the Christian religion in Germany.
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A decade later, during the first year of the National Party’s “Christian 
National” rule, Versfeld insisted on the unavoidable tension, the “most radical 
difference” between nationalistic and Christian ethics. The latter is guided by 
a belief in the true unity of humankind: human beings have a common 
origin and a common purpose in God and may therefore not act in a 
way that suggests that they were not all created in His image. Therefore 
discrimination based on race, unilateral patriotism, participation in 
unjust wars, exploitation, etc. are sinful. (GA 97–8)10
While some readers of Oor gode en afgode might not like the terms idols and 
sin, the actuality – then and now – of what Versfeld touches upon here cannot 
be denied. Someone who does not believe that these three themes deserve our 
attention obviously does not have to read this book.
4. Urgency, time and incarnation
However, anyone who feels touched by the urgent appeal to address these types of 
violence (and others discussed in Oor gode en afgode) might want to reread what 
Versfeld says about idols. The reason for this can be found in both the theme of 
unjust subjection to violence (i.e., the three examples of “idols” discussed above) 
and the experience of a feeling of urgency. Realising the urgency of worrying 
questions is to be aware of the continuation of injustice and of the necessity to 
cling desperately to the existence of something valuable that is being threatened; 
it is being aware of the passing and loss of time; in short, it is taking time seriously. 
If one can accept this, and if the historical-political use of the term idols is borne 
in mind, it is easy to concede that “[i]dolatry is indeed an abuse of time, if 
we understand ‘time’ to refer to the succession of beings [skepsels]” (GA 150). 
Positively stated, this could read: “A person’s duty during this existence is not to 
escape from time, but to develop a strong awareness of the urgency thereof – and 
never to misuse any of it” (GA 149).
10 In the letter addressed to Revd Conradie (1938), quoted in the introduction (above), Versfeld 
states his main objection to the Dutch Reformed Church: “I refer in particular to the church’s 
attitude towards non-whites: the maintaining of the colour barrier, the repeated allegation 
that discrimination on the basis of colour is based on the will of God” (p. 2). Versfeld once 
again addresses this issue in GA 95 by explicitly taking a stance against this attitude.
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It is, however, impossible to cultivate an awareness of the urgency of time 
as the succession of beings without taking a positive stance with regard to the 
material world (GA 145). According to Versfeld, idolatry is not the love and 
pursuit of people and things, but the love and pursuit of people and things with 
a degree of determination that is out of proportion with their actual value (GA 
150). It is our love of and pursuit of people and things, in the right or wrong 
proportion, that form our character and shape our life stories. Ultimately, the 
things we love and the pursuit thereof structure all our relationships – the 
relationships between us and various things, and between us and other people 
and our institutionalised existence within societies (GA 151). The quality of 
the relationships that we establish with objects, other people and institutions 
determine our well-being, and Versfeld confirms that “for human beings the 
most important thing, in fact the only important thing, is their wellbeing” 
(GA 150).
In my opinion, this reference to the importance of people’s well-being is 
of utmost significance in our assessment of Versfeld’s claims regarding how we 
should live. In fact, I consider it to be even more important than his self-imposed 
comprehensibility criterion for the success of his argument, which consists of 
“making the content of our experience more easily understandable than could be 
achieved by the interpretation of any other point of view, and then to give our 
knowledge a broader context and deeper content” (GA 144). Versfeld’s first aim, 
the criterion against which he wants to be measured, is not dogmatic faithfulness 
(although this is evidently important to him; see, for example, GA 69), but human 
well-being. In other words, his criterion is the success with which one can discuss 
the urgency of humanity and of human dealings with other humans and things 
throughout history. The acknowledgement of the value of human life is therefore 
as important as the correctness of his claims regarding – and in the name of – the 
Christian faith, and it would be futile to talk about human well-being if this does 
not include the well-being of all of humankind. This leads to a concern about 
the complete human being and all the dimensions of being human, including all 
aspects from the spiritual to the bodily life.
For Versfeld, the two criteria that he presents for the success of his work 
– one spiritual-theological (the comprehensibility criterion) and the other 
anthropological (the well-being criterion) – are as inseparable as the spiritual 
and corporeal aspects of human existence, which in turn are as inseparable 
from each other as the spiritual and physical aspects of the sacraments 
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(GA 148).11 This inseparability therefore has both a theological and an 
anthropological tendency – in both cases it can be called “incarnation” or 
“embodiment” (inkarnasie or vleeswording).
For Versfeld, incarnation is perhaps the most comprehensive test for the 
acceptability of thought. “In a philosophical sense the Incarnation means that, 
among other things, time is real, our bodies are a means for human wellbeing and 
our temporary conduct has eternal meaning” (GA 147). In other words, in the 
absence of respect for incarnation, (a) the reality of time is compromised; and/or 
(b) people’s corporeality, and therefore also their well-being, is disregarded; and 
(c) a disjunction develops between temporal conduct and its eternal significance.12 
This brief citation has brought us to a series of Versfeld’s core themes in Oor gode 
en afgode, as well as in all his later works: (a) time and the need for virtuous 
conduct; (b) human incarnation as the key to non-reductionist anthropology; 
and (c) the tight link between the temporal and the eternal. However, these three 
themes are so closely intertwined that they are in fact only different perspectives 
on the same issue. This issue is called embodiment, incarnation or unity.
We will now focus on the issue of unity and deterioration in §5 of this 
chapter, before shifting our focus to the three core themes in §6.
11 I refer to the issue of the sacraments already here, not only because it is mentioned in the text 
of Oor gode en afgode, but because it clearly indicates the crucial influence exerted on Versfeld 
by Archibald Bowman, his promoter during his doctoral studies. Here I would like to remind 
the reader that during the last year in which he acted as Versfeld’s promoter (1934), Bowman 
delivered his Vanuxem Lectures at Princeton and immediately afterwards, until the time of 
his death in 1935, was occupied with rewriting these lectures in book form. The lectures are 
titled A Sacramental Universe, and a fragment of the last lecture clearly shows that, under this 
title, he also reflected on the theme of human and divine incarnation. Those who are able to 
obtain a copy of Charles Hendel’s introduction to Bowman’s The Absurdity of Christianity 
and Other Essays (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1958) will find that it provides a useful 
introduction to Bowman’s work. The last essay in this collection is the one to which I have 
just referred.
12 War, exploitation and racism are among the consequences of such a disjunction. However, 
it is important to note that this disjunction is a phenomenon that is often seen in modern 
Western cultural development. In a manuscript titled “Rationalism and Politics”, which to 
my knowledge was never published and was most probably written during the early part of 
World War II (UCT Archive, file 18), Versfeld points out this broader disjunction between 
the rational and moral development of the West and refers to the development of the ability 
to carry out air raids.
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5. Unity and decay
It might not be immediately evident that the issue of unity is the common 
factor in the three themes elaborated above: urgency, time and incarnation. The 
term unity elucidates the synonyms incarnation and embodiment by revealing 
the full scope of these terms. When Versfeld expresses the opinion that “the 
concept of unity is at the centre of the Christian consciousness” (GA 40, and 
cf. later PO 205), he does not only have in mind a specific representation of 
the Christian consciousness during the late Middle Ages, but also accepts the 
concept of unity as the measure that will direct his philosophical thinking 
in general. The unity with which he is concerned here corresponds with the 
three themes mentioned above: anthropological (body – soul, individual – 
humankind); practical (abstract rationality – practical reasonableness, personal 
existence – institutional existence); and metaphysical (temporal – eternal, secular 
– religious) (see, for example, GA 40). Furthermore, the anthropological, the 
practical and the metaphysical aspects of unity are linked by their reciprocal 
implications. 
The decline, disintegration or decay that forms the dramatic background 
to the urgent appeal for a new orientation to life in Oor gode en afgode can be 
understood only with the aid of this representation of the Middle Ages:
The decline of the Middle Ages was the disintegration of the concept 
of unity and the beginning of a multifaceted process of fragmentation: 
the dissolution of Christendom into nation states; the irreconcilable 
clash between the religious and the secular orders; the fragmentation 
within the Church, which was brought about by Protestantism, an anti-
institutional religious movement. (GA 40)
This decline is also evident to Versfeld in the breach between the individual 
and the community, the idea of an original conflict between individuals (GA 
53ff.) and between states (GA 87), the dissolution of human unity to become 
an irreconcilable body and soul, the loss of co-ordination between reason and 
emotion (GA 41), the separation of fact and value (GA 133ff.), the breaking up 
of the human knowledge enterprise into separate and divided sciences (GA 137) 
and so forth. The explanation of how and why this disintegration had to have 
violent consequences is one of the major golden threads in Oor gode en afgode, as I 
have already mentioned. Despite the historical manifestations of the catastrophes 
caused by this disintegration, the failure is also evident in certain “symptoms 
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of decay” (verrottingsimptome) (GA 39) – which is how Versfeld refers to the 
philosophers of the post-mediaeval period.
No body of ideas is more suitable to make an effective diagnosis of the 
modern era than that of Descartes. Versfeld’s study of this “father of modernity” 
earned him a doctorate in philosophy and also provided the material for his first 
book, titled An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes (1940). Throughout his work, 
Versfeld sets himself up as Descartes’s doctor; on the very first page of his later 
book Die neukery met die appelboom (The Trouble with the Apple Tree) (1985), we 
can still read: “Descartes’s world is a disintegration of multiple substances. Things 
fall apart. The Unity, not only of the Church, has fallen apart and we would use 
the fragments to build a new world” (NA 2nd ed. 19).13 To a large extent, it is with 
Descartes’s help that Versfeld seeks access to the philosophical development of the 
modern era. This can clearly be seen in Oor gode en afgode when, in his chapter on 
Rousseau, Versfeld makes sure to point out that Rousseau’s intellectual genealogy 
can be traced back to Descartes (GA 39). Hobbes, Luther, Spinoza, Hume and 
Kant are in one way or another connected with this contamination.14 It is no 
secret that in making this diagnosis Versfeld had been influenced by the neo-
Thomist Jacques Maritain: “Maritain too had found it necessary to reckon with 
Descartes in order to reckon with modern philosophy and I don’t expect I shall 
forget the force with which his Three Reformers burst upon me, nor the influence 
of his Dream of Descartes” (Sum 20). The three reformers referred to by Maritain 
were none other than Luther, Descartes and Rousseau.
Once the reader has studied the details of Versfeld’s diagnosis of the 
philosophical “symptoms of decay” and the corresponding cultural-political 
catastrophes, it will become clear why he considered it appropriate to include the 
following appeal on the last page of his book: “In this disorderly world, in which 
it has become clear that our national idols have feet of clay, the re-assessment 
of our past becomes unavoidable” (GA 164). The first period of the past that, 
according to him, needs to be reassessed, is the Middle Ages. However, this does 
13 Versfeld had good reason for choosing the title “Descartes and Me” for his 1960 
autobiographical essay – see Sum 13–24.
14 It is interesting to note that although Versfeld refers to Nietzsche more than ten times, the 
purpose is seldom to associate him with the trend of decay – more often, Versfeld expresses 
support for Nietzsche’s analysis of culture. It is also illuminating to note that whereas Versfeld 
remarked that “[i]n his statement of the facts Nietzsche was correct” (GA 133), six years later, 
in The Perennial Order, in the translation of the text from which this quote was taken, Versfeld 
states, more precisely: “As a diagnostician Nietzsche is superb. But it has been left to others 
to endeavour to overcome, in a positive way, the evils that he has laid bare” (PO 144). Paul 
van Tongeren explores the relation between Versfeld and Nietzsche further in Chapter 4.
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not imply a return to the Middles Ages, which would be neither desirable nor 
possible. What Versfeld means – as he states more explicitly in the foreword to 
Rondom die Middeleeue (On the Middle Ages) (1962) – is that the Middle Ages 
was not only an era in history, but a “spiritual moment” and an important part 
of the tradition out of which we live. Therefore, knowledge of and a reassessment 
of that era is “something […] that is essential to our self-knowledge” (RM page 
not numbered; this point will be examined further below, §7 and in Chapter 10, 
§7). Having been successfully reminded of the catastrophes that followed after the 
disintegration of the unity of the Middle Ages, we are therefore again confronted 
by the Socratic appeal: know yourself ! In 1948, to know yourself meant (as 
Versfeld would still confirm today) not only to gain insight into modern thinking 
and social developments, but to go further back to the important treasure that 
shaped the Middle Ages, and to reassess and reflect on it. It is in this light that, in 
1960, Versfeld described himself as philosophically “postmodern” (Sum 20).15 In 
Versfeld’s opinion, postmodern philosophy is a philosophy that, disillusioned by 
the modern development of philosophy and its cultural and political correlates, 
reconsiders the tradition (of the Middle Ages, but also of antiquity, modernity 
and contemporary thinking) in an attempt to obtain improved self-knowledge. 
In Versfeld’s opinion, anyone who has any doubts about the influence of our 
mediaeval heritage only has to consider the
idea of the generality [algemeenheid] of human nature, of the value of 
the individual, the necessity of freedom and the right to a conscience 
[…]. Their theoretical development took place in the Middle Ages, and 
all progressive political movements of the modern time are based on 
these ideas. (GA 90)
At the centre of this “theoretical development” we find the concept of unity.
Let us now look at the three aspects of the concept of unity, and how Versfeld 
attempts to gain insight into them by making use of mediaeval, and other, means.
15 This philosophical self-typification also responds to the culture-critical opinion that he 
expressed in The Perennial Order, namely that “the ‘modern period’ is drawing to a close” 
(PO 205).
77Self-knowledge and practical reason in a time of political madness
6. The concept of unity – Or, a philosophy of incarnation
To confirm the existence of a form of rationality that is unlike that with which 
we are familiar in modernity is one thing; to convince ourselves that it is, at the 
very least, worth taking up is something totally different. This is indeed a central 
theme in Versfeld’s philosophy. If he wishes to rehabilitate the concept of unity 
or incarnation and make it the core concept of his “postmodern” thinking, he 
needs to restore rational credibility to incarnation in the philosophical sense, 
which entails “among other things, that time is real, that bodies provide the 
means for human wellbeing and that our conduct in time has eternal value” (GA 
147). It seems to me as if this task is similar to the restoration of appreciation for 
the unity of reason (§6.1), the unity of being human (§6.2, and the unity of the 
secular and the religious (§6.3).
6.1 Wisdom, prudentia, or the unity of reason
In Versfeld’s opinion, in the domain of reason, we appreciate time as real by 
restoring “the place and value of reason in our activity as a whole” (GA 2). Failure 
to restore the situatedness of reason, will detach it from human conduct and 
well-being. Following Aquinas, Versfeld makes an attempt, in the first chapter of 
Oor gode en afgode, to argue in favour of what he sees as the “true rationalism”, in 
other words, he argues for the restoration of the unity of reason. In his attempt 
to get a grip on this unity, he uses various terms: rationalism, rational, irrational, 
reasonable, not reasonable, unreasonable and super-reasonable. While these terms 
are unfortunately not used unambiguously, his intention is nonetheless clear: 
the unity of reason is comprised of the unity between two types of reasoning – 
namely, that which is rational and that which is reasonable. Rational activities 
are those in which reason is used in a distant, abstract, general, conceptual or 
systematising way. Reasonable activities do not show these formal characteristics 
of rationality, but may nevertheless obtain approval from the mind by occupying 
a sensible place in life: we only have to think about the many things we do every 
day, activities that can hardly be regarded as irrational, even though they are not 
rational. Artistic activities are a good example.
Just as artistic reasonableness is not enough to get a person through life, 
abstract, systematising rationality also does not suffice. In fact, both are only 
reasonable insofar as they are given a reasonable place in our “activity as a whole” 
(GA 20). The kind of reasoning that ensures each activity of a rightful place, 
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regardless of whether it is rational in the strict sense of the word or not, is the 
practical use of reason, good sense or prudentia (GA 21ff.). Practical reasoning 
is what is required to imbue all activities and kinds of reasoning with their 
reasonableness for one’s life. Greeting people, ironing clothes, feeling guilty about 
transgressions, caring for animals, whistling tunes while walking, and planning 
a life project are all intrinsically non-rational activities, but they are nevertheless 
reasonable and not simply irrational. Doing mathematics, writing a computer 
program, and keeping a record of your income and expenses are intrinsically 
rational activities, but unless they are embedded in life in a reasonable way 
through the practical use of reason, they remain extrinsically non-reasonable and, 
in this sense, irrational (GA 6).16 Each activity is allocated a place in the course of 
a person’s life, and people who, through practical reasoning, succeed in effectively 
organising their lives and who act sensibly (reasonably) will enjoy well-being.
This basic distinction between rationality and reasonableness within the 
realm of reason is followed by a lengthy argument – first to indicate that poetic and 
artistic activities are generally reasonable, even though they are not rational, and 
then to show that, similarly, faith is reasonable even though in the strict sense of 
the word it is not rational. When I say that Versfeld argues for the reasonableness 
of “faith”, I have to add that it evident that what he has in mind is belief in the 
traditional Christian doctrine (see, for example, GA 5, 22 and 30). It is, however, 
far from trivial to note that when Versfeld considers faith, and religion in general, 
as a type of knowledge, and when knowledge is here understood as the mutual 
appropriation of knower and known (GA 30), this type of knowledge applies to 
all “religious perception” (GA 25ff.). In this way, Versfeld’s thinking, from an early 
stage, leaves room for reflection on other religious and spiritual traditions (see, for 
example, the discussion of the Upanishads, starting from GA 26) and his love of 
Eastern wisdom. Furthermore, it should be noted that the reasonableness of faith 
is made dependent on the prudence17 by which one pursues one’s own well-being, 
in accordance with the well-being criterion for the acceptability of philosophy 
16 In his review of Oor gode en afgode (in which only the first chapter is considered), Hennie 
Rossouw correctly emphasises the precise importance that Versfeld here wants to attach to 
reason when he states that “Versfeld’s earliest understanding of philosophy was an attempt 
to – in the spirit of ‘true reasonableness’ – show respect for both the central function and the 
relative place of reason in the human existence” (Rossouw, “Die kuns van die lewe is om tuis 
te kom”, 13).
17 Note, however, that the practical reason is again later made dependent on a metaphysical view 
of reality (which is a philosophical articulation of tenets of religious faith – see GA 37). In 
other words, an intimate dialectic exists between practical reason and the combination of 
metaphysics and faith.
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as proposed by Versfeld himself (GA 150, discussed in §4, above). It is for this 
reason that Versfeld’s metaphysically worded insistence on the unity of reason, 
which leads to his insistence on the importance of practical reasoning, should 
not be understood as dooming him to inflexible rigidity. It is precisely through 
practical reasoning that the metaphysically oriented individual can respond to 
the changing and time-bound demands of concrete events: practical wisdom or 
prudentia is, according to Aristotle’s understanding of phronesis, “the ability to 
see the appropriateness of a principle within the inexhaustible variety offered by 
reality, and to apply it” (GA 56).18
I leave it to the reader to evaluate the details of Versfeld’s ideas about the 
reasonableness of faith and religion. However, it should be pointed out that, 
with this, Versfeld attempts to restore two aspects of the unity of reason. In the 
first place, he is concerned with the co-ordination of all the different types of 
reasonableness among themselves, and between reasonableness and a person’s 
life, so that about any activity it can be said: “If it can be incorporated into life by 
reason, it can be called reasonable, even if it is not knowledge acquired through 
concepts” (GA 22). Thus, the reality of the temporal nature of reason is also taken 
seriously; contemplation on reasoning cannot be separated from reflection on 
practice. This then is the orientation from which Versfeld opposes the separation 
of fact and value, resulting in an unfair emphasis placed on the narrow definition 
of rationality, and detaching the ability to judge from the sphere of human 
reasonableness (cf. GA 133ff.).
Second, when you think about practice, you reflect on time and on the 
course of your own life and the relationship between your life and the lives of 
others – in other words, you necessarily think historically.19 However, since every 
representation of the historical course of events requires selection of what is 
narrated, such historical representation is dependent on a wider perspective from 
which selection can be done sensibly (GA 140). For Versfeld, this perspective 
is metaphysical, and it is this overarching metaphysics that not only keeps fact 
and value together, but also saves the various sciences from an irreconcilable 
18 Virtue, as the intelligent approach that helps us to decide, in concrete cases, how to live an 
ethical life, is also discussed in Oor gode en afgode (e.g. GA 50). The gender-specific term 
manliness [manlikheid], which is often used (GA 46, 81, 98), is hardly acceptable today. 
However, based on its etymological origin, this term should perhaps rather be understood 
as, and replaced with, virtuosity (vir: Latin for man).
19 Throughout his work, Versfeld emphasises an essentially Jewish legacy of the otherwise Greek 
thinking of Christendom, the Middle Ages and the European culture: the ability to think 
historically (cf. GA 147ff.).
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multiplicity, and thus also saves reason from one-sidedness (GA 4, 92ff.). Thus, 
human finitude does not invalidate the practice of metaphysics, but rather 
encourages metaphysical thinking. It is for this reason that Versfeld continued to 
spend time reflecting on the nature of metaphysical thinking, because deep down 
metaphysics is not the possession of truth, but the love of truth:
[Metaphysics] exists as a question about itself, and for this very reason 
it knows that it is not the answer to its own question. It seeks its own 
being qua ens and is well aware that its adequatio can never exhaust its 
own essence. It always points beyond itself to a wisdom which is its 
own being, and without this reference to transcendence it would not 
be what it is. By keeping itself open, it keeps the special sciences open to 
their own progress. (“Talking” 17–18)
In essence, this corresponds with what Versfeld says in Oor gode en afgode 
(GA 4, 135, and 137).
6.2 Body and spirit: On anthropological unity
These thoughts on the unity of reason and on the central role of practical reason 
should already serve as an indication that Versfeld viewed the unity of the human 
being as extremely important. The contours that he gives to this unity may be read 
about in Oor gode en afgode. However, it may be useful to point out that here, 
once again, two aspects of the unity of the human are at stake.
On the one hand, Versfeld is concerned with the unity between body and 
spirit. Since it is the body that makes humans temporal beings involved in worldly 
matters, the body is of the greatest significance for ethics:
The human being as a moral being is an embodied being who is in touch 
with the world of historical and incidental details through his/her 
senses, and influences the world through conscious decisions expressed 
in the form of bodily actions. (GA 47)
A hypothetical disembodied person would not be able to act sensibly and would 
not understand the urgency of the passing of time.
On the other hand, we have the unity of individuals and humankind 
(GA 40ff., 139). People are not only incarnated in a body, but also in humanity. 
An essential part of Versfeld’s political philosophy is the emphasis he places on 
multiple institutions and collectives in which people participate – like a body 
made up of various organs – rather than on the direct link between individuals 
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and the state. Furthermore, just as Versfeld’s high regard for the body does 
not comprise an anthropological reduction to a mere body, he also does not 
reduce the individual to a mere citizen of a state. He subscribes to Augustine’s 
instrumental view of the state in that the individual may be part of the state, 
but the state has a duty to serve individuals and assist them in rising above the 
functioning and values of the state (GA 82).
6.3 Analogy of the unity of the secular and the spiritual
We now come to the third form of incarnation or the concept of unity: the unity 
between the temporary and the eternal or, as Versfeld says, the fact that “temporary 
behaviour has eternal meaning” (GA 147). As suggested in the discussion in §6.1 
above, it was evident to Versfeld that practical reason spontaneously leads to 
faith and metaphysics. However, according to him, following Aquinas’s example, 
this does not imply the surrendering of life to irrationality or obscurity. To 
determine the reason for this is of central importance in all Versfeld’s work. At 
least three reasons can be given. First, because he is of the opinion that faith, 
even though it is a gift and a mystery, is also a form of knowledge, in particular 
knowledge of something that has an “ontological status” that differs from that of 
humankind (GA 30). It is for this kind of knowledge that his arguments about the 
acceptability of religious perception must serve as justification. Second, because 
practical reason demands and approves our continuous practising of a human 
faith20 (GA 32) and, to a large extent, our social existence is made possible by 
this kind of faith. Third, because Versfeld was convinced that what is believed “is 
rooted in nature”; in other words: “It is the natural life that helps us to understand 
supernatural life and makes us amenable to it” (GA 32). This is simply Versfeld’s 
concise formulation of the idea of analogy, which he calls the backbone of 
“our Mediaeval culture” (GA 35) and advocates as the only protection against 
naturalism (GA 34), in other words, against the reduction of reality by a natural 
scientific mindset.21
20 The example of this given by Versfeld, which was derived from Bowman, is that “Pasteur’s 
conviction that fermentation is caused by a microscopic organism, was in his case a truly 
reasonable conviction; in my [Versfeld’s] case it is a belief ” (GA 9).
21 “The religion of the Middle Ages was characterised by an acknowledgement of bodily things, 
and also of the sacraments by which people are incorporated into the mystical body, which is 
the carrier of their historical fate. Under the Cartesians (at least), the new physiology isolated 
the body from the spirit and history as coherently functioning matter, as a machine, which 
in turn became the model for interpretations of the body!” (Wat is kontemporêr? 20).
Martin Versfeld82
I would like to focus on this last point – Versfeld’s appropriation of the 
concept of analogy, because in my opinion this is one of the most typifying 
characteristics of his work. This is how he explains this principle in Oor gode en 
afgode: “Human love is filled with foretastes of God’s love, and those who are 
prepared to face nature without prejudice will find themselves on the threshold 
of the temple” (GA 32). By claiming that an analogy exists between something 
earthly and something spiritual, it is stated that while a similarity does exist 
between them, the difference between them is not denied, with the result that 
the difference serves to highlight the similarity, and vice versa.22 
Once one understands how important this figure of thought is to Versfeld, 
its use in multiple variations becomes obvious. Even before Oor gode en afgode 
was written, an essay written by Versfeld and included in Die berge van die 
Boland (The Mountains of the Western Cape), co-written by Versfeld and W.A. 
de Klerk, discusses a “few major climbs on Table Mountain,” and it would be 
wrong to assume that he is merely expressing himself lyrically when he says that 
“rock climbing is much more than a form of physical exercise. It is a spiritual 
experience”.23 While in Oor gode en afgode Versfeld does not yet articulate the 
separation or tension in the analogy – “the earthly is filled with foretastes of 
the heavenly” – he compresses this relation in his later work, so that miraculous 
phenomena are almost identified with the secular. In Food for Thought, he says: 
“[t]he secular is the miraculous” (FT 89).
Here it would be wrong not to take note of the analogy and to regard the 
expression as a mere metaphor or a statement of identity. For this reason, I refer 
to this kind of statement as an analogical symbol or an analogical spark, hoping 
that it will evoke ideas of a difference, a tension, a connection and a sudden 
mutual clarification.24 
[I]t is the ordinary which is the extra-ordinary (PP 1). 
Paradise is wherever you feel at home, and the gate of heaven is your 
own gate. (NA 2nd ed. 38) 
22 A detailed discussion of the mediaeval concept of analogy can be found in chapter VI of 
Rondom die Middeleeue (RM 82–92).
23 Versfeld and De Klerk, Die berge van die Boland ([1947] 1965), 29.
24 Speaking about this figure of thought used by Versfeld in this way seems more correct than 
to assert that the separation of transcendent and immanent is revoked by incarnation – as I 
did in my 1999 article, “Sanctus Marthinus laudatory philosophicus”, 94 (now Chapter 7, 
below).
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If you want to convert an atheist, get him to clean the carrots well. (FT 
20)
The cook, even the domestic cook, is a priest or a priestess. (FT 20) 
If your cooking is play and not work, it will smell of Paradise. The 
resurrection starts in the cooking pot, because man is what he eats and 
because what he is, his substantial existence, is in its uniqueness touched 
with eternity. (FT 93) 
Being able to talk to God is being able to talk to the world. (KK 8)
When we play, we become united with God’s creative imagination. (KK 
97) 
[Y]ou are a priest when you roast the leg of mutton […]. Kneel down 
when you light the fire” (TD 109).
This originally Catholic way of thinking facilitated Versfeld’s openness with 
regard to the Eastern religions and wisdom; the advice that “[i]f you want to 
levitate, buy a step-ladder” (PP 67) summarises the lesson contained in an Indian 
story. Similarly, the statement, “your spiritual life is your biography, your life-
style. Spiritual life is being yourself. It is your ordinary life” (ACCG 10), is based 
on a Zen story and can be found in Versfeld’s commentary on the Christian 
philosopher Augustine:
If the bread of the Eucharist is not the same bread as that with which 
he feeds his family it is of no use. […] Your spiritual life is your ordinary 
life: washing dishes, cooking supper, going to a concert or a shop. You 
can’t “find yourself ” by walking out of all this. Prayer is cutting bread. 
(ACCG 9) 
This is clearly the culmination of a thought process that attempts to overcome the 
disintegrated oneness of body and soul, of value and fact, of theory and practice, 
of reason and faith, and of humans and nature. This is done on the strength of 
the concept of unity, or in imitation of the idea of incarnation to which the 
Christian sacrament (GA 90, 148) is a key: “This is my body”. Although we are 
clearly dealing here with a figure of thought and not with a figure of style, I am 
inclined to imagine that this analogical symbol or spark played a major role in 
the high regard in which Versfeld was and is held by poets, novelists and scholars 
of literature. The openness that it reveals with regard to the miraculous nature 
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of everyday phenomena, and the celebration of the apparently banal, imbues 
Versfeld’s text with a unique poetic quality (I will demonstrate this in more detail 
in Chapter 7, §§3 and 4 and Chapter 10, §4).
7. Reception and continuation
In Oor gode en afgode, we do not yet see the calm playfulness that is characteristic 
of later texts. In 1948 the reader makes the acquaintance of an author driven by 
the passion of a recent life choice who is urgently seeking alternatives to a decaying 
world. Despite the confidence he shows about his discovery of, and excitement 
about, a strange old wisdom, the author of Oor gode en afgode finds himself at 
the beginning of a journey of development on which he not only seeks insight 
into his themes, but also searches for the correct language and register in which 
to reflect on it.
He was also a thinker who still had to decide how he should respond to 
his readers and critics. Some of them shared his concerns; others would have 
preferred that he act as an advocate for other issues or sympathies; and yet another 
group was impressed by the strangeness of his approach or use of language.
In a radio review broadcast on 17 March 1949, Tjaart Büning praised the 
author of Oor gode en afgode for his “probing” work in which he creates a bridge 
between the Middle Ages and the twentieth century, between Aquinas or Anselm 
and contemporary thinkers, to reflect on “some of the core problems of our 
disrupted world”. Even though Büning considered the last two essays to be less 
convincing than the first three, he characterised Oor gode en afgode as follows:
This is an interesting collection of essays that stimulates serious 
reflection. Despite the author’s occasional disturbing tendency to 
become preachy and somewhat fanatical [dweperig], one can generally 
agree with him if one subscribes to his point of departure. Versfeld 
reads mainly English texts, which probably explains why his Afrikaans, 
although quite satisfactory, is not always idiomatically correct.25
25 Radio talk by Tjaart Büning, broadcast from Johannesburg on 17 March 1949 (UCT 
Archive, file 205, quotations on pp. 1 and 2).
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Three points that are evident from the above are the seriousness and importance 
of Versfeld’s thinking, which is commended, the doubt that exists concerning 
his (probably mediaeval, Christian philosophical) point of departure, and his 
language use.
Although H.G. Stoker’s 1949 review26 of Oor gode en afgode was clearly 
written from a Calvinistic trench, it echoes Büning’s more impartial review:
Dr Versfeld’s five incisive and enthusiastically written popular 
philosophical essays require us, as Calvinists in this country, to consider 
where we stand in relation to Rome, in particular since they are 
written in Afrikaans (albeit interspersed with acceptable and original 
Anglicisms). The frank and courageous faith language employed by this 
thinker in his criticism of the increasingly heathen spirit of our time 
deserves to be fully recognised. He is not ashamed of his faith, which 
is the fertile ground from which his philosophical thinking develops. 
These are the words of a confessing Christian. His thinking is closer to 
ours than that of Kant, Rousseau, Nietzsche, Hegel or Whitehead. The 
work contains many ideas that we can accept as they are, or differently 
formulated. However, we reject the specific Catholic-philosophical 
principles on which it is based and which bind it together. I regard 
Versfeld as a Christian and a keen-witted philosopher, and would 
like to recommend this book to our readers. I enjoyed reading it and 
also learnt from it. However, anyone who is aware of the increasing 
influence of the Roman Catholic Church in this country will realise 
that it has to be read with discrimination. This book enriches our 
Afrikaans philosophical literature.
The dilemma that Stoker faced is evident: here we have a serious, well-informed, 
openly Christian philosopher from whom one could learn, but whose Roman 
Catholicism creates a cacophony in the traditional Afrikaans-Calvinistic ear. It 
is evident from many of Versfeld’s autobiographical descriptions that this review 
by Stoker reflected the reaction of many of his contemporaries to the author’s 
early thinking.
Although I cannot judge whether such a strong English overtone is audible 
in Versfeld’s 1948 book, I found interesting material in the archive that cast 
some light on this question. The typed text, “A Moral Philosopher Looks at 
26 Review in Koers, February 1949, 4 (my page reference here refers to Stoker’s typed text sent 
to Versfeld by Nasionale Pers – UCT Archive, file 205).
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His World”27 corresponds in part with chapter 3 of Oor gode en afgode and is 
definitely older. There is also an early text titled “Morals and Machines”,28 the 
first part of which largely corresponds with chapter 4 of Oor gode en afgode. 
Finally, I discovered a text on Rousseau,29 the beginning of which shows strong 
similarities to chapter 2 of Oor gode en afgode, but then continues with a more 
detailed discussion. I suspect that this was a lecture he had prepared before he 
wrote Oor gode en afgode. From this, it could be derived that probably more than 
half of the book had originally been written in English before being translated 
into Afrikaans. The archived material further revealed that Versfeld rarely wrote 
notes in Afrikaans as most of this material – consisting of notes or manuscripts 
for his lectures – had been written in English. We should therefore assume that 
when he wrote, Versfeld thought mainly in English – at least during the 1930s 
and 1940s. However, it appears that in the foreword to his second book on 
philosophy published in Afrikaans, Rondom die Middeleeue, Versfeld justified 
his use of Afrikaans to his critics as follows:
[In Afrikaans philosophical writing] we tend to rely on German and 
Dutch, sometimes with disastrous consequences, while we tend to shy 
away from English. However, regardless of whether we are aware of it 
or not, we are strongly influenced by English and this, from all sides. 
To deny this and to pretend that such influence does not exist, is to 
cause an inner conflict and then to suppress it, sometimes with almost 
neurotic consequences. It would not harm us if we chose to write in 
Locke’s style rather than in Hegel’s, which would prevent the average 
person’s interest in philosophy from being smothered to death by big 
loads of big words. (RM foreword, not numbered)
However, the acceptability of philosophy does not depend only on its style. 
An intense involvement with the history of philosophy is typical of Versfeld’s 
lectures and published works. By so doing, he gave a concrete response to what 
he regarded as the unavoidable re-evaluation of history (GA 164). Oor gode en 
afgode does not offer a master plan for undertaking this in-depth exploration 
27 UCT Archive, file 19. This text was probably written during the early 1940s.
28 UCT Archive, file 23. This text was probably written at the latest in 1949 and refers to another 
version of the same text written two years earlier. It is therefore quite possible that an earlier 
English version of this text existed before the publication of Oor gode en afgode.
29 UCT Archive, file 34. This English text on Rousseau cannot easily be dated, but since both 
the manuscript and the typed version have been preserved, it is highly likely that it is the 
original version, which would correspond with Versfeld’s custom.
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of the history of philosophy, but several important lines of investigation run 
from this book through his subsequent work. In the first place, a line runs from 
Oor gode en afgode directly to The Perennial Order. Chapter 10 of the latter is 
a slightly rewritten version, but is largely a translation of chapter 5 of Oor gode 
en afgode, which deals specifically with the philosophy of history. Furthermore, 
The Perennial Order (like almost all his other books) is a clear effort to immerse 
himself in the reappropriation of mediaeval thinking. Rondom die Middeleeue 
(On the Middle Ages) is Versfeld’s most comprehensive discussion of mediaeval 
thinking, but we should not forget that, already in 1958, he had published a 
well-received commentary on Augustine’s philosophy – A Guide to the City of 
God – and that his thoughts about mediaeval philosophy are clearly reflected in 
his last complete collection of essays, St Augustine’s Confessions and City of God 
(1990) (on the relation between these two books, cf. Chapter 10, §1).
The philosophy of antiquity, represented by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in 
Oor gode en afgode, was also to receive Versfeld’s direct attention. His preference 
for Plato is evident in the titles: Plato. Die simposium of die drinkparty (Plato. The 
Symposium or the Drinking Party) (1970) and ’n Handleiding tot die Republiek 
van Plato (A Guide to Plato’s Republic) (1974). In addition to these, one also 
has to consider numerous essays written by Versfeld, including his inaugural 
speech delivered at the University of Cape Town (1971), which was published 
in Persons under the title “The Socratic Spirit”. Versfeld’s interest in Buddhism 
and the wisdom of the Upanishads already came to the fore in Oor gode en afgode, 
and many essays included in his subsequent collections are devoted to Eastern 
thought. His translation and introduction of Die lewensweg van Lao-Tse (1988) 
into Afrikaans clearly shows his interest in Eastern traditions. This theme will be 
dealt with in detail by Kobus Krüger in Chapter 6.
Versfeld’s strenuous efforts to get a proper grip on modern philosophy that 
preceded the twentieth century is evident from his lectures kept in the University 
of Cape Town archives and the frequent references to philosophers from this 
period found in his books. However, he saw no need to devote a monograph or 
commentary to any specific figure, with the exception of Descartes, in An Essay on 
the Metaphysics of Descartes (1940), to which, to a large extent, Oor gode en afgode 
already attempts to respond. Versfeld’s most thorough discussion of twentieth-
century philosophy can probably be found in The Mirror of Philosophers (1960).
In all his thinking via his contemplation of the history of philosophy, the 
issue remains the problems discussed by all those philosophers. Versfeld does not 
aspire to know philosophy, but wants to respond to the appeal: Know yourself ! 
It is for this reason that he also wants to get to know the world around him. 
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The themes from Oor gode en afgode that are highlighted in this chapter are 
reformulated and repeatedly contemplated in Versfeld’s later books. The urgency 
of the post-war book did, however, make way for a calm, meditative tone; the 
confidence of the newly converted is replaced by an appreciative, poetic attention 
to the commonplace and the earthly (but I will comment on this change in 
Chapter 10, §4); the insistence on a Christian science is transformed into a serene 
Socratic ignorance; the call for a courageous decision fades away and makes way 
for hospitable humour. And yet, when we read the first page of his last book, St 
Augustine’s Confessions and the City of God, we are still unmistakably dealing with 
the author of Oor gode en afgode – the theme of decline invites reflection on the 
contemporary world with a reference to Augustine:
The reason for this book is the relevance to us of Augustine’s life, thought 
and political situation. His soul was dying, so is ours. His Rome was 
collapsing: so is ours. […] We need some participation in a vision which 
could make sense of a perilous and breaking world. Perhaps our Rome 
is also crumbling, and through the cracks we may catch a ray from the 
City of God. (ACCG 7)
This is followed by the themes that are so characteristic of Versfeld’s thinking: 
time, incarnation, everyday experiences, God, the unity of humankind, 
reasonableness, the futility of inequitable capitalism, quality of life, food, politics, 
the environment – and he takes time to contemplate each of these, as if with the 
beads of a rosary.
However, adherence to certain themes is not necessarily a reason for 
recommending a philosopher’s work. Eventually, we have to get to what Versfeld 
considers to be the really important issues in Oor gode en afgode, and how he 
worked on these issues: are the arguments convincing? The purpose of this 
chapter is not to answer this question. Each reader will have to decide individually 
how the book should be received. In Chapters 8 and 9 I will offer two general 
appreciations of his work from two different perspectives. However, a few 
questions are already in order here.
Regardless of how convincing the burning issues raised by the author might 
be, the way in which he deals with them will necessarily give rise to a number of 
questions. If it is altogether understandable that, during World War II, a person 
would have been shocked by the illness of Western culture, does that mean that 
the essence of modernity has thereby been completely unmasked and that the 
entire project of modernity should be declared bankrupt? At the same time, one 
would have to determine whether the inexorable cultural criticism of the modern 
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world (such as that of Versfeld) cannot perhaps provide an alibi for a generally 
conservative cultural politics.
The call to make a decision – based on the decay of Western civilisation 
and which, in Versfeld’s opinion means that, like the first Christians, we (in 
1948) “live in a time of moral radicalism” (GA 100) – could lead to conflicting 
practical implications. On the one hand, he envisages the necessity of a catacomb 
existence (GA 103) for a moral-religious creative minority or elite, or a Christian 
proletariat characterised by social marginalisation (GA 156, 160). On the other 
hand, he advises against withdrawal from the world and insists that we should 
participate in the political world, among other things through institutions in 
order to improve them (GA 149).
A number of questions relating to how, and with what degree of even-
handedness, Versfeld interprets the history of ideas deserve to be answered. An 
important detail from Augustine’s and Rousseau’s works respectively could be 
used as a test. About Augustine we are told that “he was overwhelmed by a positive 
meaning of the concept of incarnation” (GA 146), and throughout Versfeld’s 
works we repeatedly see this pronouncement in a variety of formulations. But 
should this positivity not be related to the abundant remarks throughout the 
Confessions that clearly show how disgusted Augustine was with his own body? 
The state that was inspired by Rousseau’s political ideas may have produced the 
Terror, but it also institutionalised human rights. And should one not welcome 
it if what has since been achieved in that state for the emancipation of women 
could be equalled by a certain Middle Ages–inspired institution of our world…?
The idea that people are shaped by history does not seem too strange to 
modern thinking, at least not since Hegel. However, it is important to reflect 
on how we are shaped by history – in particular by the history of mediaeval 
thinking. Who, in the South Africa of 1948 and today, was shaped by mediaeval 
history, and how? In which ways do many South African citizens, who have no 
direct cultural heritage from the European Middle Ages, live indirectly out of that 
period? Or how, and on which grounds, could the Middle Ages be presented to 
them as a past out of which they could live? The preservation or reactualisation of 
the idea of the unity of humankind (as it was viewed in mediaeval Christendom) 
should certainly take into account the total transformation of the composition of 
the problem of unity as it became clear to Europeans following the discovery of 
the New World. Would it not have been necessary to offer a thorough discussion 
of the complexity of the unity of a global human population characterised by 
numerous cultural and religious traditions – if not to establish the validity of the 
idea, then at least to reflect on what it means in practice?
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This naturally brings us back to the two criteria applied by Versfeld himself 
to measure the success of his work: the criterion of comprehensibility and the 
criterion of well-being. One would have to establish whether any Christian history 
or any other Christian science (in the terms in which it was defined by Versfeld) 
has ever been practised, and to what extent it could legitimately be claimed that it 
was superior to other efforts to understand the world, and if so, how it was done. 
Perhaps even more important, when evaluating Oor gode en afgode, one would 
have to ask what contribution the book, or the implementation and application 
of the ideas contained in it, have already made to the advancement of human well-
being, or what contribution it might be able to make in what could reasonably 
be seen as its potential sphere of influence.
Are the monstrous political catastrophes and the inconceivable scale of 
human suffering during the twentieth century merely symptoms of a diseased 
Western civilisation (and probably, here and there, also some other civilisations)? 
Would it be possible to heal the world of these pathologies so that the continuity 
between human actions and divine actions could again be restored or at least be 
analogically related? Besides the question asked by believers (at least since the 
ancient Jews, whose sense of history Versfeld praises) – namely, “Where is God 
in suffering?” – one would also have to ask: if something like an analogy between 
the earthly and the heavenly ever really existed, was it not brought to an end by the 
unimaginable scale of violence of the past century? Or would practical reasoning 
perhaps suggest that – maybe for God’s sake – we should declare the metaphysical 
belief of an analogy between the human and the Divine to be unreasonable and 
continue living as if it would make no sense to hold on to the reality of a God?
Should one nonetheless persist in thinking inside the framework of the 
Christian faith, one would probably also have to ask: is it still possible, realistic 
or reasonable to develop an interpretation of the Christian faith that does not 
seem to consider the development of the historical-critical study of both biblical 
and ecclesiastical documents of faith worthy of any discussion? And if the 
metaphysical way of thinking about reality is declared to be the only way to give 
intelligent articulation to the meaning of human existence and to complement the 
reflective search for meaning, should it not be extremely important to determine 
how, in the twentieth century, the proliferation of non-metaphysical philosophies 
of meaning can in any way whatsoever succeed in thinking about meaning, and 
should the value of these findings not be thoroughly contemplated? This question 
becomes even more pressing when we consider the fact that so many of these 
philosophies, each in its own way, radically engages temporality and embodiment.
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It would be possible to expand the list of questions relating to Oor gode en 
afgode much further. The many instances throughout Versfeld’s work where he 
reconsiders certain themes in different ways confirm the fact that such questions 
deserve our attention. This does not necessarily mean that Oor gode en afgode 
failed, but it could be seen as an indication of the importance of rethinking the 
themes that are dealt with. However, to determine how successfully Oor gode 
en afgode examines these issues, a thorough study of the book is essential, and I 
would like to invite you to do just that!30
30 I would like to thank Liesl du Preez, Andrew Nash, Willie van der Merwe, Ruth Versfeld and 






VERSFELD AND NIETZSCHE: 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
By Paul van Tongeren
1. Introduction
Although there are not many places in Martin Versfeld’s writings where he refers 
to the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, the passages that do so are worth 
considering, and – most remarkably – are generally very positive. Undoubtedly, 
other authors are much more important to Versfeld, among whom not in the 
least is Saint Augustine, the one whom Nietzsche called “a slave who, without 
deserving it, has been pardoned and elevated […], who lacks in a truly offensive 
manner all nobility of gestures and desires”,1 and whom according to Nietzsche, 
belongs to the “born enemies of the spirit”.2 Such designations must have offended 
Versfeld, and there are many more examples to give where the two thinkers seem 
to go in opposite directions. And yet, Versfeld seems to consider Nietzsche as a 
companion, at least for part of the way of his philosophy. One wonders why. In 
this chapter, I describe a few examples of this unexpected companionship and 
only at the end will I suggest an answer to this question.
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966), 
§50. All references to Nietzsche are to section numbers, where necessary completed by page 
numbers.
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), §359.
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2. Sounding out idols
In 1948 Martin Versfeld published a book with the title Oor gode en afgode (On 
Gods and Idols). Nietzsche’s Götzen-Dämmerung (Twilight of the Idols) had 
appeared sixty years earlier. At least the similarity of the two titles suggests a 
related interest and commitment. Both authors speak of idolatry and find it where 
contingent and timely things are eternalised and taken to be absolute.
For Versfeld, there are mainly two idols to unmask: the nation state and the 
human being. It is immediately clear that it is of course not the state as such, let 
alone the human being as such, that is an idol. They are, however, made into idols 
by “an idolatrous nationalism” (MP 181) or by an equally idolatrous humanism. 
It is the idolatry that makes the idols: “In the phenomenon of nationalism, 
a historical coincidence, i.e. a particular, transient type of social structure is 
being made into the primary source of values, and thus into a God.”3 Atheistic 
humanism “is an act of pride, or self-deification” that begins when the human 
being mistakes “the image for the original” or “mistake[s] himself for the source 
of his own light, and give to himself the worship due only to the Original” (MP 
178).
In The Mirror of Philosophers Versfeld seems to hold Rousseau responsible for 
this “idolatrous nationalism”. As a positive counter-model, he most often refers 
to St Augustine’s De Civitate Dei, in which the famous distinction between the 
terrestrial and the celestial realm is precisely meant to warn against this kind of 
idolatry. The idolatry of atheistic humanism is, according to Versfeld, actually as 
old as history: it “is the original sin, or fall of man”.
Nietzsche attacked the idols of his time from his first publications. But 
gradually his criticism becomes more radical. In his early Lectures on the Future 
of our Educational Institutions and the Untimely Observations he mainly focuses 
on the idols of his time, but from Human, All Too Human on, he increasingly 
unmasks the great values of philosophy – morality and religion – as human 
fabrications. And in the preface to his Twilight of the Idols, he declares that the 
idols he targets
this time they are not idols of the age but eternal idols which are here 
touched with the hammer as with a tuning fork – there are no more 
3 “In die verskynsel van die nasionalisme word ’n historiese toeval, naamlik ’n partikuliere, 
verganklike tipe sosiale struktuur tot die primêre bron van waardes verhef, dit wil sê tot ’n 
God.” GA 200 (all translations from writings in Afrikaans are mine – PvT). 
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ancient idols in existence […] Also none more hollow […] That does 
not prevent their being the most believed in; and they are not, especially 
in the most eminent case, called idols […]4
And precisely here our two authors seem to go in radically different directions. 
For Versfeld, every idolatry is blasphemy and an offensive denial of the only true 
God. To protect ourselves against this kind of idolatry, we need a reference to 
“a supernatural reality” (“’n bonatuurlike werklikheid”, GA 130), a “belief in a 
primary reality” (“geloof aan ’n primêre realiteit”, GA 136) and even a commitment 
and devotion to the “Church” and its “sacraments” (“sekere sakramente”, GA 
130f5) in which the reference to this primary reality is safeguarded. Versfeld 
refers to doctrine of the Church as the mystical body of Christ, a reference that 
is made explicit in The Mirror of Philosophers (MP 180). In the chapter “A Season 
in Hell”, he describes the history of modernity from Rousseau onwards as the 
gradual fragmentation of the unity of this mystical body, which has, according 
to him, caused the downfall of Christianity and the rise of nihilism. Only an 
absolute (and thus supernatural) perspective can “put in perspective” all human 
(all too human) constructions. Only a supernatural morality can bind the state 
to its instrumental meaning (cf. GA 120f ), safeguard the dignity of individual 
human beings, protect them against an “annihilation […] in a collectivity” (MP 
1846), but also save them from an idolatrous self-aggrandisement.
It is, however, precisely this supernatural morality and its divine foundation 
that is, according to Nietzsche, the “eternal” idol that is usually not called an idol. 
He clearly asks a rhetorical question when at the end of section 344 of the Gay 
Science he writes:
[…] what if this [i.e., “that Christian faith which was also the faith of 
Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine”] should become more 
and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more 
unless it were error, blindness, the lie – if God himself should prove to 
be our most enduring lie?
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1990), 
Preface, 32.
5 Cf. also Versfeld’s critical comment of Protestantism’s “loss of the idea of incarnation” as is 
shown “in its thought on the visible Church, the sacraments and papacy.” (“Tweegesprek 
tussen Marxiste en Christene”, in BU 89–108, here 95).
6 Cf. also Versfeld, “Philosophy of morals,” in PO 95–143: “But this very submission [i.e., man’s 
submission to ‘divine authority’] bestows on him a dignity which no man can take from him” 
(PO 137).
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Both authors want to sound out idols. But what, for Versfeld, is the criterion 
for the discernment of “that famous hollow sound which speaks of inflated 
bowels”7 is, for Nietzsche, itself hollow instead of holy. What, according to 
Versfeld, is the protection against “nihilism” (an important concept for 
both, on which I will elaborate further below) is, for Nietzsche, itself deeply 
nihilistic:
No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense 
that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world 
than the world of life, nature and history; and insofar as they affirm 
this “other world” – look, must they not by the same token negate its 
counterpart, this world, our world?8
One wonders whether they really hear the same thing when they “pose [their] 
questions […] with a hammer”.9
3. Man, morality and metaphysics
In terms of traditional philosophical disciplines, Versfeld and Nietzsche both 
worked mainly in the fields of anthropology, moral philosophy and metaphysics, 
without of course separating these from each other. Versfeld situated the special 
place of the human being in the whole of nature on metaphysical presuppositions 
and he elaborated the moral implications of this. For Nietzsche, the relation 
between the three is first and foremost a critical one: metaphysics and morality 
are shown to be human fictions meant to protect and promote a particular (“sick” 
or “weak”) type of life. Nevertheless, he too frames this statement in some sort 
of a metaphysical hypothesis about the world as will to power and connects it to 
some kind of anthropological definition; his vocabulary of sickness and health, 
moreover, does not leave any doubts about the practical implications of his 
understanding of the human being.
Although Nietzsche wants to “translate man back into nature” and to 
recognise “the horrifying basic text of homo natura” under the “flattering colors 
7 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Preface.
8 Nietzsche, Gay Science §344.
9 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, Preface.
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and make-up” of morality and metaphysics,10 this doesn’t alter his view of the 
human being as different from the rest of nature. Nietzsche’s “definition” of 
the human being reads: “[…] man is the as yet undetermined animal”11. This 
distinguishing characteristic is, however, radically different from the ones that 
Versfeld identifies: intelligence and self-consciousness. Versfeld refers to the 
famous expression with which Aquinas resumes Aristotle’s doctrine: anima 
humana quodammodo omnia12 to indicate the “capacity which distinguishes man 
from other objects in nature”. He adds “that the human mind not only contains its 
own and other bodies, but that it also contains itself. […] It has a being for itself, 
enters into a relation with itself, and knows itself for itself in the very moment 
that, by knowledge or perception, it receives into itself a tree or a star.” (PO 97)
It is clear that what singles out the human being among the rest of nature 
is for Versfeld a surplus, something (a capacity) which the human being has 
while the rest of nature does not. For Nietzsche, on the contrary, it is rather 
a defect that characterises the human being. The human being is “more sick, 
uncertain, changeable, indeterminate than any other animal, there is no doubt 
of that – he is the sick animal”.13 Certainly, this defect is the reverse of something 
positive: the human being “has also dared more, done more new things, braved 
more and challenged fate more than all the other animals put together: he the 
great experimenter with himself, discontented and insatiable”.14 But these great 
possibilities are based on a defect. Nietzsche’s description, in the second section 
of his Genealogy of Morals, of the process in which the human being, the “animal 
with the right to make promises”, was “bred”, starts with a loss: the loss of a necessary 
condition for happiness,15 i.e. of forgetfulness.16
10 Cf. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §230. N.B., the word “horrifying” (“schreckliche”) was 
dropped by Kaufmann in his translation!
11 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §62.
12 Cf. PO 97: “To make the statement: I am insignificant because I am swallowed up in the 
stellar spaces, is to overlook the fact that this statement is possible only because the stellar 
spaces are, in a way, swallowed up in us.” Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, De Natura Materiae, 
cap. 3: http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1225-1274,_Thomas_Aquinas,_De_
Natura_Materiae_et_Dimensionibus_Interminatis,_LT.pdf [last access 8 August 2020].
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage, 1969) §III.13.
14 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals §III.13.
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life,” in Unfashionable 
Observations, trans. R.T. Gray (San Francisco: Stanford University Press, 1995) §II.1.
16 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals §II.1.
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Different as these two interpretations of the human being sound, they are 
related, among other ways, in the respect that both point to a practical and 
normative implication. Both stand in the tradition of the doctrine that prescribes 
the human being to become what it is. Versfeld writes that “[t]his ‘self-occupation’, 
which is also a capacity of being occupied with himself, is what marks man 
off as human. It is in this capacity that he is the object of ethics” (PO 97). For 
Nietzsche, on the contrary, the human’s being “as yet undetermined” is the basis 
for his criticism of Christian morality that determines and identifies the human 
being with one particular type, and in that sense Nietzsche’s definition of the 
human being includes the demand to maintain this “non-determination” and 
so to prevent full “animalization”.17 This definition allows him in any case to 
distinguish between higher and lower types of self-realisation. The higher ones 
most comply with humans’ undetermined status, that is, those who are most open 
to many possibilities.18 I will return to this difference regarding the normative 
implications of their respective anthropologies, after considering another point 
of similarity and conflict between our two thinkers.
Versfeld connects his definition of the human being as distinct from the rest 
of nature with a criticism of naturalism and subjectivism (both with respect to 
morality) for which he claims to have Nietzsche at his side. The combination of 
naturalism and subjectivism may be surprising; for, whereas naturalism seems 
to reduce the human being to a natural object, subjectivism reduces objectivity 
(at least the objectivity of moral judgements) to subjective perceptions and 
interpretations. But Versfeld points out that subjectivism really is just a variant 
of naturalism, and precisely for that he seems to rely on Nietzsche.
Subjectivism denies that moral judgements have anything to do with real 
qualities in the objective world. They only express the preference of the judging 
subject and the more resolutely these judgements are brought forward, the 
more they command others to act in conformity with these judgements. Moral 
judgements are commands; they express “the will do dominate over others 
without regard to anything except its private urges, and morality is transmuted 
into immorality” and, according to Versfeld, “[n]obody has been more consequent 
than Nietzsche in drawing the right conclusions from subjectivism” (PO 123).
17 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) §247; Beyond Good and Evil §203; and 
Twilight of the Idols §IX, 38.
18 Cf. Paul van Tongeren, Reinterpreting Modern Culture. An Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2000), 199–201.
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This does not yet show subjectivism to be a variant of naturalism. That 
becomes clear, however, as soon as we ask why someone (or ourselves, for that 
matter) would utter a moral judgement. There would be no justification for my 
commanding, which would not repeat the same verdict. Saying that it is good 
to command would amount to commanding somebody (or even everybody) 
to command – “[t]o say that it seems good to me to command can only mean 
that I command myself to command, which is no reason at all” (PO 123). This 
leads Versfeld to the conclusion that subjectivism reduces moral judgements to 
nothing other than facts of nature: they “would then have to be located in the 
sub-rational arcana of human nature, and in the act of commanding a man would 
become a slave to his irrational desires”. And, according to Versfeld, “here again it 
is Nietzsche who has the courage to go the whole way” (PO 123).
For a subjectivist, acting becomes behaviour; acts and decisions are reduced 
to events, which can be explained without making an appeal to reasons and final 
causes (PO 103). And so the subjectivist loses the subject, because it is nothing but 
a link in a chain of causes and effects. Subjectivism finds itself back as materialism 
and relativism (PO 125), and “[r]elativism in morals inevitably means absolute 
authoritarianism in law and in government” (PO 140). Nietzsche does indeed 
criticise the idea of a free subject as originating in creative acts and judgements 
and he interprets the act of willing as a complex organisation of commanding 
and obeying:
“Freedom of the will” – that is the expression for the complex state of 
delight of the person exercising volition, who commands and at the same 
time identifies himself with the executor of the order – who, as such, 
enjoys also the triumph over obstacles, but thinks within himself that 
it was really his will itself that overcame them. […] What happens here 
is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth; 
namely, the governing class identifies itself with the successes of the 
commonwealth.19
But he also criticises what Versfeld uses as a protection against this subjectivism: 
the idea of “an ultimate Intelligence” and the recognition of “absolute principles 
of good and bad” (PO 143). That is exactly what Nietzsche calls
19 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §19.
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the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far […] 
namely Plato’s invention of the pure spirit and the good as such. […] To 
be sure, it meant standing truth on her head and denying perspective, the 
basis condition of all life, when one spoke of the spirit and the good as 
Plato did.20
In as far as Nietzsche criticises naturalism, it is not because he would not “translate 
man back into nature” or recognise “the horrifying basic text of homo natura” 
from under the “flattering colors and make-up” of morality and metaphysics.21 On 
the contrary: he opposes standard naturalism, because it misunderstands itself and 
thinks of “nature” as something that proceeds according to laws – in other words 
because of its “naïvely humanitarian emendation and perversion of meaning”22 
Nietzsche does not oppose some kind of moral objectivism over the criticised 
subjectivism and naturalism, but rather a different kind of naturalism. Nietzsche 
is not an anti-naturalist, but he is a naturalist with another interpretation of 
nature than standard naturalism. Nature is, according to Nietzsche, rather “the 
tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power”.23
Both for Versfeld and Nietzsche, morality demands from the human being 
some kind of conformity with nature. For Versfeld, this implies an adherence 
to “the natural law theory of morals” (PO 134). Nature is, as the creation of 
an “ultimate Intelligence”, well-ordered. And human beings are, through their 
intellect, able to recognise this order, to know the “absolute principles of good 
and bad” implied in this creation, and to conduct their lives according to these 
principles. Since human beings can in fact overstep the limits set by nature, they 
have a duty to do what the rest of nature cannot but do.
For Nietzsche, on the contrary, nature is will to power, and “will to power” 
is always shorthand for the struggle of conflicting wills to power.24 Moral 
judgements and moral theories, but also scientific or philosophical theories of 
nature, are themselves such conflicting interpretations through which this will 
to power realises itself. If there is a moral demand included, it is the demand to 
become homologous to nature as will to power, which is to realise oneself as a 
20 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Preface.
21 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §230.
22 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §22.
23 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §22, 30f. Cf. also P. van Tongeren, “Nietzsche’s Naturalism,” 
in Nietzsche and the German Tradition, ed. Nicholas Martin (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), 
205–215.
24 Cf. P. van Tongeren, Reinterpreting Modern Culture. An Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2000), 154–165 and 220–228.
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struggle of conflicting wills to power: “The highest man would have the greatest 
multiplicity of drives, in the relatively greatest strength that can be endured. 
Indeed, where the plant ‘man’ shows himself strongest one finds instincts that 
conflict powerfully […], but are controlled.”25
And yet, even when Versfeld claims that “there can be no morality where 
absolute principles of good or bad are not recognised”, and while referring to the 
radical nihilistic consequences of this position, he does not criticise Nietzsche, 
but writes: “There is much here to learn from Nietzsche” (PO 142f ). How to 
understand this strange affection for the thinker who seems to be his antipode?
4. Nihilism
One way to answer our question would be to suggest that Versfeld refers to 
Nietzsche as the one who describes the dangers and the problems we face and who 
therefore shows why we should make up our minds and take measures. Nietzsche 
would be the diagnostician of the disease that Versfeld is trying to cure. That is 
the suggestion that Ernst Wolff makes in his introduction to the new edition of 
Oor gode en afgode, and he refers to a passage in that book where Versfeld writes 
that “Nietzsche was right in his observation of the facts” (GA 2nd ed. 22 and 
174). He not only described the facts correctly, but also saw their connection in 
the constellation of nihilism of which they were the symptoms, and analysed the 
origin of “this uncanniest of all guests” that “stands at the door”.26
In “The Philosophy of Morals” Versfeld writes in a footnote:
The best definition of nihilism has been given by Nietzsche. A nihilistic 
universe is a universe without a goal, which holds no answer to the 
question: why?, which has in short no “finality”. Nihilism is a radical 
denial of value, of intelligibility, and desirability. It is the conviction 
that there is no point in anything that happens. (PO 105)
25 From the unpublished notes: Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe 
in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli and M. Montinari (Munich and Berlin: DTV and De Gruyter, 
1980) 11, 27 [59]; Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. 
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), §966.
26 From the unpublished notes: Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke 12, 125 2 [127]; Nietzsche, Will 
to Power §1.
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Nietzsche has defined this disease, “predicted” (GA 134) its appearance as well 
as the consequences it will produce, and put the finger on its symptoms. It is 
almost as if Versfeld considers himself to be a successor of Nietzsche. Versfeld will 
start the cure for the disease that the Nietzsche diagnosed: “[a]s a diagnostician 
Nietzsche is superb. But it has been left to others to overcome, in a positive way, 
the evils which he has laid bare.”27
There are, however, some problems with this suggestion. Although Versfeld 
is inclined to identify rather Descartes and Rousseau as the primary suspects who 
caused the rise of nihilism, he certainly knows that Nietzsche not only describes 
the disease but also seems to approve and even promote the underlying causes of 
it: the “contempt of truth and duty” (GA 173) and the proclamation of the death 
of God. And Versfeld certainly knows that his own proposals for how the threat 
of nihilism could be forestalled or averted, differ radically from what Nietzsche 
has suggested.
Against the proclamation of the death of God, Versfeld develops a “Christian 
philosophy” (GA 136f ); against the separation of “fact and value”, he refers to 
J. Maritain’s presentation of Christ as the unity of fact and value (cf. GA 175), 
and to the Church as the mystical body of Christ;28 against “the uprooting of the 
belief in a primary reality” (GA 136f ), he affirms a metaphysical unity; against 
the thesis “that there is no natural distinction between good and evil” (PO 138), 
he departs from the belief in “a supernatural morality” (GA 141). And at the basis 
of all these oppositional claims is a fundamental difference regarding the meaning 
of this concept of “nihilism”.
For Versfeld, nihilism is something to be condemned and to fight against. For 
Nietzsche, on the contrary, it is an unavoidable event.29 Moreover, the history of 
European culture is, according to Nietzsche, the historical unfolding of nihilism. 
Platonism and Christianity have admittedly been able to hide the absurdity of 
life for a long time. But they have only managed to do so with the help of the 
fiction of a true world, beyond the actual one. This fiction is itself deeply nihilistic 
because it founds the meaning it construes on the denial (annihilation) of the 
world of the senses. It is the product of Socrates’s questioning, which always uses 
the distinction between doxa and episteme, between what seems to be the case and 
27 PO 144, as quoted in Ernst Wolff ’s introduction to the new edition of Oor gode en afgode, 
22.
28 Versfeld, “Die moderne humanisme,” in BU 109–123, here 118f.
29 In the rest of this paragraph, I briefly summarise what I have developed extensively in my 
Friedrich Nietzsche and European Nihilism (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2018), esp. chapter III.
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what really is, between apparent and true reality. Socrates’s search for truth, his 
truthfulness, has finally turned itself against its own presupposition and unmasks 
this true reality as its own fictional construction. The ultimate phase of this self-
undermining Socratic questioning is experienced as an antagonism: we can no 
longer believe in the fictions that we need in order to survive. Human beings, at 
least since Socrates, cannot but search for meaning; in their search, however, they 
finally discover that it is the question itself that condemns them to misleading 
or fictional ideals. In the famous Lenzer Heide note on The European Nihilism, 
Nietzsche writes:
We now notice in ourselves needs, implanted by the long-held morality 
interpretation, which now appear to us as needs to untruth: conversely, 
it is on them that the value for which we bear to live seems to depend. 
This antagonism – not valuing what we know, and no longer being 
permitted to value what we would like to hoodwink ourselves with – 
results in a process of disintegration.30
And that is what Nietzsche in The Gay Science describes as the
inexorable, fundamental and deepest suspicion about ourselves […] that 
could easily confront coming generations with the terrifying Either/
Or: “Either abolish your reverences or – yourselves!” The latter would 
be nihilism; but would not the former also be – nihilism? – This is our 
question mark.31
From this perspective, Versfeld’s call for a Christian philosophy, a supernatural 
morality and an objectivist metaphysics sounds like the typical restorative form 
of what Nietzsche calls “passive nihilism”: the longing for what is forlorn, rather 
than the therapy that would seamlessly fit Nietzsche’s diagnosis.
30 From the unpublished notes: Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke 12, 5 [71] section 2 (my translation). 
31 Nietzsche, Gay Science §346.
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5. Conclusion
The question therefore remains: how could Versfeld, often a perspicacious and 
attentive reader of the history of philosophy, be so positive about Nietzsche, who 
clearly goes in a completely different direction? How could he neglect everything 
in Nietzsche that did not fit his own philosophy and almost reduce Nietzsche’s 
philosophy to a question to which his own thinking could be the answer?
We probably need more than only Versfeld’s published writings as they have 
been researched for this article to find a solid answer to these questions. Maybe 
his private notes can tell us more about this affinity against his better judgement.
Or should we say that the affinity is the better judgement? That affinity has 
– without doubt – to do with something that Versfeld mainly showed in other 
publications than the ones I used for this chapter. He does not need to refer 
explicitly to Nietzsche to show that affinity when he writes about cooking and 
a variety of sensual experiences in Food for Thought and in the essays collected in 
Klip en klei, or when in Die neukery met die appelboom, he replaces Heidegger’s 
“being there” with “being here”, and writes that “heaven is where one is at home 
and no longer endlessly on the run”.32 In other words, I think that Versfeld and 
Nietzsche share a very basic sense of the “here and now” and the way our senses 
connect us to the world in which we live. In Zarathustra’s call to “remain faithful 
to the earth”,33 Versfeld might have recognised a kindred spirit, with whom he 
made friends. And that friendship went deeper than philosophical disagreements.
32 “Die hemel is daar waar jy tuis is en nie in ’n ewige ontvlugting betrokke is nie.” (NA 2nd ed. 
70)
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In The Portable Nietzsche, trans. W. Kaufmann 





GRASPING THE TRUTH  
FROM WHERE WE ARE
1. Introduction: Flux, stability and where we are
Who we are as humans is arguably the most pervasive theme in the thought of 
Martin Versfeld. In the concluding remarks to his Essay on the Metaphysics of 
Descartes (1940),1 he deplores Descartes’s egocentric self, which is isolated from 
the body, others and the world to such an extent that any relation between them 
remains merely accidental to what the ego essentially is. Half a century later, 
Versfeld chose the title Sum (I am) for a selection of his essays, which serves as 
“a sort of biography”. Situating this thought between the rejection of Descartes 
and the adoption of Socrates and Thomas Aquinas, he favours the “consonance” 
of oneself with oneself, others and the environment (Sum 7). Roughly between 
these two texts, his 1971 inaugural lecture at the University of Cape Town is 
devoted to the Socratic quest of “knowing thyself ” and was chosen to open a book 
entitled Persons.2 When the first page of Our Selves then opens with the Socratic 
call to know yourself, and frames this injunction straightaway with a critique of 
Descartes’s notion of the ego and approval of certain points of the thought of 
1 Marthinus Versfeld, An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes (London: Methuen, 1940), 
chapter XI, especially 148–150. This book is the published version of Versfeld’s doctoral 
thesis, completed in Glasgow in 1934, and represents his earliest independent work.
2 Marthinus Versfeld, “The Socratic spirit,” in Persons (Cape Town: Buren, 1972), 1–15.
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Augustine and Aquinas, one easily recognises the architect of this building by 
its façade, the design of which – as Versfeld explains – is an autobiographical act 
(OS 93).
Yet, such an architectural image may attribute more stability and structure 
to this collection of ten essays than it actually has. By the time the essays were 
published together in 1979, some of them already had an eventful career behind 
them. “On Justice and Human Rights” first appeared in 19603 and was therefore 
in circulation two decades before the appearance of Our Selves. “The Human 
Vision” might be equally old.4 Some essays tell a different story. “St Thomas, 
Newman and the Existence of God” appeared in 1967,5 and a version of it 
was later chosen to become a chapter in A Saraband of the Sons of God.6 But A 
Saraband of the Sons of God never saw the light of day. Two other essays from Our 
Selves, “Reflections on Evolutionary Knowledge”7 and “On Justice and Human 
Rights”, were set to become two of the five chapters of Versfeld’s Towards an 
Existential Political Philosophy.8 But Towards an Existential Political Philosophy 
was never published either. Furthermore, whereas some of the separate chapters 
were, then, previously assigned to be read in association with chapters other than 
their neighbours in Our Selves, there is reason to believe that “The Desirability 
of Desire” was initially not planned to be included in Our Selves, and three 
other essays were.9 From this information it is manifest that Our Selves had 
been simmering for a long time before it was dished up in its current format 
and we can understand why Versfeld could later say that, “For me, making 
3 Marthinus Versfeld, “On Justice and Human Rights,” Acta Juridica 1 (1960): 1–10.
4 The fact that a typed copy of this essay appears with other essays from the late 1950s (in the 
Versfeld collection in the University of Cape Town’s Archive, file 59) allows one to situate it 
with some uncertainty in the same period.
5 Marthinus Versfeld, “St Thomas, Newman and the Existence of God,” New Scholasticism 41 
(Winter 1967).
6 The selection of essays on authors such as Augustine, Rousseau, Kolbe, Chesterton, Aquinas 
and Newman was probably compiled around 1971 and can be found in the UCT Archive, 
files 155, 156 and 157. 
7 Published initially in the International Philosophical Quarterly 5, no. 2 (May 1965): 221–247.
8 The complete typescript of this book is in the UCT Archive, file 68. It was probably compiled 
sometime after 1966 and before 1972. The three other essays of this book would have been 
“Metaphysics in Our Time”, “Augustine and the Politics of Time” and “Law and the Idea of 
the Contemporary”; they can be read in other publications.
9 This claim is made on the basis of the content of file 136 in the UCT Archive: it contains a 
mix of manuscripts, typescripts and article offprints for nine of the ten chapters of Our Selves, 
plus three other essays. 
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soup is rather like writing; my mind is a rag-bag, bits occasionally cohering to 
form some sort of unity” (FT 13). Ten essays, amended over two decades and 
flowing into an occasional coherence, would come closer to a description of this 
collection.
This detail on the boiling process from which Our Selves originated is not 
of marginal interest to understanding the book; in fact, it confronts us with its 
central concern. And if it is permissible to remind guests of the laurel leaves that 
infused a dish, but were removed before serving, I may cite one of the discarded 
passages that were intended to give flavour to two of the essays of Our Selves and 
claim that it significantly informs the thought of this volume:
All things pass, as Theresa of Avila so often said, and though we reach 
out from the flux to grasp a stability which is the common aspiration 
of all men, yet the point from which we reach out is different for every 
man and for every generation, borne on as they are by the sweep of the 
creative process. We see the truth from where we are.10
According to this noteworthy clarification, the process by which Versfeld’s 
book was formed can be said to bear the traces (cf. OS 21) of the flux of time 
– the time of the personal life of a man called Martin, to whom these texts 
refer retrospectively. Through the eventful formation of the book, its author 
continually attempted to make sense of his own contingent situatedness and in 
this way persistently affirmed the soundness of aspiring to find “a stability”. “A 
stability” is not the perspectiveless, one-size-fits-all truth, but a truth that belongs 
to someone, who in turn belongs to a social reality, and by extension, to a history 
and to a world and ultimately to a “creative process”. Conversely, this is not an à la 
carte truth chosen at will either, but a creative force in which one can participate 
– such is the stability that Versfeld will attempt to uphold and illuminate in 
dialogue with a series of authors, represented in this citation by St Theresa.
Since all of the themes of the book are in one way or another related to 
this basic orientation with respect to “where we are”, it would be in order to say 
something more about it.
10 Cited from the second paragraph of the “Preamble” of Towards an Existential Political 
Philosophy (UCT Archive, file 68).
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2. Anthropology as first philosophy
Our Selves is a book of philosophy and it is therefore of no mean importance 
to notice what Versfeld girds himself for when he puts on the philosopher’s 
mantle: “Philosophy ought to start with anthropology in the Continental use of 
the term. What comes first is not theory of knowledge, but the problem of the 
being of man”, he writes in the opening sentence of “The Importance of Being 
Human”, and adds, “We shall appreciate this better the more clearly we see how 
anthropomorphic all our knowledge is” (OS 24). If one counts well, it follows 
from this remark that philosophy, even philosophical anthropology, always 
comes, at best, second: first is the problem of being human, then comes reflection 
on this problem. Consequently, one does best to start philosophy by thinking 
about the human being and not about epistemology, since one risks failing to see 
how the problem of being human shapes knowledge. Another way of putting it 
would be to say that all philosophical claims, in fact all truth claims, derive their 
nature, meaning and significance from their setting in human life. The same holds 
for whatever one desires to achieve with truths: conducting politics, developing 
technologies, promoting culture, and even practising religion.
Hence the need for a book that contemplates ourselves as human beings. 
Now, Versfeld chose for the title of his collection of essays to separate “our” and 
“selves”. “Selves” is a noun, the plural of “self ”, which the reader will see can be 
used with a small or capital S, and the title qualifies “selves” by the possessive 
pronoun in the first person plural, “our”. These snippets of linguistic elucidation 
suggest that there is more than one self for each human being, the association 
with which is to be understood as a kind of “possession” or “having” and that one 
does better to consider this having of selves as something that concerns us, and 
not only me. In this way the title leads to the central tenet of Versfeld’s thought 
on the self: everybody has the choice between two divergent forms of existence, 
or to put it more bluntly: “[…] we have two selves, and it is fatal to choose the 
wrong one” (PP 2nd ed. 70). When Versfeld roots philosophy in the problem of 
being human, he therefore derives the significance of all aspects of reality – be 
it political, technological, cultural or religious – from the decisive question 
concerning the quality of one’s self and of the ways in which you have your self with 
others.
If the one option is for the I, self or ego and a life guided by grasping desire 
and samsara, the other option is for the real self, the Self, the person who exercises 
generous desire and follows the Tao or finds union with God. The reader will not 
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find it difficult to trace the detail of this distinction throughout the book. Yet, 
one should guard against seeing this as a simple split between a narrow and a 
broad way. We should rather see two modifications of the same human existence, 
the difference located in the variation of the attitude one adopts towards one’s 
incarnation in a body, a society and an environment. A first approximation to 
these two attitudes is provided by the existential distinction between recognition 
and disregard for transitive being: I am my body, I don’t merely inhabit it (OS 
28ff.); I am with others, they are not merely added to me (OS 80); I am my world, 
it doesn’t merely contain me (OS 105). And hence, any attitude towards human 
existence that disregards these aspects of one’s existence by reducing the human 
being to either mind or body, and humanity to a collection of individuals or by 
alienating the world from the people, is calling for personal, sociopolitical and 
environmental pathologies associated with the distortion of the real self.
But one comes closer to Versfeld’s sophisticated reinterpretation of 
incarnation in Our Selves, by recalling the possessive pronoun in the title, “our”, 
which applies to both of our selves. As a matter of fact, Versfeld reveals that the 
transitive notion of being can itself be considered a form of having – having as 
something more primitive than legal ownership (OS 109); having as attachment 
through desire or love. Our desires constitute the very nature of our temporality 
that is lived as much bodily as mentally and therefore are the energy of the 
delight one can have in oneself (OS 5f., 9). Desires are “post-social” – we are 
directed at the world in a socially constituted manner – and the quality of our 
loves determines the quality of our relations to others (OS 7, 39). And if life 
is “an activity which makes things surrounding the living being relevant” (OS 
101), it is because through loving and desiring we are incarnate in a sphere of 
relevance; one possesses one’s self by possessing the world (OS 104). Having, 
as the nature of one’s loving or desiring, is what makes a self, whether it is more 
the real and decisive Self or the superficial and pathological mutation of it. 
Consequently, sinking into, or hardening into the grasping ego is then at the root 
of the sociopolitical misery presented throughout the book.
Despite this schematisation of two attitudes towards one’s existence, which is 
needed for the diagnostic criticism of the ego, nothing is further from Versfeld’s 
intention than a coarse moralism based on a denial of the difficult link between 
the two selves. Finding the true and decisive Self cannot mean bringing an end 
to the ego, because the very attempt to escape from the small self is itself an act 
of perseverance in the small self, or the desperate effort to escape the grasping 
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ego and the deformed world that its action creates, is still a grasping of the ego.11 
If, according to Buddhism, “Nirvana is not total extinction but the extinction of 
the grasping ego” (OS 12), Versfeld still affirms the Buddhists advice: “let your 
samsara be your nirvana” (OS 49). Or, to translate the same principle into more 
Augustinian parlance: “at the heart of every desire, no matter how sinful, there is 
a seed of the divine radiance which can be set free” (OS 45). And hence, therapy 
consists, not of uprooting, but of elevating warped desires (OS 47). That is why 
Versfeld could claim that the essence of the most severe religious practice, ascesis, 
“is not struggling or straining but relaxing into what we are” (OS 21).12
This is an important point, especially when bearing in mind those people 
for whom this talk of finding a true self might sound too much like torturous 
abnegation or misty esoterica. Seeking the true self is not levitating above the 
common reality of daily life, but the submerging into the reality of that life itself: 
even in things as plain as washing dishes (OS 6).13 Simply formulated, the true 
self is “our concrete individual being historically situated in the world” (OS 157). 
This particular situatedness is exactly the fact that has to be assumed in order to 
think (OS 157), or as Versfeld elaborates: 
We must, then, accept ourselves as we are, limited and embodied, and 
really connected with other beings including sensible beings. We seek 
to make sense of what we so accept not for the sake of any arbitrary 
assumption to be proved but simply in order to be able to accept 
ourselves as we are. (OS 165). 
Our situatedness is the “where we are” from which we see the truth (as in the 
citation discussed at the end of §1), but since it is the never completely recoverable 
source of relevance of thought, it will forever remain a mystery (OS 88). Hence 
Versfeld’s assertion concerning philosophy in his inaugural lecture:
I must confess at once that I do not know what philosophy is. This 
sometimes embarrasses me before the innocence of students, but not 
before those who have come to realise that the things by which we live 
11 Or again, “[d]odging out of samsara is a samsaric dodge”, ACCG 10.
12 This is the locus in Our Selves in which to look for an elucidation of the idea that “the secular 
is the miraculous”, what I have called elsewhere the analogical difference or the analogical 
spark (see Chapter 3, §6.3). For examples of this philosophical fingerprint of Versfeld in Our 
Selves, see OS 6, 14, 20f., 47, 49 and 68.
13 See also ACCG 10: “Spirituality is not found by withdrawal from the world but by the 
indrawal of the world.”
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are the things about which we know least. We do not know what life is, 
or what knowing is, or what truth and goodness are. Or if we do know 
we can’t say it […]. (Persons 1)
Anthropology as first philosophy is philosophy that thrives from that by which we 
live; from the abyssal and unknown depths of our existence (OS 65f.).
3. Traditions and cultural criticism
One has to recognise that this decentring or unsettling of philosophical reflection 
by the singular human life calls for an appropriate relation to the (often one-
sided) history of thought by which any contemporary philosopher has been 
schooled to think. This quest for a fitting relation to the history of thought is 
the reason for the surprising intertwinement of traditions of thought from which 
Versfeld draws in Our Selves: first the Greeks (especially Plato, e.g., OS 3, 7, 43, 
111f.), then biblical theology (e.g., OS 51ff.) and its mediaeval reception (which 
is already a combination of the former two), especially that of Augustine and 
Aquinas (see, for instance, Augustine’s theory of desires, OS 39ff., and Aquinas’s 
theory of knowledge, OS 130ff.). But Our Selves opens with a burst of oriental 
wisdom – especially Buddhism (most of the first two chapters of OS), but also 
Taoism (OS 10, 34, 38, 70), a bit of Hinduism (e.g., OS 2, 15), and Jewish 
mysticism (e.g., OS 46f., 50f.).14 Lastly, there is a distinct line of existentialism 
and/or phenomenology, which is quite surprising if one considers Versfeld’s 
general critique of modern philosophy.15 All of these strands are woven together 
in an intricate dialogue in which Versfeld does his best to respect the differences 
even while driving at his most central idea: from all of these bodies of thought, we 
14 Placing Jewish mysticism in the same basket as the variety of expressions of Eastern wisdom 
is somewhat artificial. However, Versfeld had the impression, at least from the mid 1970s, 
that he witnessed a boom in Western interest in oriental thought and later clearly associated 
Jewish mysticism with it. In fact, we are thinking primarily of Baal Shem Tov, often in Buber’s 
rendering of his life. See especially “A Western Sunrise” in PP 54–61.
15 Readers of Versfeld’s The Mirror of the Philosophers (1960) will remember that he explains 
that his friend Johan Degenaar compelled him to rethink his formulation of an up-to-
then primarily neo-Thomistic and neo-Augustinian philosophy (MP 43). Whereas this 
acknowledgement leads to a discussion on Kierkegaard, and Versfeld retains a certain distance 
with respect to phenomenological interpretations of Christianity, it is probably to this book 
that his appreciation for the phenomenological tradition should be traced. 
Martin Versfeld112
can learn something of the perennial philosophy (OS 90, 100); from all of them, 
there is substantial instruction to be drawn, regarding the function of philosophy 
“not to discover new truths but to explicitate the truth which is given with us in 
our own existence” (OS 165).
If there is a need for such “explicitation” in philosophy, it is because of the 
particular situation in which Western modernity has brought itself and large 
parts of the world. This calamity – which is nothing but the negative diagnosis 
persistent in all of Versfeld’s work16 and the background against which his 
preoccupation with what we are is to be understood – is the nominalist revolution 
and the decay of the mediaeval unity. One can read the features of this process 
of decay at different places throughout Our Selves (see in particular OS 58ff.). 
The tendency to separate body and mind is accompanied by overconfidence in 
the capacity to see what is going on in the mind, as well as the fragmentation 
of human reason and the unrealistic emphasis on certain aspects of this reason 
(OS 59). The separation of mind and body is replicated on a larger scale in the 
tendency to exaggeratedly separate society and nature (OS 58). To this is linked 
the excessive development of the masculine urge to dominate, enforced by science 
and technology (OS 61) and the reduction of natural and human processes to 
mechanics (OS 64). These negative developments, supported by advertising, fuel 
consumption (both of which result in the widespread distortion of desires) and 
therefore stand in the service of capitalism (OS 59). The latter requires asceticism17 
as well as individualism, which in turn facilitates the exploitation of nature and 
other human beings and the reduction of value to monetary value.
I leave the reader to discover how Versfeld develops the connection between 
these phenomena – and to decide to what degree they could be said to be harmful 
developments with respect to the European mediaeval condition of life. What 
has to be noted is that all of these phenomena are presented as sociopolitical 
symptoms of disregard for the perennial philosophy, but more profoundly, 
of the illness of the grasping ego gone rampant. These symptoms of the decay 
brought about by modernity can equally be traced in the work of such modern 
philosophers as Descartes, Bacon, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, 
Hegel and Marx, who form a tradition of thought from which Versfeld wishes to 
save the contemporary world. If there is in Our Selves a complex dispute between 
16 As evident already in GA 40. See also Chapter 3, §5 and Chapter 7, §2.
17 Cf. OS 62: “A deep contradiction reveals itself: money may be for pleasure, and rest on the 
production of pleasure-giving objects, but to make a lot of money you must take time off from 
pleasure. Indeed, you must be ascetic. You must drive yourself along the strait and narrow 
road which leads to acquisition.”
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proponents of Greek, Christian and oriental thought on the one hand, and the 
modern philosophers on the other, it is not as a childish fight among schools but 
a contest in which the health of society is at stake.
This point may be overlooked, since so much in the book is developed around 
the question of the two selves. But careful examination will reveal that the human 
being in society with others and with the environment is equally at stake in Our 
Selves. Not only does the violence of modern sociopolitical life form the core 
of Versfeld’s diagnosis to which he responds, but as he learned from Augustine, 
ethics and politics should be seen to have immediate mutual implications (OS 
41), which could be traced in people’s reflection on desire and on justice (OS 
41, 82).18 The reason for the indissociable link between ethics and politics is the 
sociopolitical constitution of the world (OS 121). Moreover, the well-being of 
the body politic, a just social fibre, is created by the collective effect of healthy 
personal relations (OS 107).
4. Using a thorn to take out a thorn, and throwing  
both away
In accordance with his view that philosophy is not intent on discovering new 
truths, but on the “explicitation” of what is given (as explained above), one 
doesn’t find the author of Our Selves working on the construction of a novel 
philosophical system. He much rather attempts much rather to call us back to 
something from which we cannot escape and of which he is not the author. The 
value of his writing is situated in the translation of the perennial philosophy for a 
specific context, according to the needs of this context. Hence the independence 
of Versfeld’s thought consists precisely in his writing from where he is. Two salient 
features of his manner of working follow from this orientation and situation of 
his work – let’s call them reduction and detachment.
18 Writing his review (in African Book Publishing Record VI, no. 3/4, 1980) of Our Selves 
from South Carolina, Daniel Sabia seemed to miss the significance of this point. Although 
the reviewer understands the enrootedness of all the concerns of Versfeld’s book in human 
existence, he fails to see that the entire ethics of the self developed in these essays is a politics 
of the self as access to the society and world in which the self is to live.
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4.1 Reduction – Using a second thorn
There can be no doubt about the central importance of religious thought – in 
particular the Catholic thought of God – in the entirety of Versfeld’s works. And 
yet, it is not so simple to say flatly that his philosophy is Christian. Versfeld is quite 
clear on this in an earlier draft for the first paragraph of “The Yin and the Yang 
in Christian Culture” (OS chapter 5): 
Being known to be officially a Catholic in the regions where I live, I 
am sometimes asked: you’re a Catholic, aren’t you? I can never reply 
without a considerable degree of hesitation. I have pondered over 
this hesitation. I have come to the conclusion that this pondering has 
sufficient significance to be made public. 
This isn’t quite as personal as it sounds. We are all under the 
influence of the Christian ethic and spirituality. We inevitably go on 
being Christian as Chinese go on being Confucian, no matter what 
sea-changes have occurred. The Marxist, for instance, continues to be 
dynamised, of historical necessity, by much of what he explicitly rejects. 
You can take stock of where you are, but you cannot step out of it.19
In other words, for Versfeld, thought about being a Christian, and his own 
thought in particular, has to acknowledge the general cultural shaping it has 
undergone by a certain Christian heritage, but has to do so in two divergent ways: 
one that recognises the failures, weaknesses and violence of this tradition; the 
other that explores the true core of assumed Christianity. We find a number of 
forms of existence of Christianity that are rejected by Versfeld, and the reader can 
learn much of the author’s cultural criticism from this: he rebukes fundamentalist 
and moralist Protestantism (OS 59), the body-despising, institution-rejecting and 
business-minded Puritan individualism (OS 36, 62), some of the “superficial fools 
who write books on apologetics” (OS 157), of course Cartesianism, in which God 
comes only to a solitary, ahistorical, disincarnate and world-doubting mind (OS 
157, 164), and the political compromise and moral policing of some popes and 
the curia (OS 54f., 57).
19 In UCT Archive, file 135. Although these two paragraphs are crossed out, I consider them 
to state in a more personal and specific manner what is written in more general terms in the 
final version of the text, and partially to overlap with it (OS 52).
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But just as it is, therefore, not that simple to say that Versfeld is a proponent 
of Christianity, so it is, in his mind, not self-evident to deny a certain Christianity 
that energises his non-Christian contemporaries. What Versfeld intends to do is to 
find what is precious in both confessing and cultural Christianity. However, this 
statement should be qualified, since for Versfeld it is not a matter of Christianity 
as opposed to other religions (as can be seen in particular in OS chapters 1 and 
2), or of faith in opposition to reason (see in particular OS chapters 8 and 9). In 
fact, the other religions and spiritual traditions and the use of reason are vital for 
calling us back to that something from which his thought draws: “that by which 
we live” (or ought to), that which the perennial philosophy attempts to explicate 
truthfully. 
The different traditions of religion and thought from which Versfeld borrows 
in Our Selves all serve to lead us back to this mysterious and elusive core. It is 
not to introduce a new and truer thought or religion that Versfeld engages with 
Buddhism or Taoism, but “for many of us at any rate, it would be wiser if these 
Eastern ideas served to remind us of things that have been forgotten or have 
gone stale in our own tradition, and brought new life to them” (OS 69) – this 
“own tradition” being our Christian past of which we cannot rid ourselves (OS 
52, 68, 162). Buddhism puts the taste back into Christianity. But this service 
can be rendered in the opposite direction too: “Those who think that Buddhism 
contains the answer to all their problems, fail to see the strength of their own 
tradition. While Buddhist pundits were hairsplitting grasping desire into many 
dozens of variety, Western thinkers were analysing the political consequences of 
grasping desire. The foremost was St Augustine […]” (OS 41). Furthermore, apart 
from the instruction on the political implications of desire that Augustine can 
give his Buddhist colleagues, he shows his strength by calling to our minds the fact 
that distorted desires do not point the way to eliminating desire, but to the need 
for elevating them (OS 47). For Versfeld, instead of this debate leading eventually 
to the elimination of one of the parties, rather the reconstructed discussion serves 
to enhance the searching effort: since “[e]very man is naturally in the truth – a 
Zenist would say that he is a Buddha; a Christian that he is in the image of God” 
(OS 87) – the mutual contradictions remind us of the provisional character of 
both, and should encourage continual discussion by which we are led back to this 
nonpropositional truth in which we live.20
20 The complex interplay between traditions should deter the reader from reaching unjust 
conclusions, such as reducing Versfeld to his appropriation of oriental thought – as was done 
by the anonymous reviewer of Our Selves in “Mirror of Enlightenment,” The Cape Times, 12 
May 1979. In his review of Our Selves, Hennie Rossouw is more precise by saying that Versfeld 
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Let it immediately be added that philosophy has its voice to add to this 
chorus. Having transcended the strictures of the materialism–idealism debate, 
contemporary philosophy finds the unity between humans and their world, and 
as a result can help us to better understand oriental thought (OS 90). Particularly 
remarkable is the role attributed to philosophy with regard to Aquinas: his proofs 
of the existence of God “must be given an existential interpretation” (OS 159) 
and from the context of Versfeld’s argument one should understand this as an 
existential, phenomenological interpretation. The fact that Versfeld undertakes 
this existentialisation of Aquinas by means of the Catholic philosophy of John 
Henry Newman is of secondary importance.
The spirit of this confrontation of different traditions seems to me perfectly 
captured in the phrase, “[…] to go back to the perennial philosophy”, in which 
the latter is immediately defined in terms of the meaningful relatedness of people 
to a world (OS 90) – in other words, as a means of leading one back to what 
precedes philosophy. Versfeld’s way of doing this consists of leading his reader 
and his dialogical partners back from spectator perspectives (and especially from 
the modernist absolutisation of the spectator perspective) to the perspective, or 
rather the fact, of being a participator in a world, in other words to our true selves.21 
It is only from participation in existence that one can find one’s own humanity 
and world meaningful (OS 168). By contrast, philosophy that starts from doubt 
withdraws the thinker from the personal, social and natural world that makes 
that thinker into a person (OS 105); by recognising the practical situatedness and 
the meaningfulness of one’s situation, one can think about things that matter. 
Hence, the superiority of Aquinas over Descartes (OS 158), or Newman over 
Russell (OS 161). Hence also the importance of Aquinas’s assertion that the 
human being has intellect and hands (OS 108, 111, 135, 159). The combination 
of intellect and hands amounts, for Versfeld, to practical reason or prudence 
(OS 107, 169) – in other words, reason as physically, historically, socially and 
environmentally situated and which seems to be the root of anything that could 
doesn’t plead for a “spiritual emigration” out of the Western tradition and rather seeks to 
affirm one’s embeddedness in that heritage by means of oriental wisdom (see “Versfeld – 
filosoof met eie boodskap,” in Die Burger, 12 July 1979). But this holds, of course, only for 
those standing in the Western tradition.
21 I have underscored the position of a certain influence of phenomenology on Versfeld, not 
only because the notion of “leading back” (reduction as re-ducere) is a central notion operating 
in phenomenology, but also because reduction is charged with coping with the relation 
between the self as spectator and the self as participator. See Rudolf Bernet, “La réduction 
phénoménologique et la double vie du sujet,” in La vie du sujet. Recherches sur l’interprétation 
de Husserl dans la phénoménologie (Paris: PUF, 1994), 5–36.
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be called rational or reasonable for Versfeld.22 Hence the importance of the 
life that supports an argument: who one is, or rather, what kind of life one has, 
matters at least as much as what one’s opinion is. In fact, philosophy is for Versfeld 
first of all a way of life, as has been affirmed with force by Pierre Hadot, and one 
could rightfully claim that the message of Our Selves is the call for the art of 
coming home.23
But by working towards the confluence of these traditions and carefully 
choosing which aspects to highlight and which parts to make echo with others, 
has Versfeld not in fact created his own theory of human existence and made it 
the universal code of entry into meaningful human existence?
4.2. Detachment – Throwing both thorns away
Versfeld answers the objection above explicitly:
It may, of course, be retorted that in this chapter I have been theorising 
myself, and simply putting up an alternative construction. I could reply 
in the words of a Buddhist that Buddhism was using a thorn to take out 
a thorn, after which one throws both away. […] [W]hat I have tried to 
do is to point to a moral fact rather than explain it. It remains a mystery 
to me. If I have called your attention to yourselves you can forget about 
me. (OS 88)
If the sociopolitical evils of the modern world and the philosophical expressions 
that supported it, implicitly or not, represent the first thorn, then all the traditions 
that Versfeld deploys, and certainly his own work, represent a second thorn, one 
that is destined to be discarded with the first one … but not without being used 
first. And not without the conviction (or the assumption, OS 157) that by doing 
so, something of decisive importance is laid bare. But have we not seen from the 
beginning that this something decisive, this mystery, is “our concrete individual 
being historically situated in the world” (OS 157)? Has this concrete existence 
22 While avoiding for current purposes extensive comparisons between Versfeld and other 
philosophers, one can hardly omit noting the striking similarity between the centrality 
of a metaphysics in which all categories of being are reduced from a phenomenological 
reinterpretation of Aristotle’s notion of phronesis (prudence) as in Heidegger, and Versfeld’s 
existentialisation of Aquinas – with the help of Newman –to place practical reason as the 
source of all intelligence. 
23 As Hennie Rossouw pointed out in his discussion of Our Selves in “Die kuns van die lewe is 
om tuis te kom,” 18–19.
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not been expounded as the most primitive form of having? Why then speak of 
detachment and not rather of attachment?
To be sure, these questions lead us to the apparent paradox that “the only 
attachment is detachment” (OS 47). As “intellect and hands”, human beings 
penetrate their surrounding environment and establish ties of relevance with 
that which they are not (OS 102), and it is exactly by appropriating a world in 
this manner that one becomes a person (OS 105). Accordingly, attachment is 
epistemologically and practically given (OS 48, 108). This seems to me to be 
ultimately the significance of Versfeld’s ceaseless insistence that the basis of acting 
in the world is the fact that the world is already in us (e.g., OS 28, 32, 73, 79, 
103, 129). Reformulated, that an environment has meaning to someone is what 
makes it possible to act. Therefore, the speaking about detachment is a “spiritual 
counsel” (OS 48) not to become so obsessed by the people and things with 
whom we interact that we lose sight of how we are meaningfully woven into our 
environment of people, things and nature. Detachment, therefore, doesn’t aim 
to withdraw from the world or dissolve into a bland state of apathy, but rather 
to reassume the meaning that constitutes us as persons by “relaxing into what we 
are” (OS 21). It is a major persuasion of Our Selves, and probably of all Versfeld’s 
work, that what we are, is given to us, proceding from divine generosity and 
coming to us as the procession of the creatures created by God (OS 48, 50, 109). 
If detachment is relaxing into the flow of time initiated by this creative process, 
then finding the true self means acting “directly out of what we are” (OS 85). 
That is why “the saint’s detachment is really a higher form of attachment” (OS 
48) and therefore ethics has everything to do with creativity and not that much 
with rules, in Versfeld’s mind. In other words, moral judgement is for him less the 
application of principles or ideals and rather a matter of spontaneity – and on this, 
Christian, oriental and contemporary existentialist thinkers would concur (cf. 
OS 86). One could say that the ethics of detachment is an ethics of love, because 
“love is creatively spontaneous” (FT 92).
But I have announced the theme of detachment by saying that it forms part 
of Versfeld’s way of working. By describing what detachment entails for one’s 
life, I have not lost my thread, but prepared the context from which detachment 
as a manner of philosophising draws its meaning. We can observe in a number 
of ways how Versfeld attempts to detach himself from his writing even when 
writing. The interference of different traditions of thought could be considered 
the first of these, or it might be that elements from them are woven together in a 
supportive manner to form the “second thorn”, but this can be done only at the 
expense of whatever claim to exclusivity any of them might have. The value of 
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Versfeld’s trade is submitted to a similar relativisation: detached dishwashing is 
in final consideration more valuable than expressing one’s ego by writing a tome 
of philosophy. This means that philosophy is reduced to recalling or pointing 
to truth, instead of containing it: “If I have called your attention to yourselves 
you can forget about me” (OS 88). Humility, which is the basis of the cardinal 
virtues, is therefore certainly more than the style of presentation of one’s writing 
or action – it is the act of detachment by which one affirms that one belongs to 
a world that is given, not self-made (OS 104f.).
Versfeld seems to drive the detachment of his philosophising to a climax in 
the last chapter of Our Selves, when he digresses on the nature of philosophy (OS 
165f.). He discards the pretence of philosophy to discover new truths, and pushes 
aside the claim of a certain philosophical tendency to master its own hold on 
reason by methodological doubt in favour of drawing from naivety. In this sense 
philosophy thrives on a sort of stupidity (OS 10). Furthermore, instead of serious 
work or even serious creation, the first virtue of the metaphysician is now said 
to be play, understood as “conflict creatively controlled by a containing order” 
(OS 166). One can hardly miss how far Versfeld is down the road of detachment, 
when he – who insisted that philosophy starts with anthropology and adamantly 
affirmed the anthropomorphic nature of our knowledge – asserts that the human 
being is not only insignificant (OS 26f.) and unknowable, but funny, and so 
promotes humour to the heart of philosophical seriousness. Kierkegaard is singled 
out as a thinker who “had the humorous sense of incongruity and the comic 
necessary for a metaphysician” (OS 166).
Readers of Versfeld’s work of the 1980s might interpret his exquisite sense 
of humour as the licence of a retired professor who is fed up with the discipline 
of academic writing. Perhaps this is not devoid of truth. But it would at least be 
equally plausible to see this turn of style as progress in his detachment. “Detaching 
yourself from things is a good old advice”, the Catholic philosopher writes in 
an essay on “Mucking Out” and continues: “If you chuck the Bible into the 
wastepaper basket, it proves perhaps that you have learned its most intimate 
lesson.” 24 
24 See “Opruim” in NA 2nd ed. 30.
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5. Questioning from where we are
But if Versfeld confronts us with ourselves and the world in which we live, he can 
do so only by confronting us with himself. In this chapter I have attempted to 
show how he does this by highlighting a number of the most striking themes that 
run through this selection of essays and by interpreting their interconnection. A 
proper evaluation of the book can be undertaken only by considering it in all its 
complex and intricate detail – a pleasure to which I hasten to invite the reader. 
Thus, in conclusion, I shall merely suggest a number of questions – ensuing from 
the previous discussion – that might enhance the reader’s attention when reading 
the book and contemplating its contents.
Decisive for any reception of Versfeld’s thought is the extent to which one 
considers his diagnosis of modernity convincing. The decay of the mediaeval 
unity, started by the nominalist revolution and developed fully in modernity, 
tends to be represented as a lens for reading contemporary sociopolitical evils, 
as the historical manifestation of the political implications of an Augustinian 
diagnosis of distorted desires. Versfeld surely suffers from no shortage of examples 
to make the case for an ailing Western world, and when he goes so far as to 
consider Hitler to be “an inevitable phenomenon of a utilitarian rationalising 
society and a product of the Enlightenment” (OS 66), one has to acknowledge 
that he is in good company (think especially of the critical theorists of the 
Frankfurt School). Yet, one could wonder if more recognition of the other fruits 
of modernity is not due in his philosophy of history. I think not only of the virtues 
of existentialist phenomenology (because he sings its praises in Our Selves), but 
more importantly of the humanist cultural politics of the Enlightenment, which 
(apart from whatever valid criticism one might want to formulate against it) 
should at least be credited for creating the intellectual climate and institutional 
support in which translations of and commentaries on the Upanishads, Lao 
Tzu and Chuang-tzu, and the Buddhist masters (on which Versfeld’s thought 
flourishes) could be made. Such modern tendencies of thought are, additionally, 
responsible for creating the means by which to edit and distribute these and other 
texts, without which Versfeld’s work would simply be impossible.
Conspicuous in Versfeld’s encompassing outline of modern decay is the 
absence of the profusion of the arts. Surely one can trace modernist characteristics 
in the different forms of artistic invention of the modern era, but I find it difficult 
to see the music of Bach, for instance, as a symptom of decay of anything. Or should 
one rather understand Versfeld to maintain that some modern sociopolitical 
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tendencies are harmful, as motivated or testified to by modern philosophers, but 
that other typical modern phenomena are either good or at least harmless? But if 
this is the case, one will have to embark on a very tough search in Versfeld’s text for 
the sources of such nonmediaeval (and non-Buddhist, non-Taoist, etc.) sources of 
well-being in modernity itself. Furthermore, if the decay of the mediaeval unity 
explains Hobbes and Descartes, what explains Kierkegaard and Nietzsche?25 Or 
is it implied that modern culture is to be understood to carry some good despite 
itself, analogously to the deformed desires of which Versfeld says that they should 
not be uprooted but elevated, since they contain some good (OS 45, 47)?
Contrasting a philosophy that starts in doubt with one that seeks to 
excavate and explicate meaning is not unacceptable (think, for example, of 
Versfeld’s contemporary, Paul Ricoeur, who drew a similar distinction between 
interpretation as an exercise of suspicion and interpretation as recollection of 
meaning). But would one not risk succumbing to plain naivety if one were to 
practise a philosophy of the explication of meaning without confronting the 
preformed meaning steadily with different varieties of doubt or suspicion? 
Now, since one can certainly not attribute such a basic naivety to Versfeld, is 
one then to conclude that the kind of suspicion generally required by our times, 
can be delivered with the help not of Marx, Freud, Nietzsche and company, but 
with other means such as an elaboration on Augustine’s philosophy of desire? 
(That such a cultural criticism through alternative means is realisable, is amply 
illustrated in Versfeld’s feminist critique of modern Christian culture in OS 
chapter 5.) But still, this Augustinian critique does seem to have left the tissue of 
meaning weaved by the real self ’s being in the world in a state of uncompromised 
innocence. There is, for instance, according to Versfeld, “often more wisdom in 
our bodies formed by the eternal Tao than in our minds” (OS 70). In other words, 
for Versfeld the true self is not a predator, but is truly innocent, and yet, at the 
same time, the true self is also the singular, historically formed and situated self. 
Subsequently, this line of interrogation ultimately leads to the heart of the thesis 
of Our Selves, since the reader will have to decide with what justice Versfeld can 
suppose that the true self to which Versfeld attempts to lead his readers (and 
25 In my introduction to the reedition of Oor gode en afgode (now Chapter 3, §5) I have 
shown that in Versfeld’s very first development of his criticism of modernity, Nietzsche is 
exempt from criticism and co-opted as a diagnostic partner. This reading of Nietzsche is 
repeated with only a slight deviation in Our Selves. See again Van Tongeren’s examination 
of Versfeld’s relation to Nietzsche in Chapter 4. While he subjects Kierkegaard to a harsher 
reading, Versfeld elevates him in Our Selves at least to the position of quite a good modernist 
philosopher.
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himself ) back and which is characterised by the exercise of balanced desires, is 
the same as the particular historically situated being of every individual. One 
could also ask if it is not imaginable that the ego could sometimes act as the first 
defence against the mysterious forces at work in the inscrutable depths in which 
the singular, historical self is constituted. The answer to these questions will 
decisively influence one’s idea of the desirability and success of Versfeld’s project.
These reflections on modernity inevitably direct one to ponder the notion 
of the world in which we live, or as Versfeld would say, the place where we are. 
Now, I understood well that he has insisted that this world is neither the sum of 
things around us, nor merely the sum of mental pictures that we have of it, but the 
incarnate living in a sphere of relevance. Yet, this notion of the world cannot be 
thought without consideration for the things that happen to surround a specific 
person. Therefore, whereas one might easily go along with Versfeld’s criticism of 
contemporary capitalism and consumerist society, it is less obvious to see where 
his philosophy of the true self would lead those people whose daily lives are shaped 
by the way in which they are inescapably embedded in this historical context. This 
matter becomes painful when one ponders what it could mean to find your true 
self by relaxing into what you are, for people living under conditions of social 
injustice, where what one is, is constituted by structural injustice. It might be a 
drawback of all his recuperation of classical and mediaeval authors, that none of 
them wrote from or for the life in the big modern city and hence their wisdom 
– as rich in instruction as it might be – doesn’t occupy itself with the intricacies 
of having to live in such an environment. Consequently, the teaching of the true 
self can remain intact, and the complicated question regarding practically living 
in the modern world is swept under the rug of a cultural criticism of modern 
society. Or should the reader rather accept that the nature of advice for true living 
is such that it cannot be prescribed, and that Our Selves is an invocation to an 
ethic of prudence and spontaneity for which every agent has to take individual 
responsibility?
But the question concerning “where we are” also has an intellectual side: 
if one concedes to Versfeld’s claim (as regards mediaeval Christianity) that one 
cannot tear oneself from the spiritual tradition in which one is historically rooted 
– should it then not be admitted that three or four centuries of modern history 
suffice to form a tradition of its own, one from which it might be equally injurious 
to tear oneself ? And if one lives in plural traditions, would it not be necessary to 
reflect on the relative importance, significance, desirability and influence of these 
respective traditions? One would also have to contemplate, when reading Our 
Selves, what the status is of traditions that are not named here. Are they omitted 
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simply because Versfeld didn’t have time to work on all of them, or is it that they 
make no significant contribution in calling us to who we are? Something should 
at least be made explicit about this – a demand that has over the last three decades 
of South African history only gained in importance. And then one could also ask 
questions about the traditions that Versfeld draws on with as much enthusiasm 
as creativity. One case in point: I certainly don’t deny a philosopher the right to 
select from other thinkers what to take on and what not to, but if one considers 
the kind of repeated criticism to which a political thinker like Hobbes is exposed, 
one cannot but be astounded that Versfeld, for whom the very political import 
of his philosophy of our two selves is structured by an Augustinian continuity 
between ethics and politics (OS 41), never even mentions that Augustine’s 
justification of violent opposition against the Donatists constitutes “the key 
witness for the theological justification for forcible conversions, the Inquisition 
and the holy war, against deviants of all kinds”.26 The reader will have to decide if 
the charge of a lack of even-handedness against Versfeld’s use of historical sources 
is valid, and if so, what the significance thereof is for his central arguments.
A last set of interesting questions with which to explore Our Selves concerns 
exactly the relation between ethics and politics. I simply accept Versfeld’s 
insistence on the role that interpersonal relations play in weaving a social and 
even political fabric. However, it is something quite different to deduce that 
the “great injustices are the cumulative expression of the injustices done in 
particular personal relationships” (OS 107). I cite this statement because it says 
a lot about a tendency in Our Selves to reduce political action to ethical action. 
The consequence of doing this is that a very heavy load of decision-making, also 
with a view to political justice, is placed on the individual (cf. OS 106f.). This fits 
awkwardly with his insistence on the primordial sociality of people. But then, it 
cannot be denied that this shift gives vigour to individual responsibility in the 
repressive context of apartheid in South Africa, which could perhaps be said to 
have necessitated a shift in the balance from political to ethical initiative. One 
will have to decide to what extent his ethicopolitical convictions in Our Selves 
took shape in response to these particular historical circumstances and whether 
such convictions could be considered appropriate for this situation and for ours. 
Furthermore, even when considering the importance of individual responsibility, 
one has to contemplate if the desiring ego wouldn’t under certain circumstances 
fare at least equally well in obstructing injustice as a mindset of detachment.
26 See Hans Küng’s discussion of this in his chapter on Augustine in Great Christian Thinkers 
(London: SCM Press, 1994); citation, 82.
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If these questions succeed in plunging the reader in the lively flow of a life 
of reflection of which Our Selves is a midway account, they have served their 
purpose. A midway account is indeed what Our Selves is – not only because, as has 
been indicated in the chapter’s introduction, this selection of essays documents 
something of the life and evolution of their author, but also because this selection 
of essays represents an episode of the continual effort of the author to go back from 
his own grasping ego to his true self. Pointing out the developing tensions and 
unsettled issues in Our Selves doesn’t amount to rejecting it; rather, by entering 
into a vigorous contemplation of these essays, the reader will be questioned, and 
challenged, by the development of a singular human being’s efforts to find his 
real self, to find nirvana in his particular samsara. Besides, the reader that looks 





VERSFELD’S  DIALOGUE WITH 
EASTERN THOUGHT
By J. S. Krüger
1. Introduction
The encounter of Marthinus (Martin) Versfeld (1909–1995) with Eastern 
thought is a fascinating thread in the tapestry of his life and work. Brought up 
in the Dutch Reformed Church, Versfeld joined the Roman Catholic Church 
a number of years after his exposure to Aquinas and Christian mystics during 
his doctoral studies at the University of Glasgow. As a result, Catholic thought, 
represented particularly by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, became the lifelong 
mainstay of his thinking. He completed his doctoral thesis on Descartes, which 
was subsequently published as An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes (1940). 
This figure would remain the lifelong negative reference point of Versfeld’s 
thinking. The third side of the triangle of his work was his interest in Eastern 
thought, which also commenced at a fairly early stage of his life and continued 
to its end. A number of articles dealing with his philosophy1 refer to this interest, 
1 W.A. de Klerk, “Marthinus Versfeld: mens en denker”; W.A. de Klerk, “Marthinus Versfeld: 
die man en sy denke”; Rossouw, “Die kuns van die lewe is om tuis te kom”; Wolff, “Sanctus 
Marthinus Laudator Philosophicus”; Wolff, “Selfkennis, verstandigheid en inkarnasie: ’n 
Interpretasie van Martin Versfeld se Oor gode en afgode”; Wolff, “Grasping the Truth from 
Where We Are”; and Wolff, “Poeisis. Oor maaksels en hul wêreld na aanleiding van Versfeld 
se Pots and Poetry.”
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but as far as I could establish, this aspect of his thinking has not been investigated 
in detail before.
How far did he journey, how deeply did he penetrate the religious landscape 
of the East? Who were his guides and companions? Was he a casual tourist or 
visitor, or did he find a second home there? Versfeld does not offer any significant 
autobiographical pointers in this regard, so I shall trace his development as it 
unfolded in his publications (both more academic and more popular, in both 
English and Afrikaans) in the chronological order of their appearance, and 
that will determine the format of this chapter. I am interested in the following 
aspects:
(a) The measure of his direct contact with Eastern thought, by which I mean 
acquaintance with primary texts (perhaps in the original languages) and/or 
exposure to any living traditions.
(b) The extent to which his encounters with at least some oriental religions are 
embedded in a well-informed understanding of their historical contexts and 
developments.
(c) An explicit theoretical model in his writing concerning the relationship 
between Western Christian thought and Eastern thought. To what extent 
do his encounters express an explicit comparative methodology and 
hermeneutic? To what extent does his writing accommodate both Western 
and Eastern religions in one comprehensive, inclusive theoretical context?
(d) The possible structural similarities between his own thinking and Eastern 
models, regardless of his own intentional articulation of such relationship.
Starting with (a), Versfeld does not appear to have had any direct linguistic access 
to Mandarin (the literary language of Taoism, his Chinese field of interest), 
Sanskrit or Pali (the two classical languages of Indian religions, including 
Buddhism, his particular religio-philosophical interest in that subcontinent). 
This is noted, but will not be held as a serious criticism of his dialogue with 
Taoism and Buddhism, taking into account that he was a pioneering figure in 
the twentieth-century South African context. On the other hand, for the sake 
of a realistic appraisal of his work, it needs to be said that he made no serious 
contribution to the study of Chinese or Indian religions as such in a linguistic, 
historical or philosophical sense. To put this in proper historical perspective, 
bear in mind the contributions made to the study of Sanskrit by, for example, 
William Jones long before, beginning in the end of the eighteenth century, and 
Wilhelm Schlegel in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In this analysis, 
I shall limit myself largely to his encounter with Indian religion in the form of 
Buddhism, not least because I am not a specialist in Taoism with the linguistic 
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requisites to give an expert opinion on that religion. However, his references to 
Taoism will be carefully noted.
Versfeld’s writing is usually of an entertaining, relaxed, essayistic type. That 
is not regarded as a handicap to intellectual, academic or religious work, but 
appreciated as part and parcel of the entire package of his thought.
2. Groundbreaking early works
1. The foundations of Versfeld’s mature thinking were laid in two works appearing 
during his thirties, in the decade spanning the beginning of the Second World 
War (1939), and the beginning of the system of apartheid as government policy 
in South Africa (1948). The first work was his doctoral thesis on Descartes, 
written in English: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes (1940); the second, 
a book of protest and warning, written in Afrikaans: Oor gode en afgode (On 
Gods and Idols) (1948). Both books are led by a sense of crisis: the first aspired 
to a break with Descartes and the birth of “a new kind of man”,2 the second, to 
a break with nationalism and apartheid; both marked the outlines of Versfeld’s 
future development.
The thesis does not yield anything of relevance concerning Eastern religions. 
It is a critique of Descartes, blaming the French philosopher’s subjectivism and 
egocentrism for the error of psychologism in modern philosophy. The course of 
Versfeld’s thinking was by this point fixed, but there is no evidence of an awareness 
of and interest in Eastern religions. An interesting question is what difference 
it might have made if Versfeld had been conversant with, for example, a third 
(Eastern) possibility, such as early Buddhism’s critique of both the construction 
of views of what lies outside the limits of human cognition (an equivalent of 
which was Aquinas’s five proofs for the existence of God), as well as of the fixation 
on the “ego” (which is what Descartes’s position boils down to). Likewise, one 
may wonder what difference an early confrontation with the epistemological 
critique of a Nāgārjuna would have made to Versfeld’s adherence at this stage to 
two alternatives: theistic religion of the Augustinian-Thomistic type, and what 
followed in the wake of Descartes. But such speculation is futile; such a meeting 
would have been outside the bounds of what was available to the young scholar 
in 1940.
2 Versfeld, An Essay on the Metaphysics of Descartes, 148.
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2. Eight years later (in Oor gode en afgode) the Eastern side of the triangle 
is slightly more evident, but still in rudimentary form. Neither an inclusive 
religio-historical framework, nor an explicit comparative religious hermeneutic, 
nor a theory inclusive of all religions is as yet discernible. By comparison, his 
endorsement of Platonism-Aristotelianism and his intellectual and existential 
commitment to Augustinian-Thomistic thinking has taken clear shape in his 
Christian philosophy. His response to Descartes has taken off.
In Versfeld’s view, Aquinas presents “the best, perhaps the perfect solution” 
(GA 3) to the problem of the relationship of Greek philosophy and Christian 
faith. Those who took wrong turns are the ones turning away from that model, and 
they include Luther (with his contradistinction of faith and reason) and Kant (as 
follower of Luther). Eternal God (GA 149) as “Primary Existent” (GA 97) is the 
axiomatic point of departure, and Christian faith is “a life of loving commitment 
to a Person” (GA 55). Thomas’s supranaturalistic realism is aligned with Plato’s 
notion of a “reality beyond reality” (GA 65). Contrary to the Renaissance, which 
viewed the human person as merely a “natural being” “without any transcendental 
context” (GA 84), Christianity views the world as God’s creation (GA 57). Some 
religious truths, including the real existence of God, can be proven by reason, 
analogically (GA 35); others, such as the Incarnation and the Trinity, cannot, 
although they are compatible with reason (GA 5ff.). Overall, Versfeld presents 
his view as “metaphysics” in the sense of a “Christian philosophy”, a “Christian 
science” (GA 138).
That is the context of his critique of nationalism and apartheid. Remember, it 
was 1948, when the Nationalist Party came to power in South Africa. To Versfeld, 
“only a super-natural morality can make of this earth an inhabitable home” (GA 
101). With the destruction of Plato’s and Thomas’s connection of metaphysics, 
morality and politics were involved several evils, including the split in the Church 
with the Reformation (GA 40ff.); the disintegration of mediaeval society into 
separate nation states (GA 40); the rejection of religious sanction for morality 
by Descartes (GA 101ff.); the split in the individual human person of body and 
mind by that same philosopher (GA 41); the split between individuals by yet the 
same founder of modernity (they can now only be united mechanically, GA 63); 
the split between church and state with Rousseau (GA 67ff.); and the split of 
humanity into separate races and nations (GA 97). In this modern dispensation 
(read: South Africa in 1948), race could become “the final reality” (GA 97), and 
some races could be seen and treated as “inferior” (GA 94, 97). Versfeld’s position 
is clear: the crises of modern culture derive from the disintegration of mediaeval 
Christian culture, “the loss of universality of catholicity” (GA 137) – the context 
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leaves no doubt that this is a loss of Christian universality and catholicity. There 
is no “uniting metaphysic” any more (GA 137).
References to Eastern metaphysical resources are not entirely lacking in 
this book, but they play no constitutive role. Versfeld lists the Upanishads along 
with St Augustine, Julian of Norwich, Jacob Boehme and St John of the Cross to 
illustrate the point that religious experience is unique, and different from science 
and art (GA 25ff.) – but makes nothing of it. And the early Brihadarayaka and 
Svetasvatara Upanishads and the phrase tat tvam asi (GA 26f.) may be valid 
as examples of religious knowledge and mystical experience, but mentioning 
them en passant (with neither primary nor secondary references) serves no real 
purpose; as far as content goes, these examples do not appear to be, at face value, 
reconcilable with Versfeld’s version of Christian belief. He offers no reflection on 
the significance of those ancient Indian sources.
Hardly more elaborate are his references to Buddhism (GA 145ff.) in 
his treatment of the Christian notion of history. Here the claim that to 
Buddhism, the temporality of things and physical bodies are simply “illusions” 
(“illusie”; “droombeelde”), is incorrect. And the emphasis of early Buddhism 
on impermanence (anicca) as a fundamental truth of things opens a promising 
perspective on a metaphysic of history and a dialogue with Christianity, but 
Versfeld lets this opportunity slip away unnoticed. He also makes a fleeting, at 
best seriously unclarified and at worst seriously wrong, reference to Buddhist 
“Nothingness” (“Nietigheid”), contemplation of which is said to be the aim of 
“the good man” (GA 148).
Such isolated references do not occur in any developed metareligious 
hermeneutic or synoptic philosophy of religion. For example, the ancient 
Buddhist notion of impermanence could be extrapolated to a philosophy of 
history, implying the finitude of all human systems of meaning, including 
Christianity. But Versfeld does not touch on such a possibility, and leaves no space 
for any challenge to Christianity. In this book he remains bound to Christian 
universality and catholicity; his promising notion of “a uniting metaphysics” 
(GA 137) is not extended to include non-Christian systems of ultimate meaning. 
Humanity is indeed seen as “one indivisible whole” (GA 138), but this does not 
seem to apply to the field of religion and metaphysics. As an apologetic book, it 
is directed at modernity, not any other religion. There is no real inter-religious 
encounter.
In his opposition to apartheid, Versfeld trod a path that was followed by 
many Christian critics of that system, such as his slightly younger contemporary, 
Beyers Naudé (1915–2004). Such critics opposed apartheid by falling back on 
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strongly entrenched versions of Christian orthodoxy, and in Versfeld’s case, of 
Augustinian-Thomistic thought. His book positions Christianity against all forms 
of separateness in modern society, but does not address the root assumption: the 
ontological separateness of God and world in the orthodox Christian belief 
system – erased in neither the Incarnation nor mystical experience. He does not 
investigate the possible authoritarian implication of such a two-level ontology, 
both politically and religiously. In the Indian systems that he mentions, precisely 
that separateness of natural and supernatural is denied. This I find a key aspect, 
the key aspect, of the encounter investigated in this chapter.
So far Versfeld did not allow for an eye to eye meeting of Christianity and 
Eastern thought as equals, working together towards a wider horizon including – 
and radically relativising, and thereby saving – both discourses. Is Indian religious 
thought here a toothless tiger, merely paraded? Let us not rush to conclusions. 
Those were early days and such ideas were novel in the South African context. 
Even being a Catholic in 1948 was an act of defiance for an Afrikaans-speaking 
South African, and required some courage. Would he accept the challenge, would 
he be prepared to engage in serious conversation? The fair conclusion to draw is 
that at the time, Versfeld had a mild interest in, but no thorough acquaintance 
with, any Eastern religion.
3. Midcareer
3. In The Perennial Order (1954), putting forward his philosophy in systematic 
form, Versfeld emerges confidently as established Roman Catholic philosopher 
(nihil obstat, imprimatur). He deals with a variety of topics: God, the human 
state, science, morality, history, law, art. In terms of our present interest in Eastern 
thought, this book marks no advance beyond Oor gode en afgode. Building on 
Thomas’s proofs, the phrase “God […] the absolute selfsubsistent Being who 
is the source and ground of everything that is” (PO 245) reveals the bedrock, 
the norma normans, of his thinking. From this follows the endorsement of the 
derived but real character of the empirical world (e.g., PO 23). The book as a 
whole flows from the point of departure that the world is historical, God eternal. 
In terms of this most basic point of departure, he, not surprisingly, disqualifies 
Indian thinking. Quoting the Svetasvatara Upanishad via Berdyaeff, he affirms 
that Hinduism establishes an antithesis between history and eternity (PO 58). 
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Buddhism fares no better: for it, “the world of time is the world of illusion, and 
material bodies are simply phantoms which haunt the unenlightened mind, 
caught up in the sorrow of birth and death” (PO 151). A number of relevant issues 
receive no attention, including the differences within “Hinduism” in this regard, 
for example, between the Advaita and Dvaita schools (the latter being much 
closer to Versfeld’s Christian position); the differences between “Hinduism” and 
“Buddhism”; the Buddhist critique of a substantialist notion of God; and the 
potential points of growth of a rapprochement between a Buddhist emphasis on 
continuity and the value of the empirically unique (cf. Zen), and Versfeld’s own 
emphasis on history and empirical existence. Especially the last is of interest: the 
gradual increase of an existential focus in Versfeld’s work (qualifying his enduring 
allegiance to Thomism) announces itself, and may have been fertile ground for 
his growing interest in Zen over years. On the other hand, a link with Versfeld’s 
equally enduring rootedness in Augustinian thought is obvious.
Given the scope of The Perennial Order, I fully grant that it may be unrealistic 
to have expected a more nuanced view of these religious complexes. Moreover, 
Versfeld refers to them from a Christian perspective; provides no evidence of 
finding or building a second home there, having made a first-hand study of them; 
outlines no methodology for dealing comparatively with them in relation to 
Christianity; and does not envisage a large-scale synthesis, perhaps amounting 
to a demolishing of both the first and the second homes on an absolute horizon 
of mystical silence. In significant respects, this book is a continuation of Oor gode 
en afgode. Yet, were the seeds for a truly integrated perennial philosophy sown?
4. Looking back on his own philosophical development in 1960, with the 
publication of “Descartes and Me” (Sum 13–24), Versfeld again pledges his 
well-established allegiance to Augustine and Thomas and decries Descartes 
and like-minded philosophers such as Comte. However, in passing he also 
makes a noteworthy comment: “I am always prepared to go back to Aristotle 
or Aquinas or Confucius or Samkara […]. Incidentally, there seem to be good 
reasons why we should devote some time to Eastern philosophers” (Sum 21). He 
adds the methodologically telling point that such historical truth “must be able 
to make sense of and to integrate our contemporary experience, and the historical 
processes which have given rise to it” (Sum 21). Both comments mark an advance, 
compared to his position in 1948 and 1954, and are useful in themselves, as far as 
they go. But he does not demonstrate having gone back to Confucius or Samkara 
(did he perhaps do that over previous years, without writing about it?). He does 
not elaborate on the “good reasons” for devoting time to Eastern philosophers. 
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And he does not argue how thinkers such as Confucius and Samkara could be 
integrated with the Western-Christian historical processes and the contemporary 
experience of that religio-cultural complex. He provides useful programmatic 
guidelines, but no real evidence of executing them.
5. Again he confesses his orthodox Christian belief that at least “a God exists” in 
The Mirror of Philosophers (MP 21), without venturing into the agora of inter-
religious encounter to test this. In the substance of his thinking there is no change, 
yet his sentiment that “the notions of mystery, contemplation and metaphysics go 
together” (Sum 22), coupled with the notions referred to above, are promising 
as far as a true pax fidei (Cusanus) is concerned. But the bridge has not been 
constructed or crossed.
6. Two years later, in Rondom die Middeleeue (On the Middle Ages) (1962), 
Versfeld proceeds to provide his Afrikaans readers sympathetic insight into 
the mediaeval spirit, which is part of their own history. In itself this was a most 
commendable undertaking. His readers could easily have forgotten that majestic 
chapter in their cultural and religious tradition. Indeed, this book, all the more 
impressive because of its charming presentation, draws a convincing picture 
of, among other themes as can now be expected, Augustine and Thomas and 
the latter’s intentions with his proofs for the existence of God. By now, age 53, 
Versfeld made up his mind, found his peace. This book is not the first time his 
readers follow him into the Middle Ages and the normative Augustine and 
Thomas. Yet there is no in-depth dialogue with Eastern thought. We find only 
one swipe at an unspecified “Chinese Buddhist writing” expanding on the “Tao”, 
but the reader finds no sufficient ground to either agree or disagree with Versfeld’s 
claim that there “cannot be a more thorough anti-scientific manifest” (RM 94f.).
Of more importance is the opportunity missed in that book to engage 
the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God via analogy (RM 59–92) with 
the alternative routes traversed by Taoism and Buddhism. This is where the 
Western and Eastern religious continents meet, where the real essentials are at 
stake. Our present question does not concern the merit or not of Aquinas’s and 
Versfeld’s arguments as such, but whether his arguments here were informed by 
a certain knowledge of the Taoist and Buddhist positions. This cannot really 
be proven either way, but one may suspect that if these two Asian religions had 
been fairly well known to Versfeld, it is conceivable that he would have discussed 
the relationship between Aquinas’s proofs that God exists, and those versions 
of emptiness conceived in the East beyond analogical bridges. Conspicuous 
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in this context is also the apparent lack of awareness of the Buddhist notion 
of causality (paccaya) in Versfeld’s elaborate discussion of causality (RM 77ff.). 
Thomas argues that the all-pervasive phenomenon of change ultimately, logically, 
necessitates the notion of an unchanging but all-changing Being (“called ‘God’ 
by all”); Buddhism rests with the acceptance of a pan-conditional impermanence 
of all things, issuing not in substantiality (including divine substantiality), but in 
radical non-substantiality. If Versfeld had known of this fundamental difference, 
he would have tackled it; of that we can be quite certain.
We are here not dealing with innocuous, nice-to-know-and-show peripherals, 
but with the most central issues in the encounter of Christianity (as a matter of 
fact, any theism) with those Asian models. I am all too aware of the dangers of 
drawing conclusions from silence, whether by design or lack of information. 
Could Versfeld have been aware of this direct, seemingly irreconcilable encounter, 
but not prepared to deal with it for whatever psychological or strategic reason? 
Or could the full strength of the wind from the East not have touched him yet? 
I suspend judgement, but suspect the second. The most likely conclusion is that 
at the time he was not cognisant of it. I fully endorse Versfeld’s high regard for 
the Christian Middle Ages, and specifically for Augustine and Aquinas, and his 
own passion for ultimacy, but must point out the lack of serious encounter with 
Eastern religions at this stage of his life. It could have enriched his Christian 
thinking.
7. I now turn to a key paper that Versfeld presented at the Eighth Congress 
for the Advancement of Philosophy in South Africa in 1965, entitled “Talking 
Metaphysics”.3 He was 56 years old, well advanced and established in his publishing 
career and at the height of his powers; some interest on Versfeld’s part in Eastern 
religions had surfaced some twenty years earlier. In this paper he championed 
metaphysics; it could indeed be read as a programmatic statement, containing 
his view of the vital ingredients and concomitants of a viable programme of 
metaphysics. He expresses the typical concern of metaphysics, namely the “desire 
for and pursuit of the whole” (“Talking” 12), behind and beyond all special 
disciplines. By definition, such desire and pursuit would include all serious 
religious thought, West and East (and more). Yet, at this crucial point Versfeld 
remarkably stops short of what could have been a groundbreaking step in the 
highest academic body of South African philosophical thought fifty years ago.
3 Marthinus Versfeld, “Talking Metaphysics,” in M. Versfeld and R. Meyer, On Metaphysics 
(Pretoria: Unisa, 1966). 
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His argument as a whole in the paper is steeped in the symbiosis of Western 
thought with its founding father Socrates, as well as of Platonism-Aristotelianism, 
and the Christian faith, resulting in the Christian syntheses of Augustine and 
Thomas. He also does not mince his words concerning the dangerous deviations 
of Descartes and what followed with Kant, Comte, Hegel and analytical 
philosophy. Care should be taken not to make too much of an argumentum e 
silentio, yet the fact that Versfeld does not make a single reference to any Eastern 
religion precisely in this context is telling. Was it an implicit admission of a lack 
of sufficient knowledge? A failure of nerve, perhaps on an assumption that such 
references would not seem relevant or be palatable to his audience of Western-
trained professional philosophers? Perhaps, but could it also have been indicative 
that, after all, Eastern thinking was of secondary importance and that, ultimately, 
Eastern thinking did not play a central, constitutive role in his own metaphysical 
model? Or did he simply not have enough time to deal with that? This omission 
would have to be evaluated in the context of his corpus as a whole.
The above lacuna becomes obvious in his references in this paper to the basic 
metaphysical questions of the ultimate origin of the world and the human being. 
These themes as such are not expressly dealt with in detail, yet the Platonic and 
the orthodox Christian teaching as finally formulated by Thomas, are assumed, 
without admitting any Eastern challenge. The Platonic view that truth has to do 
with Being is normative. That is a most respectable position to take, but in our 
present context it is noteworthy that dialogue and comparative analysis involving, 
for example, Vedantic monism, or Taoist or Buddhist notions of Emptiness as the 
ultimate horizon and source of all things beyond Being, play no role.
Epistemologically, Versfeld adopts a “nescient” position, presenting that 
stance as in line with Plato (“Talking” 8ff., 17ff.). True metaphysics is the 
opening of horizons rather than the provision of final solutions (“Talking” 
19ff.), demonstrating “an essential capacity for relativising itself ”, “rooted in its 
own contingency”, resting in “humility”; whereas Descartes moved from doubt 
to certainty, Augustine moved from scepticism to questioning. Versfeld obviously 
turns away from any variant of authoritarian truth. Here an obvious structural 
link with Taoism and Buddhism appears, yet Versfeld gives no hint as to whether 
Eastern religions are silently present, and if so, how – as constitutive elements, or 
perhaps reinforcing influences, or mere interesting coincidences?
This teasing silence can be heard elsewhere in his paper, where sub-themes 
are dealt with which occur in Eastern as much as in Western metaphysics, in 
Confucian Mencius as much as in Christian Augustine – such as that metaphysics 
is essentially connected to emotion (e.g., love, a moral passion for the good), and 
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that it has a social dimension; that it is about human relationships, a just society, 
politics, in which truth and justice are intimately connected, and imperialism 
of any kind is ruled out. And here, I suspect, lies the reason for his omission of 
Eastern thought: he had his hands full with the South African social crisis of 
the time. The country was in a state of emergency as part of the aftermath of 
the Sharpeville shootings in 1960. Versfeld, an outspoken critic of apartheid, 
indirectly but clearly for philosophers who had ears to hear, addressed that moral 
and political crisis. That is why he makes a strong point of the importance of the 
historical dimension of metaphysics, much more so, he says (“Talking” 14), than 
understood by Plato. Metaphysical awareness and existence take place in time and 
history, in a certain society, a certain century, a certain milieu (“Talking” 14ff., 
19). That is the point he wished to make, as cautiously as prudence at the time 
prescribed. Here he had a political agenda, not a religio-comparative one, and 
the inter-religious dimension was not central to his argument.
8. In the same year, in Wat is kontemporêr? Vier opstelle oor ons tyd (What Is 
Contemporary? Four Essays on Our Time) (1966), Versfeld consistently continues 
along the road taken in his youth, with the Christian patristics and mediaeval 
philosopher-theologians as normative guiding lights against the backdrop of 
European classics and Scripture. As always, modernity since the seventeenth 
century is his main adversary. The essence of his argument is that to be truly 
contemporary, “a thinker should experience the mystery of the Divine Presence”.4 
That was also the year that his lecture “Talking Metaphysics”, analysed above, was 
published. These four essays confirm the conclusion that at the time Versfeld did 
not have a profound knowledge of Eastern religions. Perhaps one may suspect 
that had he been well acquainted with Buddhism, he might have made something 
of the interesting parallel between this religion and Hume’s views concerning a 
permanent personal identity,5 but I do not wish to make much of it.
More significant is the appearance of Zen in his writings. Again a hunch 
that cannot be definitely confirmed: could he have made an acquaintance with 
an introduction of Zen to a Western audience in popular literature at the time, 
such as the books by Alan Watts? Zen, mostly isolated from the wider Buddhist 
setting of which it was one manifestation, became quite a buzzword in the West at 
the time. In any event, Versfeld makes no references to any sources here (in OS 85 
he refers to Watts). But perhaps Watts was not a major source of information and 
4 Versfeld, Wat is kontemporêr? 35.
5 Versfeld, Wat is kontemporêr? 28.
Martin Versfeld136
inspiration, for Versfeld seems to associate the practice of Zen with “withdrawal 
from the world” (OS 30) (which was hardly the view of Watts). Versfeld also refers 
to Zen as a “flight from time” (OS 34), shared with “sorcerers and drug-users” (OS 
34). That is all. Whatever the other merits of this book may be, it does not excel 
in the conversation between Christianity and Eastern religions.
9. In Klip en klei (1968), a volume of entertaining essays on various topics, 
the reader finds many insightful observations. One of these is a loving sketch 
of Versfeld’s father (KK 44f.), which gives an insight into the circumstances 
behind Versfeld’s turning away from the Dutch Reformed religion of his youth 
and his turn to Catholicism – a move lovingly understood by his father. The 
reader also comes across a fleeting, strangely ambiguous reference to “the Zen 
tea ceremony” (KK 38). Of more significance is the lack of congruence with 
the Buddhist ethos apparent in this book as far as the treatment of animals is 
concerned. He enthusiastically endorses hunting and the consumption of meat, 
one of his arguments being that “the death of an animal and the death of a human 
being are totally different” (KK 59), and finds that “much of the fuss about 
blood-sport is morally unhealthy” (KK 59). With these statements, he in fact 
stands considerably closer to the views of his archadversary Descartes than to the 
typically Buddhist view of the interconnectedness of all life and the maxims of 
non-violence and nonkilling that flow from that ontology. The salient point in the 
context of this chapter is not the issue of vegetarianism per se (I am not advocating 
that here, not at all), but the fact that Versfeld obviously did not seriously engage 
with Buddhist thinking in this connection. Apart from explicit references, one 
does not sense a closeness of thought and sentiment with Buddhism. For example, 
neither of the two parts of the observation that “the only immortal nation is the 
Church of God which is the body of God” (KK 106f.) is compatible with the 
essential pattern of Buddhist thought, which would not allow for the idea of an 
eternal civitas Dei.
10. One year later, in Beweging uitwaarts (Movement Outwards, co-authored with 
W.A. de Klerk and J.J. Degenaar in 1969), Versfeld contributes three essays. In 
one of them (dealing with “morality and moralism”, BU 67–88), an unexpected 
step is taken, compared to his book from the previous year. Could it be because he 
now wrote for a different audience? Or did something he read, or some personal 
contact, trigger a newly found interest? Or did a seed, present yet slumbering over 
the years, suddenly start to sprout? Not only does the chapter start with a Zen 
poem (“the oldest Zen poem”, he says, and presumably taken from Watts, going 
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on what he would say in OS 85), but we find, for the first time, a reference to 
central Buddhist issues, in this case, the teaching of anattā (BU 71ff.), albeit not 
in a convincing sense. What Buddhism does, he says, is destroy the constructed 
ego of our own making with which we usually identify ourselves. That is correct. 
But then he seems to see the Buddhist view as part of what he terms “Indian” 
thought (BU 71), which is said to identify the self with the ground of being (BU 
71), which is not correct as far as Buddhism is concerned. The watershed between 
Buddhism and the type of monism commencing in the Upanishadic age and 
culminating in Advaita Vedanta is not recognised. He also conflates Buddhist 
“atheism” with the Christian via negativa, assuming that the Buddha merely “did 
not want to speak about God” (BU 73). What Versfeld glosses over is that even in 
the most apophatic forms of Christian mysticism the personal being and existence 
of God are not in doubt, whereas in the message of the Buddha that notion is 
utterly emptied and transcended.
We also find a useful reference (but again without a source) to a “technique” 
developed by “Zen Buddhists” to break down the conceptual barriers we erect 
(BU 82), and a few other nice brief quotes from Buddhism (BU 87). Overall, the 
enlisting of Buddhism, particularly Zen Buddhism, in a critique of moralism is 
very much in order. Also, the willingness to enter into dialogue with that religion 
can only be applauded. But there is no denying that those were early days. No 
references to sources are provided. I am not pointing this out for fussy, technical, 
formalistic reasons, but simply because it would have helped us to understand 
the extent and quality of his guides and the context of his thinking. It cannot be 
said that this lack is simply a consequence of the communication style adopted 
here; quotations from Western sources in this particular book are sometimes 
paragraphs long. The overall conclusion must be that neither his rendering of 
Buddhism nor his integration of Buddhism and Christianity breaks significant 
ground. As far as Taoism is concerned, we read only that “Thomas and the Taoists 
had much in common” (BU 87) insofar as both view love as undercutting the 
intellect. This is a promising bud.
First steps in a “movement outwards” in a religio-philosophical sense had 
been taken. South Africa was in the grip of closed thinking, politically as well as 




11. Versfeld started his seventh decade with a celebration of Plato (Plato. Die 
Simposium of die drinkparty, 1970), an enduring mainstay throughout his life. 
This translation of the Symposium and the light-hearted introduction to it are 
classic Versfeld, with his firm anchorage in Christianity and his loyal indebtedness 
to Plato, expressed in his unique literary way – but there is not the least glance 
sideways at Eastern thought. It is popularisation of a classical document at its best, 
yet without any use of the original Greek text of any consultation of secondary 
literature to contextualise his work in the large, continuing debate with Plato. 
This is relevant in our present context, because this lack of citation also marks all 
his dealings with Eastern texts.
12. Four years later, a similar book appeared, this time not a translation but 
an introduction to Plato’s Republic, intended for a young Afrikaans academic 
readership: ’n Handleiding tot die Republiek van Plato (1974). We meet an 
excellent lecturer in this text. Not unexpectedly, this book too links Plato with the 
Roman Catholic tradition: Plato’s mystical notion of the contemplation of eternal 
Being is reminiscent of what has become part of the European tradition, and is 
echoed by Augustine.6 But this time there are a few references to other works on 
Plato and a few casual glances to the East: similar to Platonic morality, we read, 
Zen spontaneity requires discipline;7 comparable to Plato’s appreciation of the 
impact of art on politics, is that of Confucius;8 and similar to Plato’s notion of 
education for society, Confucius emphasises education for social unselfishness, 
sympathy and authority.9 Such asides are interesting, but lack any strongly argued 
structural significance.
13. Between the above two Afrikaans works on Platonic thinking appeared 
a more systematic work in English (Persons, 1972); the substance of some of 
these chapters had appeared previously in Afrikaans. The central thought of the 
book is that knowledge of persons has priority over knowledge of things. The 
first chapter of this book (“The Socratic Spirit”) is his inaugural lecture at the 
University of Cape Town of 1971 (Persons 1–15). It would seem to be of singular 
6 Versfeld, ’n Handleiding, 66, 80ff.
7 Versfeld, ’n Handleiding, 30.
8 Versfeld, ’n Handleiding, 45, 112.
9 Versfeld, ’n Handleiding, 61.
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significance, because “in an inaugural lecture a man should declare himself ” 
(Persons 1). Exactly five years have now elapsed since his other programmatic 
statement (“Talking Metaphysics”, 1966). Has anything significant happened in 
this period? Perhaps. It causes no surprise that he chooses Socrates as the topic 
at this illustrious occasion, and handles the Greek well. Then follow the usual 
crown witnesses: Plato, Jesus, Augustine, Thomas and the usual rascals, starting 
with Descartes. But now, compared to five years before, Zen makes a happy, 
relaxed entry onto the stage (Persons 2). And mention is made of the fact that 
Socrates, like Jesus and the Buddha, wrote nothing (Persons 3f.). The reference 
to Zen still does not contribute to the substance of the argument, but to its style: 
the “supreme feat” of laughing at oneself is lauded. I sense that in his essayistic, 
aphoristic style of communication Versfeld felt an affinity with the seeming 
simplicity of Zen (not unlike that of Socrates) and its quotability. The thinking 
was all very much and essentially about the West (“our tradition”, Persons 5), but 
perhaps something new was afoot.
This surmise is confirmed by what might be interpreted as a new, mild 
ambivalence about God in this book. Versfeld still accepts Augustine’s classical 
understanding of God and does not doubt His eternity (e.g., Persons 71, 121), but 
now we again read that Buddhism is “wise” “because it refuses to talk about God” 
(Persons 86). Versfeld is concerned with sinful people’s idolatrous conceptual 
constructs of God, but this does not make a serious dent in his acceptance 
of the being of God as such; the constructed God is a false God. However, 
refusing to talk about God is one thing, nihilating such talk altogether and at 
most accepting it as a penultimate step in a process towards radical nihilation is 
another. What we find here is a virtual enlistment of Buddhism in the service 
of Christian apophaticism, but not a square confrontation with the full force of 
the radical dissolution of such a concept emerging in, for example, the Tevijja 
Sutta in Theravāda Buddhism or the Mūlamādhyamika-kārikas of Nāgārjuna 
in Mahāyāna.
It is as if Versfeld hovers on the brink of a bridge over a chasm. He displays 
an intuitive affinity with certain aspects of Buddhism, but not a clear grasp of 
the historical continuities and discontinuities among various Eastern religions, 
specifically Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism and Confucianism (cf. Persons 97f.). 
We find some exploratory, suggestive matching and mixing in the service of his 
well-established Augustinian-Thomistic model, but not a thorough theoretical 
dialogue that risks everything in the fire of an encounter with India and China 
(e.g., Persons 85f.). We find an encomium on Augustine and the Catholic faith 
(Persons 126ff.). That is quite in order, but it cannot be said to be argued in the 
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process of an in-depth confrontation with Eastern patterns of thinking. Notions 
such as the changeability and constructed nature of ideas and interpretative 
schemes make their appearance (Persons 69f., 191f.), but are not carried through 
in ways that would have passed the test of, for example, classical Buddhism. 
At this stage Versfeld does not exhibit a coherent macrohistorical picture of 
religions West and East, a developed comparative hermeneutic or a systematic 
macro theory encompassing the various religions and philosophical models he 
mentions from time to time.
14. In 1978 Versfeld produced a short essay, “Wyn en wysheid” (“Wine and 
Wisdom”), in which we enjoy the ageing Versfeld at his youthful best, playing 
beyond the constrictions of abstract thinking. It is a celebration of the wisdom 
of appreciating wine, of finding the miraculous in the everyday, not only in the 
bread and wine of the Christian Eucharist but equally present in the Zen tea 
ceremony and ancient Taoists’ peaceful use of their mouths for the business of 
eating. Versfeld pokes fun at abstract thinking, and by implication – presumably, 
ultimately and rightly so – at any attempt to construct a final inclusive philosophy 
or theology of religion. Here at least he was not interested in that.
15. However, the following year, he demonstrated his enduring interest in 
establishing a pax fidei at a more theoretical level. In a slender book called Our 
Selves (1979), published seven years after Persons, Versfeld – now seventy years 
old – presents the most comprehensive systematic presentation of his oeuvre 
thus far as far as his encounter with Eastern thought is concerned. These ideas 
had evidently simmered for several years.10 In Our Selves, Versfeld engages with 
Buddhism, Taoism and to a lesser extent Hinduism – to an extent unprecedented 
in his own work and in South African academic work up till then. He does 
this without compromising his longstanding loyalty to revered figures and his 
unwavering censure of others in the Greek-Christian Western tradition – the first 
starting with Socrates, the latter with late mediaeval nominalism. Versfeld enters 
into some debate with Eastern systems, more so than before. 
But overall he does not work from within a well-developed linguistic-
historical frame of reference, and some of his understanding of Indian and 
Chinese thought is suspect. For example, we find a two-page analysis of Ramānuja, 
Ramakrishna, Patanjali and even the Tibetan Book of the Dead (OS 17ff.); also 
present are references to the five Buddhist khandhas and the Buddhist insight 
10 Cf. Wolff, “Grasping the truth from where we are.”
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into impermanence and non-substance (OS 3ff.). But alongside that occurs 
the fatal identifications of “the real self ” in Buddhism with Brahman (OS 5ff., 
15ff.), of Atman with Buddha nature (OS 20), and of “union with God” with 
“Nirvana” (OS 21). He treats “Indian thought” (OS 9f.) as all of one kind, and 
that is said to be the same as Paul’s teaching (OS 15). In encounters like this, 
the acknowledgement of differences is as important as the acknowledgement of 
possible convergences, and in this respect no real advance has been made compared 
to his position ten years earlier (cf. BU 71). The problem is compounded by the 
fact that Versfeld does not provide any information on the sources he draws on 
for his information, which would have helped his reader to gauge the extent and 
depth of his reading. His sense that “the contemporary fugue into the Oriental” 
(OS 40) may tempt people to forget the strength of their own tradition is valid, 
but that insight does not diminish the need for careful comparative analysis 
if “the Oriental” is introduced in a meeting of faiths. His method adds up to 
short-circuiting eclecticism rather than true synthesis. Yet, he ventured onto a 
path as yet untrodden in South African academic discourse in both philosophy 
and theology, and at a time when an independent subject of religious studies 
(comparative religion) was non-existent at South African universities.
As for Taoism, we find cursory quotations from Chuang-tzu (OS 34), but also 
quite extensive use of the yang and yin model to explain two types of historical 
epochs (OS 42, 52ff.). The match between the strong Western-Christian presence, 
with all its Latin quotations, and the much weaker presence of Eastern thought is 
unbalanced as far as scholarship and insight are concerned. Nevertheless, for the 
first time, Versfeld deploys Eastern thought (here, especially Taoism) in a context 
critical of Western thought: Taoism throws light on the present “dominative 
phase of our Christianity”, the masculine urge to dominate, individualism, 
industrialism, moralistic religion, the self-oppression of spontaneity, and the 
“explosive Yang mixture of Puritanism and Cartesian rationalism” (OS 57, 66ff.). 
Indeed, the yang phase of Western Christian culture is over, but then Christianity 
has reserves of yin (OS 68), and there is no reason to “sell our birth-right for 
Oriental ideas” (OS 69). Praise is bestowed on Zen and Taoism, but the brakes 
are also applied: we should not “get rid of our past” (OS 68); we may find “many 
correctives in Eastern thought” (OS 68), yet it would be wiser if “Eastern ideas 
served to remind us of things that have been forgotten or have gone stale in our 
own tradition” (OS 69). He remains with the twoness of East and West, and does 
not attempt a larger historical or theoretical synthesis or consider the possibility 
of one shared, common religious space. Rather, Eastern religions are absorbed in 
the terms of one, more dominating one.
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In Our Selves, Versfeld’s commitment to Aquinas, including the great 
mediaeval theologian’s analogical proofs for the existence of God, remains 
solid (OS 146ff.). Yet he also goes along with the existential slant of John 
Henry Newman (incidentally, like Versfeld, a convert to Roman Catholicism), 
which does not remotely imply doubting the real being of God. In the last 
chapter of Our Selves, at this most critical point of his meeting with Buddhism 
and Taoism, Versfeld does not take their respective emphases on ontological 
emptiness into consideration. Or, is it conceivable that his endorsement of 
Newman’s “softer” version somehow might have taken place under the influence 
of Buddhism and Taoism (apart from his reading of Western existentialism)? 
Is that why he now emphasises the belief in God as a matter of assent, rather 
than of strict rational proof ? I do not draw any firm conclusion here, except 
that Versfeld was not prepared to openly come to terms with what he might 
have seen as the subversive, devastating theological consequences of these two 
systems of religious thought. In the end, he opts effectively to reduce them to 
inspirational reminders of spontaneity and simplicity, found in Christianity 
anyway. The final verdict in Versfeld’s investigation of Eastern thought has now 
probably been delivered in grand style: traditional, orthodox Christian theism 
remains intact.
Thomas’s formulation of cognitum est in cognoscente per modum cognoscentis 
(the known is “known in the knower in the way of the knower”), favoured by 
Versfeld and often recurring in his writings, usually contra the epistemology 
of Kant, again makes its appearance in Our Selves (OS 159). Versfeld uses 
this expression to emphasise the realistic implication of Thomistic thinking, 
particularly concerning the existence God, which at the same time allows for a 
subjective element in that knowing. Whatever the merits of Versfeld’s position 
vis-à-vis Thomas, Kant and Newman may be, he made no real allowance for the 
epistemological critique of Buddhism. He claims to reveal all such thinking to 
be constructions, projections – like a staircase built up into the sky leading to a 
non-existent palace (Tevijja Sutta). In other contexts, Versfeld is aware of similar 
critiques in Western quarters, such as those of Marx and Nietzsche, but does not 
draw conclusions that would overturn Thomistic thinking. Structurally, Versfeld 
conducts Christian apologetics; he engages with Eastern thought on the fringe of 
Catholic Christianity. I do not mean that as criticism, merely as fact.
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16. Three years later a selection of essays appeared in Afrikaans (Tyd en dae, 1982) 
shedding no new light on his balancing act of Western-Christian and Eastern 
thought. In the footsteps of his beloved Augustine, Versfeld cataphatically refers 
to God “the Present” (TD 93), Lao Tzu and Chuang-tzu merely marginally 
embellishing his attack on the idol of the modern time machine (TD 85f.).
17. In Food for Thought (1983, I use the 1991 edition) we read Versfeld at his best, 
and his most mischievous, continuing the thread spun in his 1978 essay, “Wyn 
en wysheid”. This is also the best possible illustration of the implications of his 
analogical thinking: the ordinary as bridge to the miraculous. This nimble-witted 
book does much to commend itself, above all showing a love for nature and life. 
The book is liberally spiced with quotes from and quick references to Taoism 
and Zen. And quotes from the Taittiriya and Maitri Upanishads confirm the 
point that “ultimate reality” is “food” (FT 18f.; 43ff.). This is stirred in with the 
Catholic Mass, during which “we eat and drink the Truth”, without adding that 
in the Mass the consumption of Truth is restricted to the flesh and blood of one 
Man. To Versfeld’s credit, in his thinking it appears that from the Incarnation 
a secondary effect radiates outwards, including the sharpening of a pencil, the 
building of a house and the making of soup. Again this brings him in the vicinity 
of Zen, in which every leaf on every tree, every frog plopping into the water 
reveals eternity – yet without any implication of an analogous relationship with 
an ontologically Other level of Being. Versfeld never, as far as I can tell, directly 
addresses the problem of the exclusivity of the Incarnation in Christ.
He makes a delightful comparison of his own thinking with the culinary 
art, “concocting” it like soup (FT 13), playfully admitting that “my mind is a 
rag-bag, bits occasionally cohering to form some sort of unity” (FT 13), and 
wisely confessing that it is “difficult to assimilate properly the cuisine of one 
other country, say Chinese or Japanese” (FT 13); ultimately, “the soup your 
mother made” (FT 13) is always to be chosen. Read this as a confession of the 
important difference in his evaluation of Christian theology-philosophy on 
which he has been nourished on the one hand, and Eastern thinking, the taste 
of which he also likes in small helpings, on the other. Again his relative lack of 
knowledge of historical context shows, for example, as he (like many Westerners) 
somehow sees “Buddhism” and “Zen” as different entities (FT 19). Compared to 
his position on vegetarianism fifteen years earlier (1968), nothing has changed. 
Christian man has been carnivorous man, meat is processed plants, the difference 
between animal and cabbage is smaller than the difference between animal and 
human, and vegetarianism is not clearly distinct from sentimentalism (KK 46ff.). 
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The issue here is not the eating of meat or not as such, but Versfeld’s lack of 
thorough engagement with the philosophical underpinnings of, say, the Buddhist 
injunction not to kill, mixed with his suggestion that consuming meat is essential 
to Christianity.
18. Die neukery met die appelboom (The Nuisance with the Apple Tree) (1985) adds 
nothing new to Versfeld’s previous work, apart from a welcome ecological twist.
19. The same verdict applies to Pots and Poetry (1985). Taking all into account, 
Versfeld (now seventy-six years old) has reached a plateau in his writing, parallel 
with the incline of his thinking over decades. With a certain but light touch, 
he moves with ease and confidence among the figures who have over decades, 
increasingly become the furniture in his spiritual home, now all dusted again with 
love. His emphasis on the earthing of philosophy and theology in the context 
of redefining the human being’s position in nature is to be appreciated, as is his 
sustained critique of apartheid (“The Rape of District Six”).
Pots and Poetry is Versfeld’s most integrative book. We find a critical comment 
on the restriction of interest, in Western philosophy, to Western philosophy (PP 
62). He shows the way forward by example in a fine comparative chapter on Plato 
and Plotinus (and Taoism) (PP 69–84). He delivers at times lengthy quotes from 
the Upanishads, modern Hinduism, Zen, Confucius, Lao Tzu and Chuang-tzu 
(the latter from the translation of fellow Catholic Thomas Merton). Versfeld 
is now clearly at ease with the Chinese thinkers. Taoism has crystallised as his 
favourite Eastern partner, and he can refer to Lao Tzu, “the unknown Old Man”, 
as “present to me like a brother” (PP 59). This occurs in a clear affirmation of “a 
new world-wide wisdom and holiness that is not confined to the few canonised 
European Baroque saints who are, if we hold any such conversation at all, all that 
most of us know” (PP 55). Yet, Augustine remains the one whom “I owe what 
I have been saying almost entirely to” (PP 49). The ghost of eclecticism has not 
been exorcised, and his knowledge of Eastern religions is not comprehensive. We 
find an honest self-revelation such as “I am not capable of sorting out Hinduism 
from Buddhism” (PP 63), and he still tends towards a facile, unclarified conflation 
of apophatic theism and Nirvana (PP 58). Yet, he was sure of the direction to take.
Stylistically, Versfeld here demonstrates his forte: the quick wit, the brilliant 
put-down, for example, in his treatment of Hegel (PP 77). He pays a price for that, 
of course. The real test for intercultural, inter-epochal, inter-religious encounter 
in our time is the ability to patiently construct higher, more inclusive syntheses 
of what may appear to be irreconcilable opposites. The challenge for today is the 
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connection of a Plato, a Thomas, a Hegel and (to mention one name from the East) 
a Fa-tsang in one theoretically articulated frame of thought, giving proper regard 
to each figure. It is one thing to ridicule Hegel, another to construct a similarly 
impressive synthesis of seeming opposites, appropriate to one’s epoch. Versfeld, a 
pioneering figure, does not quite achieve that, may not be interested in that.
Overall, this is vintage Versfeld. The breadth of his interests and the depth 
of his commitments are clear. This is communicative writing with a broad public 
in mind, with the inevitable price to pay.
20. With Die lewensweg van Lao-Tse (The Path of Life of Lao Tzu) (1988),11 
Versfeld clearly felt emboldened enough to venture deeply into new territory: 
translating an ancient text. It was an Afrikaans translation of the classic Taoist 
text, the Tao te ching, in a series on “Poetry from distant lands”. As Versfeld admits 
apologetically in the introduction, he has no knowledge of Mandarin whatsoever, 
so the translation must have been based on existing translations in other European 
languages, none of which is disclosed by author or title. Whether the work has 
literary merit in its own right is not for me to judge, and is irrelevant in our present 
context. What matters is the extent to which it was true to the letter and spirit 
of the original, and whether it succeeded in conveying that intention in the new 
context of the receiver language. Any translation based on another (undisclosed) 
translation (or translations) of an ancient epoch in a different culture is deeply 
suspect. This would particularly be the case with ancient Mandarin, with its 
notoriously or pleasingly (depending on one’s perspective) multivalent and 
ambiguous nature, far more so than is the case with Sanskrit, a cousin of Latin 
and Greek. Versfeld provides no explanatory notes to help bridge the vast gap 
between that ancient language and thinking, and what the readers are accustomed 
to. He does not reveal his hand, does not help his reader, but places the latter in 
the position of sceptic detective or credulous recipient.
One instance of at the very least a misleading translation occurs in sections 
73, 77, 79 and 81. He does not translate tiān as “heaven” (which is usually the 
case), but as “God”, without any further clarification or motivation. That is a 
fatal shortcut. By now, the reader is fully aware of Versfeld’s endorsement of 
the Augustinian-Thomistic concept of “God”. To what extent is he uncritically, 
unwittingly, projecting that into this text? “God” is not a univocal word by far. 
In a serious bridge-building exercise between cultures and religions, a lot of 
hermeneutical work, worthy of being made explicit, goes into the translation of 
11 Marthinus Versfeld, Die lewensweg van Lao-Tse (Cape Town: Perskor, 1988).
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any donor text. That was not the case here. By way of comparison, Heidegger also 
had a longstanding interest in Taoism, but did not indulge in wading into that 
religion in his writings, in all likelihood because of academic reserve: he could 
not work from the original language itself. In my view this publication of Versfeld 
was an error of judgement, although I grant that it could have helped to make 
“Taoism” more of a household word in the provincial South African cultural 
context of the eighties, and that is to be appreciated.
21. In 1990, at age eighty-one, Versfeld published his last book. In keeping with 
his remarkably consistent writing over decades, it was a return to his first and true 
love, Christian philosophy: St Augustine’s Confessions and City of God (1990). The 
East features, but as semi attached to his true spiritual home. A true theoretical 
integration, doing justice to the tendentional drift of both religious continents, 
is not achieved. Versfeld’s intention can be applauded, but the execution, the 
fitting and joining, did not quite succeed. Thus we read that Augustine has much 
in common with Gotama and the Upanishads: all three “seek to eradicate ego” 
(ACCG 57). True, but he seems to identify the ways in which this is done. Can 
Augustine’s “story of persons made meaningful by a Person” (ACCG 81) so easily 
be conflated with the Atman of the Upanishads (ACCG 57)? Or Augustine’s 
tranquilitas with Buddhist Nirvana (ACCG 114)? Overall, the creative spark of 
difference does not ignite. Versfeld breaks no new ground in comparison to his 
earlier work. One throwaway formulation captures what his strategy over decades 
boils down to: “The revelation of Christ can include Chuang-tzu” (ACCG 99). 
That is of course one way of structuring a dialogue with Eastern thought, and I 
feel no need to criticise him for that. However, it is clear that the exploration of a 
space beyond all religious institutions and theological systems, including those of 
Christianity, would have been a next step. Versfeld did not penetrate to the anattā 
nature of all things, including constructs about God, due to the constraints of the 
anicca nature of all things, including brief human lives of 86 years.
5. Conclusion
Versfeld was a contemplative thinker, the relationship with God being his lifelong 
central concern. In the course of his career, he succeeded in forging integrations 
of seemingly disparate schools of thought around that interest that served him 
well, both psychologically and intellectually. After his conversion to Catholicism, 
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Augustinianism and Thomism merged seamlessly to form the basic pattern of 
his religious thinking. He also unified philosophy and theology in his model of 
Christian philosophy. And he celebrated an integration of Greek thinking, in the 
form of Platonism, with Christian thought. Remarkably, Plotinus and Christian 
Neoplatonism remained in the background shadows. I mention that, because a 
stronger association with that accent in Christianity might have facilitated his 
attempts to come to terms with Eastern religio-philosophical thinking. Within 
Christianity, he was, taking all into account, not a particularly ecumenical spirit. 
For example, he does not seem to have made an attempt to engage with Reformed 
theology and mysticism (say, a Calvin, or a Bavinck – both very much part of his 
own personal and cultural context) extensively and in bonam partem at any stage 
of his life. This may be attributable to the fact that his was a dramatic conversion, 
a turning away from that institution in utter disillusionment and the embracing 
of another with exclusive commitment.
Apart from his switch from irreligion to Catholicism, Versfeld never changed 
his mind substantially. Nevertheless, over decades, he increasingly strove to 
harmonise his understanding of Christianity with Eastern thinking, mainly in 
the forms of the Upanishads, Buddhism and Taoism, with Confucianism on 
the fringe. Fascinating albeit brief interchanges with those religions abound in 
his writings, but essentially they remain excursions, external to his Christian 
structure. Overall, his strategy of weaving selected threads of the East into the 
basic, normative configuration of Trinity, Incarnation, Creation and so on turns 
out to be comparable to the theological approaches of, among others, Catholic 
scholars Thomas Merton and Bede Griffiths – but closer to Merton than to 
Griffiths. That is an understandable procedure, and I do not wish to fault it as 
such. However, the question does announce itself whether there may not be a 
further step beyond the ones taken by Versfeld. In this regard, Versfeld did not 
achieve by far the same degree of theoretical harmonisation as was the case in 
the fields of his interest mentioned above. Also, he did not clearly explicate his 
hermeneutical procedures in this undertaking.
A first factor inhibiting such creative synthesis was probably that Versfeld 
did not study any one of the Eastern systems at root level, by which I mean the 
basic texts in their original languages, or serious involvement in those religions as 
living traditions. He knew Latin and Greek, but no Sanskrit, Pali or Mandarin. I 
do not wish to make a measure of linguistic competency the only or final test. It 
would indeed be possible to understand and internalise the intentional structure 
of a religion from secondary literary sources and serious personal engagement 
with that religion. However, it seems to me that an intellectual programme of 
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appropriation and informed critique would require a degree of historical-critical 
understanding of such an investigated religion: a sufficient knowledge of the 
historical context in which it arose, its development over time, its various branches 
and the differences between them. Versfeld does not provide evidence of having 
made such a study. However, here too I would add a qualification: intellectual, 
academic competence is not to be confused with existential understanding. It 
cannot be said that Versfeld made a serious study of these religions in the strict 
“academic” sense, but that he was personally intensely interested in them and 
appreciated their depth and beauty up to a point is beyond doubt. Yet it cannot 
be denied that he sometimes cut corners impressionistically rather than undertake 
painstaking analyses, and that his conclusions were not always accurate and his 
probes not always deep. Indeed, he tended to opt for the popular simplification 
rather than a wrestling whatever the cost or outcome. This resulted from time to 
time in the facile identifications and subsumptions under Christianity pointed 
out in paragraphs above.
In the dialogue of West and East, Versfeld was a pioneer in his own country, 
with an affinity for especially Taoism and Zen. His resolute, pro-cosmic life, his 
affirmation of the concrete ordinary things of everyday life, his pithy style of self-
expression and his humour all drift naturally towards the synthesis of Buddhism 
and Taoism as it took shape in philosophies such as Hua-yen, inspiring Zen. 
However, he did not manage to harmonise that theoretically with his Christian 
Catholicism: the concept of God in the theism of Augustine and Thomas, and 
emptiness as ultimate horizon in Taoism and Buddhism, remain unreconciled. 
Versfeld did not produce a creative, original framework; he did not break new 
ground, relativising all religions to a point of final breakdown and thereby saving 
all of them, yet as penultimate vehicles of salvation, not more. That is in my 
estimation the ultimate shortcoming of his work. He did much to promote inter-
religious encounter, but did not venture into a dimension of radical metareligious 
critique and transreligious mysticism. Yet I pay my sincere respect to this student 
of Socrates, Lao Tzu, Chuang-tzu and Augustine, whose company is impossible 





POIESIS  –  ON THE VOICE OF 
POETS,  PHILOSOPHERS AND 
OTHER POTTERS
There is almost no commentary on Versfeld that does not mention his special 
use of language. I am certainly no exception. In Chapter 2, §3, for instance, I 
comment on the rich stylistic and argumentative variety in his writing. There I 
argue that this is not mere decoration, but is to be understood as continuous with 
the metaphysical and cultural-critical views that he conveys. But giving an account 
of the philosophical meaning of his use of language is only part of the story, as 
could be seen in another strand of reception of his work. It is a well-known fact 
that he was well received by important figures of the South African literary world.1 
1 In divergent ways this could be derived from Dennis Walder, Athol Fugard (London: 
Macmillan, 1984), 21; André Brink, “In Praise of All that Is Fleeting and Eternal,” 
introduction to Marthinus Versfeld, Pots and Poetry and other Essays (2nd edition) (Pretoria: 
Protea, 2009), 7–16; Breyten Breytenbach, Dog Heart. A Memoir (London: Faber & 
Faber, 1999), 44–51; Remona Voges, “Antjie Krog, gemeenskaplikheid en die behoefte aan 
interverbondenheid in Mede-wete (2014),” LitNet Akademies 16, no. 1 (2019), https://www.
litnet.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/LitNet_Akademies_16-1_Voges_145-165.pdf 
[last access 12 February 2020]; Marlene van Niekerk, “Die etende Afrikaner. Aantekeninge 
vir ’n klein tipologie,” in Van Volksmoeder tot Fokofpolisiekar. Kritiese opstelle oor Afrikaanse 
herinneringsplekke, ed. A.M. Grundlingh and S. Huigen (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 2008), 
75–92; and perhaps the note on Jeremy Cronin in “Johann Lodewyk Marais. Marthinus 
Versfeld (3),” http://versindaba.co.za/tag/marthinus-versfeld/ [last consulted 3 March 2020]. 
 Some of his essays were also reprinted in anthologies of literature; cf. “Die pampoen” 
[“The Pumpkin”], in Borde borde boordevol. Verhale en essays oor kos, ed. Hennie Aucamp 
(Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1998), 157–159; and “Oor huise” [“On Homes”], in Vertellers: die 
groot Afrikaanse verhaalboek, ed. M. Scholz (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1990), 23–41; “Die 
pampoen” [“The Pumpkin”], in Vertellers 2: Die tweede groot verhaalboek, ed. M. Scholtz 
(Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1991), 404–406. 
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Furthermore, the esteem for Versfeld in literary circles is witnessed by the incident 
that occasioned the present chapter. When Protea published a reissue of Versfeld’s 
Pots and Poetry, the editors of Tydskrif vir Letterkunde (Journal for Literature) 
approached me to write a review article thereof. That was fifteen years after the 
philosopher’s death and a quarter of a century after the original publication of 
Pots and Poetry.
This was a good opportunity to reflect on the relation between philosophy 
and literature in Versfeld’s thought. The aim of this chapter is to comment on 
his understanding of “poetry” as it is found in the book, where one gathers from 
the title that it cannot be detached from his understanding of pots. Explaining 
this link will also require that I clarify the relation between writing poetry and 
writing philosophy as Versfeld understood it. In all, I hope to shed some light on 
the appeal that Versfeld’s thought and writing have exercised on people with a 
vocation for poetry, literature and the arts.
1. On writing
The decision to reissue Martin Versfeld’s work2 not only honours the author, but 
is an exceptional occurrence in the South African intellectual world. That such an 
event is considered to be remarkable enough to be celebrated by reflecting on it 
in an academic journal is perfectly in order. However, there is something unusual 
about the fact that the Tydskrif vir Letterkunde requested me to comment on the 
reissuing of Versfeld’s Pots and Poetry.3 Versfeld was not a man of letters, and his 
philosophical texts contain fairly little commentary on literature. Literature as 
a theme also enjoys relatively little attention in his work. A quick glance at the 
names of the chapters and at the contents of his book will reveal that Pots and 
Poetry is not concerned with the theory of poetry. In fact, almost as if in disdain 
of the title, the author appears to be more interested in stones and their rights, 
the relationship between Western and Eastern thinking, criticism of society or 
naughty jokes than in poetry. In view of this, one could be excused for suspecting 
2 Finally this project by Protea publishers stopped at a handful of reissues. 
3 Where two page numbers are separated by a forward slash, they refer to the first and second 
editions of Pots and Poetry, respectively. For reasons I am unable to explain, there are minor 
differences between the two editions: see, for example, PP 30f. / PP 2nd ed. 56f. However, 
the differences that I found made no real difference to the content.
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that the Tydskrif had erred in requesting this review of Pots and Poetry, and all 
the more from me – also rather a philosopher than a man of letters. However, 
this suspicion could be removed by investigating Versfeld’s reason for using the 
words poetry in conjunction with pots in the title, and the multiple implications 
that can be developed from this connection.
It may strike the reader that Versfeld starts his book with a few autobiographical 
comments about himself as a philosopher,4 and it might be helpful to approach 
the content by carefully considering the author’s own description of the nature 
of his practice.5 Two references are sufficient for the current purposes. In his 
inaugural speech at the University of Cape Town (1971), Versfeld revealed the 
following:
I must confess at once that I do not know what philosophy is. This 
sometimes embarrasses me before the innocence of students, but not 
before those who have come to realise that the things by which we live 
are the things about which we know least. We do not know what life is, 
or what knowing is, or what truth and goodness are. Or if we do know 
we can’t say it […]. (SS 1)
In my opinion, this statement is the heart of Versfeld’s (somewhat idealised) view 
of his own work at that time, but it also presents us with an uncertain starting 
point: if philosophy is, as it were, nothing more than a constant discussion of 
what eventually turns out to be ineffable ignorance, one can understand why 
“philosophising” is often used in common parlance as a euphemism for “talking 
nonsense”. And if philosophising is nothing more than pompous drivel, one could 
wonder whether such a philosophical discourse will succeed in doing anything 
better than presenting poetry as mere doggerel (“verdigsels”).
However, a second statement made by Versfeld about the task of a philosopher 
takes us in another direction and also helps us better to understand the first 
statement:
[…] the philosopher shares with the poet an absorption in the 
articulation of existence, expressing itself in the unique voice by which 
a tree and stone and blade of grass proclaims itself to be this and to be 
lovable. (MP 13, my italics)
4 On this point, see also Chapter 2, §2.
5 See Rossouw, “Die kuns van die lewe is om tuis te kom”, or Chapters 2 and 9 of this book for 
an overview of Versfeld’s philosophy.
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If Versfeld’s opinion of the philosopher and the poet is correct, it would mean that 
philosophising and the writing of poetry both stem from the same experience of 
reality: an experience that acknowledges something that deserves to be called the 
voice of everyday things like trees, stones or grass, as well as the lovableness of such 
things. In other words, the philosopher and the poet do not merely write, but 
respond to an initiative that precedes and provokes their writing. Furthermore, 
both philosophy and poetry articulate things to which one is sometimes so close 
that it is as if one were absorbed by the experience – so close that it is impossible 
to take an impartial distance from an object, with the result that one cannot know 
much about it (as expressed in the first quotation). It therefore cannot be expected 
that this absorption in the things of the world can articulate itself exhaustively, 
and if it makes no sense to expect of a poem to sing its theme comprehensively, it 
would also make no sense to expect a philosopher to fully capture in words “the 
things by which we live”.
These two quotations from Versfeld’s earlier works orientate us towards the 
type of philosophising that should be expected from the author and also guide 
us to the threshold of Pots and Poetry. Do not expect Versfeld to present a treatise 
on poetics! Rather, prepare yourself for a conversation aimed at highlighting the 
exceptional aspect of commonplace, everyday things – as clearly explained on the 
first page of Pots and Poetry.6 The motif that is present throughout this collection 
of essays is his attempt to find and reflect on this absorbing and loving everyday 
connection with reality.
2. Connectedness
The collection titled Pots and Poetry is comprised of nine stand-alone essays of 
which at least two (“Time and Speed and the Quality of Life” and “Plato and 
Confucius”) were previously published in journals, and to which Protea had 
added three essays from Sum. Selected Works/’n Keur uit sy werke (1991) for the 
reissue. The original issue had been published in 1985 and the essays from Sum 
were all written afterwards. A quick review of the divergent themes dealt with in 
6 Versfeld’s examination of the relationship between philosophy and poetry started at an early 
stage. Already in chapter 1 of Oor gode en afgode he uses poetry to illustrate the non-rational, 
non-irrational reasonableness of practical reasoning. A further discussion of this follows 
below.
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the book does not seem to produce a single obvious theme. Chapter 1 deals with 
pots and poetry; the following three essays could be characterised as sociocultural 
critiques;7 chapters 5, 6 and 7 contain a contribution to the co-ordination of 
Western and Eastern themes and ways of thinking; and the original collection 
concluded with a reflection on the inevitable sociopolitical implication of writing 
and a plea for naughty jokes. The additional chapters in the Protea reissue include 
discussions of ecology, the university and the thoughts of some early members of 
the Mountain Club of South Africa.8 Would it be possible to identify coherence 
in such a hotchpotch? I am convinced that it is not only possible, but that the 
coherence simultaneously reveals the central theme of the collection, which is 
closely linked with the author’s way of working. To support this assertion, we 
have to consider another clarification given by Versfeld concerning the nature of 
his philosophical work – this time from Pots and Poetry:
[…] connecting in my thinking has a priority over analysis. I am 
impressed with the relation of all things to each other, that is, with 
the fact of communication. I have my moments when I can see the 
universe as a vast and divine festivity, and catch faint echoes of what 
St Augustine called the carmen universitatis, that is, the singing that 
should accompany a fiesta. What I have to say about pots and poetry 
arises from this. (PP 3–4 / PP 2nd ed. 22–23)
On the first page of the book the author confesses that, besides the previously 
mentioned qualifications, the kind of thinking performed in his book was 
inspired by the connection between things. The appropriate way of writing about 
them is therefore one that connects things.9 However, working in such a way is 
possible only if one has refused to play a particular game: if a decision in favour 
of prioritising an analytical way of thinking is taken from the start, this means 
7 A somewhat later publication of one of these essays, “Our Rapist Society” (PP 29–40 / PP 2nd 
ed. 55–70) was reviewed by Neil Viljoen, “Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Martin Versfeld’s 
‘Comments on the Rapist Society’,” English Academy Review 5, no. 5 (1988): 116–137.
8 The new edition of Pots and Poetry includes a foreword by André Brink, which is basically 
an English version of the foreword he had written for the reissue of Die neukery met die 
appelboom. Therefore my critical evaluation of the foreword also applies here – see Wolff, 
“Die neukery met verval en herstel in Versfeld se storie van die appelboom,” Koers 74, no. 3 
(2009): 539–542, here 541.
9 Reminiscing about Versfeld as his professor in philosophy, Jeremy Cronin highlighted this 
idea of connection and integration in his teaching – see Jeremy Cronin, “Interview with 
Helena Sheehan”, recorded on 17 April 2001 at the University of Cape Town. http://
helenasheehan.ie/interview-with-jeremy-cronin/ [last access 12 February 2020].
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that a particular genetic defect of modernity is de facto reactualised and the 
ability to hear the song or poem of the universe (the carmen universi) is adversely 
affected. Versfeld’s justification for placing connection before analysis – which is 
expressed in different ways throughout his work10 – is based on the conviction 
that a whole series of pathologies of the modern world are the result of a wrong 
way of thinking, and if we change the way we think, we may be able to change 
our quality of life (on the significance of quality of life or well-being, cf.  Chapter 
3, §4). The choice that we encounter throughout Pots and Poetry is the choice 
between thinking as analysis and control, or as surrendering to the song of the 
universe (exactly what this is will be discussed at a later stage).
The first option is summarised in Die neukery met die appelboom (The Trouble 
with the Apple Tree):11 “During the 17th century the Western mind became very 
10 It is strange that the idea of an analogy, which is at the centre of Versfeld’s thinking and is not 
only at the core of the concept of connectedness in Pots and Poetry, but is even practically 
executed (see, for instance, the analogy between Divine poiesis and human poetry), is not 
explicitly mentioned in Pots and Poetry.
11 Die neukery met die appelboom is close in spirit and content to Pots and Poetry. An excursion 
on the former is therefore warranted. 
 This short volume was written for a wide audience and large parts can be read for the 
sheer enjoyment of its conversational style. However, it would be wrong to assume that the 
author is merely chatting: the entire book was informed by Versfeld’s philosophical work of 
the preceding fifty years (as is evident from the resurgence of his favourite themes), and the 
playfulness with which he deals with them is simply another expression of the passion with 
which he writes about these themes in all his other works. Versfeld’s ideas of decline provide 
the background to these essays. Indeed, the dawn of the Renaissance and modernity represent 
a disintegration of the unitary nature of life in the Middle Ages (NA 2nd ed. 19, 43; cf. Chapter 
3, §5). Descartes’s rationalism and the accompanying desire to use science to control both the 
environment and humankind attest to the maladies of our time. The name Newton comes to 
denote the progressive realisation of Descartes’s dream for science. The association between 
Newtonian physics (cf. the anecdote about his experience with a falling apple) and human 
alienation from the natural environment (cf. Adam and Eve’s original sin involving the “apple 
tree” and their expulsion from Paradise) creates the tension from which the book’s title was 
derived. This “trouble” or “botheration” with the apple tree refers to the tension between a 
diagnosis of his era and the cure for which Versfeld pleads. 
 Versfeld’s diagnosis or cultural criticism emanates from the scenario of decline that 
underpins this book (and all his works): modern rationalism disrupts the unity of body 
and soul, subjects our lifeworld to a scientistic reduction, alienates humankind from the 
environment, and provides people with modern technologies that enable them to control and 
exploit nature. It therefore becomes exceedingly difficult to be at home in such an objectified 
world. This unhomeliness results in a compulsion to be constantly on the move (not only by 
moving away from your local place, but also by moving away from your true self ), to become 
subservient to abstract time, and to develop an inflated, domineering ego, which results in 
your having a negative effect on others (this diagnosis has been explored in Chapter 5, above). 
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analytical. Descartes’s world is a disintegration of multiple substances. Things fall 
apart” (NA 2nd ed. 19).12 In a similar characterisation of Western thought, the 
desire to control, inherent in its analytical thinking, is pointed out: “criterion of 
truth becomes pragmatic: the workability of concepts and their serviceability for 
prediction and control” (PP 16 / PP 2nd ed. 39).13 And when thinking becomes 
obsessed with control, its powers are exerted on people and the environment, 
eventually with catastrophic results. This diagnosis of modernity is encountered 
throughout Pots and Poetry, but is concentrated in the three social critique 
chapters (chapters 2 to 4).
In opposition to this violence of modern Western culture, Versfeld endeavours 
to connect with his world in a different way. He does this by attempting to give 
renewed credibility to specific moments in the Christian and Eastern traditions 
of thought. Two things – represented by the “psalm of the universe” and the 
“dance of Shiva” – should be highlighted in this regard: (1) the connectedness 
of everything that exists, in the way that individual notes are connected in a 
melody (see PP 49, 87 / PP 2nd ed. 82, 130) or single movements are connected 
in a dance, and (2) the rejection of the greedy and domineering will. Every denial 
of the connectedness of things represents a transgression against their rightful 
Such an ego leads to the warped idea of the possession and exploitation of others (cf. “Wat 
is myne?” [“What is Mine?”], NA 2nd ed. 49ff ). In three places (NA 2nd ed. 23, 37 and 37), 
Versfeld criticises forced removals, by which people who are not truly at home in the world 
deprived others of the possibility of being at home. 
 However, Versfeld also provides the medicine: think metaphysically (his views in this 
regard are briefly described in “Tyd, lewe en dood” [“Time, Life and Death”], NA 2nd ed. 
39ff.); be aware of the temporary nature of your own existence; think analogically rather than 
analytically about reality; acknowledge the unity of body and soul; and learn to be at home in 
the “here” by developing an understanding of your place in the world. God remains the anchor 
of this metaphysics. Versfeld offers no argument to support the acceptance of the idea of God, 
but his plea is constructed in such a way that agreement with his diagnosis ultimately implies a 
certain degree of consent to a (rather vague) idea of God. Harmonising with Versfeld’s earliest 
work, his deepest conviction is that we should recognise the miraculous in the secular (NA 
2nd ed. 34, 38, 47, 70). Such recognition makes one at home in the world, but it also means 
withdrawal from the ruinous mechanistic world (NA 2nd ed. 33–34). As a philosopher, 
Versfeld implicitly attempts to do the same: he declines participation in the careerist form of 
academic activity (NA 2nd ed. 34), but does take on the role of the “philosopher as vulture”, 
feeding on the ruins of a disintegrated society (NA 2nd ed. 67ff.).
12 For Versfeld, the disintegration of the (mediaeval) unity was the guiding diagnostic category 
for social and political pathologies form the early stages (cf. Chapter 3 on Oor gode en afgode) 
and right up to his last work (as just demonstrated in NA).
13 Also see: “We seldom question this assumption, nor ask ourselves how many of the ills that 
we wish to control have been caused by the desire to control” (PP 41 / PP 2nd ed. 72).
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place in the whole and a step towards a meaningless world; every concession made 
to the domineering will is an affirmation of an individual, cannibalistic rapacity. 
According to Versfeld’s diagnosis, the central problem in Western society, or in any 
society shaped by Western influences, is the intellectual and practical withdrawal 
of the individual from the meaning-giving connection into which individuals are 
embedded and the obstinate perseverance in that isolated existence. By contrast, 
Versfeld offers no alternative programme for the rehabilitation of people or a 
new social project, but rather describes the connections existing between people.14
Against this background it becomes clear that the two forms of thinking that 
Versfeld contrasts on the first pages of his book – analysis-driven thought and 
connection-driven thought – are not, in the first place, two ways of being clever, 
each with its forms of institutional embeddedness. Here we have two forms of 
being that stem from two fundamental possibilities for existence for the same 
person (PP 40 / PP 2nd ed. 70).
3. Creativity, love, generosity
The first insight gained from Versfeld’s alternative approach to life is that 
humans exist in no other way than in response to an enormous gift: “Man, then, 
is absolutely gratuitous, a gift to himself. His self-possession, his property in 
himself is relative and dependent […]. But his most common delusion is that he 
has absolute property in himself ” (PP 24 / PP 2nd ed. 49). If we have seen earlier 
(§1) that, for Versfeld, philosophy, like poetry, has always been a response to the 
world in which we are engaged, it is because the essential initiative that leads to 
our being human has always been situated outside of us. In the language borrowed 
by Versfeld from the Judaeo-Christian tradition, human beings are “[themselves] 
spoken by the creative Word through whose reverberations we can hear nature 
speak” (PP 25 / PP 2nd ed. 51). This is an implicit reinterpretation by Versfeld 
of Aristotle’s definition of human beings as living beings who possess language: 
14 Marlene van Niekerk certainly understood this point correctly when – making use (with 
approbation) of Pots and Poetry, particularly the first chapter – she wrote her culture- 
and literary-critical essay on “The eating Afrikaner”, in agreement with Versfeld’s spirit 
of connection-making. Cf. Van Niekerk, “Die etende Afrikaner. Aantekeninge vir ’n 
klein tipologie,” in Van Volksmoeder tot Fokofpolisiekar. Kritiese opstelle oor Afrikaanse 
herinneringsplekke, ed. Albert Grundlingh and Siegfried Huigen (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 
2008), 75–92.
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the conceptual pairs carmen universi-poetry and Word-reverberation present the 
bearer of language as a being who responds to and is a continuation of the origin 
of life. A third pair of concepts is hidden within a third form of language usage: 
God must find the denial of his existence very funny indeed. His 
laughter is the pouring forth of creatures into the Void so that they may 
echo his Word. Creation is funny and that is why copulation is funny, 
and why the best jokes are about sex. They spring from our participation 
in God’s creativity. (PP 92 / PP 2nd ed. 137) 
Here, Versfeld’s intention is to speak a true word in jest.
Human creativity, of which poetry and philosophising on the meaning of 
connectedness are two forms, owes its emergence to the original generosity, which 
is mentioned throughout Pots and Poetry. As is evident from the passages quoted 
above, Versfeld regards this generosity as synonymous with creativity. Whoever 
talks about creativity is talking about the beginning of things, and therefore about 
time. Versfeld views creativity as the possibility of a new beginning and a new 
course. The thing that creativity and generosity have in common is that they are 
both unexpected – each opens a door to a new future (PP 40 / PP 2nd ed. 70).
A third key term (which is relatively infrequently used in Pots and Poetry) 
fits in this context, namely love. Like generosity, love is the origin of all things 
and the power through which they come into existence: “Everything that is has 
the dignity of being loved by God, which it expresses precisely in being what it 
is” (PP 21 / PP 2nd ed. 45), and if love is spontaneously creative (FT 92), we can 
understand why he regards love as being “anarchist” (PP 23 / PP 2nd ed. 48).15
Versfeld’s ambitious project in chapters 5 to 7 of Pots and Poetry is to show 
that this original orientation of human existence can be heard in the harmonious 
resonance between Christian and Eastern wisdom. Here, Pots and Poetry offers an 
extension of a project of which chapters 1 and 2 of Our Selves most likely present 
a more sophisticated version, and which had its roots as far back as in Oor gode 
en afgode (see GA 25ff.).
15 Hence the title of Marlene van Niekerk’s review of Sum: “Martin Versfeld. Anargis van die 
liefde” [“Martin Versfeld. Anarchist of Love”], Die Suid-Afrikaan (April/May, 1992): 70 and 
77. The mutual relationship between the three key terms can clearly be seen in the following: 
“God is sheer generosity, and there is no reason for creating nor compulsion to generate in 
God. Creation is a joyous outburst of sheer generosity. The universe has no being but the 
love of God. If the being of creatures is time, it is also love. [Love] is the being of things: the 
hardness and weight of stones, the greening tree, the rising sun, the breaking wave: whatever 
makes things relevant to each other” (PP 50 / PP 2nd ed. 82–83).
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4. Poiesis
Since Versfeld is concerned, in Pots and Poetry, with the complex and amazing 
connection between things and is determined to do them justice, the collection 
contains a wealth of themes. I would like to take time to focus on the two themes 
announced in the title of the book – more specifically on the second, poetry – 
because this is the concern of the present chapter. At the same time I will share 
my answer to the question: how does Versfeld’s book relate to poets and writers?
It is well known that in the Western cultural and intellectual history, the 
Greek verb poiein – to make – developed into two very different views on the 
poiemata – the things made – and on the processes by which they are respectively 
made, which is poiesis. In my opinion, the fact that Versfeld attempts to bridge 
this violent divide between artefact and art (poetry, in this case), and to view and 
contemplate the products of human cultural life-activities together, is a major 
merit of his work. The “and” in Pots and Poetry represents these efforts, while the 
two forms of poiemata are represented by pots and poetry respectively.
As asserted in §3, “Creativity, Love and Generosity”, the source from which 
one can truly live – that which you have to acknowledge in order to be your true 
self – is the super- and pre-human generosity of which the cosmic song is the 
key metaphor. This original orientation can also be expressed as poetry: “[…] the 
world is the poiesis of God, chanted with every sunrise and echoed by poets who 
perform the rites of wonder at the rising of the sun” (PP 2nd ed. 152). Anyone 
who does not acknowledge this origin (regardless of whether it is articulated in 
Christian, Eastern or any other discourse), in other words, who believes that to 
be a “self-made man” and therefore chooses the degenerated self, is, according to 
Versfeld, not able to create (PP 58 / PP 2nd ed. 94, 152). This creative or poetic 
origin of the true self, including the necessary criticism against the ego which 
denies this origin, is not only the principle behind poetry, but in a parallel way 
also the principle behind pots. If we can cook a tasty stew, it is because we have 
already been served with a delicious world. From the pot, which represents the 
oldest and most common and durable aspects of human culture, the creation of 
a human world fans out so that art and science, social interaction and landscape 
formation (agriculture), industry and politics become mutually involved (see 
especially chapter 1 of Pots and Poetry). As widely as the connections of creative 
activities can ripple outwards from the cooking pot, just as widely can the scope 
of the misdeeds of the greedy ego become evident in human actions: from the 
formula-like recipes in glossy magazines that smother the poetic nature of the 
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art of cooking (PP 3 / PP 2nd ed. 22), to the pressure cooker (PP 10 / PP 2nd 
ed. 31), which is symptomatic of a society in which “saving time” (so that more 
can be done) becomes more important than “making time” (for other people), 
to “cannibalism” (see PP 30 / PP 2nd ed. 56), which reigns supreme in a society 
in which the struggle for survival has become the ultimate law (themes that 
Versfeld developed in more detail in Food for Thought). All of this results in the 
world becoming anthropomorphised in accordance with the functionalist and 
domineering prescriptions of the greedy ego. According to Versfeld, C. Louis 
Leipoldt has shown us that the original generosity does indeed make it possible 
for us to write poetry and cook, thus echoing the original creativity:
[…] the poetry of Leipoldt celebrates this [Cape agricultural] landscape 
and these people, and is by no means to be separated from his interest in 
food. His books on cooking celebrate the poetry of the kitchen. Poiesis 
means “making”, and we make pies as well as poems. Thus his poem 
“Oktobermaand” and his Cape Cookery fulfil each other, and his poetry 
enables you to taste the landscape. (PP 7 / PP 2nd ed. 27)
For Versfeld, being poetic – be it as a poet, cook, philosopher or whatever – means 
first and foremost that you have to be a particular kind of person (PP 87 / PP 
2nd ed. 130). This type of person is able to acknowledge the connectedness of all 
things and can appreciate their uniqueness, or love them: “A poet is a man [sic] 
who can take off his hat to a brick in honour of the original Poiesis” (PP 25 / PP 
2nd ed. 51) and “all poems are love poems, since poetry is about real things and 
whatever is real is related to other things” (PP 50 / PP 2nd ed. 83). The poet’s love 
of things is expressed in beautiful, accurate and exact language (PP 93 / PP 2nd 
ed. 138). The real things about which the poet becomes lyrical are the ordinary–
extraordinary things (cf. PP 1 and 88 / PP 2nd ed. 19 and 132), and in this respect 
the poet and the philosopher are kindred spirits.
This idea of the poet does not in any way reflect the romantic adoration of 
the artist as the secular messenger of the gods; whatever Versfeld considers to be 
characteristic of poets is, in principle, equally characteristic of any other person. 
All writing has a social dimension and, ultimately, political implications. The 
same applies to all human activities (PP 85f. / PP 2nd ed. 128f.). Versfeld’s belief 
that a poet must have some degree of unsoundness of mind (PP 93 / PP 2nd ed. 
138) comes close to the idea of the insanity of artists, but this unsoundness, 
rather than capturing a secularised idea of inspiration, is in fact a revolt against a 
dominant form of rationality. It is an alternative form of reasonableness that he 
had sought since his early neo-Thomist days. Already in Oor gode en afgode (GA 
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14f and cf. Chapter 3, §6.1), poetry served as an example of an alternative form 
of reasonableness: the art of writing poetry is an activity that cannot be regarded 
as rational, but it is easy to acknowledge that it does not contradict, but rather 
supports, an intelligent approach to life. As such, poetry is an expression of 
practical reason. This seems to be the current of thought that underlies Versfeld’s 
claim that poetic activity has political implications: poets specialise in awarding 
each thing its rightful place in such a way that each element, regardless of how 
insignificant it seems, contributes to the consonance of the whole (PP 85 / PP 2nd 
ed. 129). In this sense, poets can be regarded as the true lawmakers (PP 88 / PP 
2nd ed. 130): they control (at least their perspective on) the practical reason that 
awards a place to each member in a way that does justice to each one. This idea 
seems even more acceptable when the broad meaning of poetry – the practical 
reason that ripples out from the pot – is taken into consideration. It is for this 
reason that Pots and Poetry continuously returns to culture-critical themes.
Although I shall not here discuss these themes in detail, it is important to 
point out that various sociopolitical outrages constitute the dark background to 
the merriment of Pots and Poetry; to some extent Pots and Poetry also responds 
to this. It is, in my opinion, one of the main shortcomings of Pots and Poetry 
and, indeed of Versfeld’s work in general, that it does not provide a truly credible 
and respectful place for human suffering. Versfeld pays only scant attention to 
the question of how it is possible for the carmen universi to be silenced by the 
cacophonous chords of military bands. How it is possible to echo the psalm of the 
universe or dance with Shiva if the rhythm of your life is determined by violent 
labour relations or political injustice, is a dilemma to which Versfeld does not 
readily pay attention. In certain cases, Versfeld’s philosophy of history simply has 
to be judged to be unacceptable, for instance, when one thinks about the atrocities 
of the political history of the past century and then read: “History is the time that 
cooks created men and women until they are ripe and fully leavened” (PP 9 / PP 
2nd ed. 30). Something that may, for some, make sense on the level of personal 
psychology could, on a larger scale, be an unacceptable political theodicy.
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5. Silence
Even if the meaning of poetry resides ultimately in using words to express 
appreciation for the connectedness of things, one should nevertheless remember 
that a naughty joke can sometimes fare better than a poem – and such jokes can 
be poetic (PP 93 / PP 2nd ed. 138). The complicated song of the poem could 
be silenced by an ordinary witty remark, which sometimes does more justice to 
things. Furthermore, the laughter evoked by a good joke silences all language and 
may show up as laughable some of the most courageous efforts to use language 
in a meaningful way.
Should one then conclude that ultimately the philosopher has outperformed 
the poet with regard to the use of language? No, because – as I have indicated 
in the first quotation, above, in which he talks about philosophy – many years 
spent thinking eventually leads to the amazing acknowledgement that we do 
not really have a clear idea of what we have been doing. For that reason Versfeld 
at least attempted to replace an academic philosophical language with a more 
playful colloquial language.16
What then about the theologians? Ultimately they do not escape this 
“negative” fate either. About God Versfeld writes: 
The only “proof ” of his presence is his absence. He is too near to be seen 
and too real to be credible. No propositional truth can attain to him 
because he is its source. If it is true, it is because it is sufficiently true to 
Him to obliterate itself. (PP 58 / PP 2nd ed. 93–94)
It is in this silence that Versfeld wants us to arrive home. It is not the silence of 
dejected surrender or fatalism; neither is it a silence that finally silences the poet, 
the philosopher or the theologian. It is a silence from which we can once again 
hear the world and respond to it – “being still and keeping quiet are not the same” 
(PP 53 / PP 2nd ed. 87). Perhaps the greatest life skill a poet and a philosopher 
can develop is the ability to write silently.
16 However, one does not have to believe him when Versfeld claims that he bade farewell to the 
higher unintelligibilities (as he derogatively referred to his previous philosophising, cf. PP 
1). The large number of French, German and Latin technical terms that are used – without 
translations – throughout the book, and the number of references he makes to philosophers, 








In the previous chapter I examined the wide sense in which Versfeld uses the word 
“poetry”. At the same time, Versfeld’s forms of expression (examined in Chapter 
2) and his ideas found echoes among a wide range of novelists and poets.1 Indeed, 
the literary reception of Versfeld is of equal importance to the philosophical 
reception. This congenital match is witnessed by the poems by which Marlene 
van Niekerk and Antjie Krog preferred to articulate their responses to Versfeld.2
By Marlene van Niekerk
Johnny in the mountain park instagram*
From Johnny’s Anthropocene Blues
This rock has all a hostage
needs: fresh air, solid
footing, grass, the thrill
of being touched by slicks
of moss and nodding
ferns. She hides her lithium
like the jewel in that Box
of the World, painted by
Courbet though he preferred
to do the central cleft in oils.
1 See again the references at the beginning of Chapter 7.
2 The title of this chapter is my choice – EW.
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We keep her in a fenced
reserve while we exploit
the cliffs outside. We drill
into the tops when lower
reaches prove abstruse. Once
that fund’s exhausted,
we’ll start exploring here.
Meanwhile, for the world
to see, we care for mountains
in our custody.
On a day like this,
with noctilucent cirrus
and gorges rife with petrichor,
do yourself a favour,
and take your little Zeiss field
glass with which to scan
her face. Soon you’ll find
an aquarelle, wet on wet,
the bleeding greys and blues
on red. You won’t hold
back the tears, your eyes
shall bathe the limbs
of our lady erstwhile risen
from the magma swells.
If you watch and wait,
your lenses misting over,
you’ll feel the bond emerging
between the keeper
and the kept
Her approach is irrevocable,
you might mistake it for the dusk,
a dimming way down in your gut,
a deep unfastening of locks.
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You won’t forget the moment
she first put her hands in yours,
and surrendered to your better
judgement. It’s pure chemistry,
please note, it started way back
with the Bang.
Henceforth you can have
your way with her, anytime
you want. Re-charge your
batteries, suppress
your bi-polar.
This here is the two of us, please
like and forward to your friends.
L’envoi
It’s known, I am told, as
Stockholm syndrome, applicable
to urban rooks, to herons
and the small red fox. They
all eat from our hands.
As of now, I have proof,
it also holds for rocks.
*Written in response to the address given by Versfeld at Maclear’s Beacon, Table 
Mountain, 24 February 1991. Pots and Poetry and other Essays 171–172.
I have the sense that nature is a Heraclitean fire in which man is the phoenix. Let 
us be mindful of the fuel, for the rocks, too, have their immortality of which we are 
the keepers. We have to redeem nature from the death that we have brought and are 
bringing upon it. Unless we work to preserve each other, seeing only the humanity, 
the image, in each of us, we shall lose the mountains and the sea. The rights of man 





I cook  the world as food
is a humanised world
to cook is an act of courtesy
the kitchen steams in golden batter
of laughter wine and spices
the umbilical cord between us and the world
is the casserole – Grandma Dot’s casserole
in the oven – stuffed with rosemary
and garlic ingots the joint sizzles
every burning bush is a holy bush but
he who presides over leg of lamb is a priest
I boil rice as if I’m caring for little children
with a grain of nutmeg I praise creation
scrubbed carrots begin to glow from within
in butter and ginger they find a true
voice  beans plunge into white pepper and fennel
a salad spoon reveals a flash of currants softly
clicking jewels of naked olive cherry tomato and
almond  the deepest precision of pumpkin arrives
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at the table the eaten-of-abundance-world
is a beloved world  a meal that overflows
with warmheartedness’s blessed
sounds  yes, feeding people is a moral deed
a resurrection. my exuberant family sits down to eat –
suddenly brittle in their enoughness  their un-
scathed selves   our all-still-togetherness. we praise
easy generosity as the great sufficient Guarantee.
The takers of the earth take hands.
(after Martin Versfeld)













but the earth does not appear









The world as food is the world humanised. 
Martin Versfeld
the sandwich and tea in my hands
are the making of breath in the world
each one who comes to my front door asking
for food  dissolves an estrangement:
as the knife carefully spreads the butter right
to the crust the triangle of sandwich has already
unconstricted me a body kneels between hunger
and abyss  an eaten world is a beloved world
butter is the approachable face of bread
bread attends to the slices of creamy smooth avocado
tomatoes singing beneath the grinding salt and pepper
ribbons of crunchy spinach, a twist of bitter rocket
spikes of orange peel a drop of balsamic
and the true baritone of cheese
hear how the solid centre of the bread resounds
– presented this way the sandwich becomes a psalter
to wrap food in heartness is a moral act
the sandwich filling that spills with a soft sigh into
a cupped hand  the mug of rooibos-buchu tea – all this
records the spreading aroma of a related adverb:  goodwill
the umbilical cord between you and me and the world
is the sandwich – bread and butter spread embodied light
butter reveals the ruddy bread tomato
the clear-breathing onion       eating on the pavement
from hunger perhaps you long for a drink yet some part
of you also seized by the flavour of deeply attached earth
:resurrection begins with the bread and the butter
and the man at the open door’s mouth of a shared world
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convivium
1.
why do my knuckles linger so tenderly on your cheek? why
do I hurry when I hear you’re hungry or frightened or suicidal if
the firmament is exploding like a thing hurled in fury?
what sense does your downy summer cheek make
if gravity grinds ice frigates to skyscrapers of dust if
collisions leave behind ruins and new viciously flaring kernels?
why should I care that your cheek hollows fill with tears if
we stand surrounded by helium lightning    startling sunwinds that
devour moons  tear apart finer-spun stars         shatter surfaces?
oh abandoned wells empty of all but darkness
oh holes filled with nothing where only violence holds sway
what use is the luminescence of your cheekbones against
gravitational whirlpools where supernovas collapse with
such force that not even miniscule splashes of light escape?
what use my caress in the breath-earthed night if a centre-
less universe opens space in the nonexistent for dark
matter to overpower a few broken beads of light?
oh holes where only empty violence holds sway
oh abandoned wells filled with darkened nothingnesses
2.
but spiral wands exist you say
the lovely feathery slender spiral arms of our galaxy exist
in a dreamy ballet you say             of haze and orbit
and the slowly pulsing lifespan of stars       oxygen
and quasars nebula wombs and the immense light
at the outer reaches of the visible universe you say
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the Milky Way’s humming        peaceful silver-purifying orbits exist
the love of moons           tides           light paths and eternal equilibrium        all this
exists you say: is it not precisely the stars as profusion of piercings
on still summer evenings that hold us in outreaching orbits?
whenever we turn to each other in fallow surrender
we do it under a roaring baldachin of stars
3. Symmetry (HH212*)
at first you do not see the disk-shaped cloud’s accreting might
     firing gas swirls in opposite directions –
          both of them pulsing shimmering creamy rays towards
               semi-benign collisions lightly bumping
                    urging each other on to visibility: look back at how
                         within her cleaving elbows, the star now threads symmetrically
                              on either side a pristine incandescent vertebra of light.
                              on either side a pristine incandescent vertebra of light.
                         within her cleaving elbows, the star now threads symmetrically
                    urging each other on to visibility: look back at how
               semi-benign collisions lightly bumping
          both of them pulsing shimmering creamy rays towards
     firing gas swirls in opposite directions –
at first you do not see the disk-shaped cloud’s accreting might
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4.
my body echoes with pockmarked Mercury
– the airlessness and embedded iron core
my body weathers Venus’s sunwind              the inferno
of it the orangeconsuming azure blue sulphur
of slow precise turning to the other side
my wrist holds the Earth aloft – our water planet
chastened blue throbbing under light fingerprints of vapour
my body ploughs duststorms from Mars – ochre
icesilting sulphurstained desert planet and starts
to measure the two frost-trapped blondbearded little moons
it is my body that takes the enormity of Jupiter
in tow: the virulent speed  the circling
raging red abscess the cluster of moons along creamy paths
of smoky serpentine patterns and metal hues
she can fit three-quarters of the solar system inside her body
only through my body can I love Saturn’s freezing beauty –
the still yellow light  the caressing imprisonment of rings
the spaces between the rings  the heartpebble smoothness
the exuberant greatness of perfect form    the lovely
tilt of the body – you are so light Saturn    you can float on water
my body stares through its fingers at the pearl eye of Uranus
fallen on her side              fallen one            methane-heavy palate
my body sinks with the stormy blue darkness of Neptune
mumbling marrowing under gas oceans autistic        morose
frozen through with deposits of wind torpid        obscene
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5.
the universe is differently unstopped, you say than just through
a fight for survival look how celestially throated this morning
is the spread of light on the Mooiberge the lyrical counting of hours
the heartbreakliturgy in the ear of autumn            you crouch amazed
within it for blessed are we
that this thin bony inherited mortal body
tuneforks such abundance
*The birth of a twin star was discovered by the Berlin astronomer Hans Zinnecker. 
HH 212 is pumped out symmetrically by an invisible proto-star near the Horsehead 
Nebula in the Orion constellation. The poem was written in collaboration with 







SANCTUS MARTHINUS  
LAUDATOR PHILOSOPHICUS –  
OR,  S ITT ING AT THE GURU’S  FEET
IN WHICH I  RELY ON EXPERIENCES GAINED 
THROUGH READING THE WORKS OF THE 
SAINTLY MARTIN VERSFELD IN ORDER TO 
INTRODUCE THE READERS TO THE MULTIPLE 
ASSOCIATIONS EVOKED BY HIS  SOCRATIC L IFE 1
I started reading Versfeld’s work around the time of his death2 and I will take 
advantage of the momentum granted by the folly of youth to comment on it. 
However, I do so hesitantly, while my thoughts involuntarily go to another man 
from Africa. Doctor Luke relates that Philip once met an emasculated Ethiopian 
statesman who, in addition to this problem, also struggled to understand the text 
he was reading3 – as a result of his disabilities, in time and in an amazing way, 
he became the father of all of us who suffer from impotence in understanding.
Having invoked saints, I need to clarify the title of my chapter. The reader 
might find it strange that I refer to Versfeld as a saint. It would be very difficult 
to imagine him as an ascetic, although he did speak kindly about the hermits 
(NA 19) who did not fit into the great Roman political system, but knew how 
to live from the land and by God’s love and how to share this grace through 
hospitality with others. Something of this is reflected in Versfeld’s love for his 
1 Has litteras expono ad gratiam agendam meo dilectissimo professori Jano Scholtemeijeri qui 
me introduxit in amorem Marthini Versfeldis et rerum classicarum.
2 Intended as an oblique reference to the first chapter of Jan Terlouw’s Koning van Katoren.
3 Cf. Acts 8: 26–40.
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house in the Kouga. However, he was no puritan. A puritan is someone who 
wears his fig leaf over his mouth (PP 93) and those readers who know how many 
children Uncle Martin had will share my suspicion that his fig leaf must have, at 
some point, landed in a stew. He enjoyed cooking, you see.
No, Versfeld was a saint in the degree to which he viewed his work as a calling 
and made it a song of praise to God. His saintliness can be seen in his common 
sense (RM 44 and ACCG 10), in the way he prepared vegetables for the pot, in the 
way he built his house, the amazement with which he looked at speckled things, 
and in the way he blew his nose. In brief, his saintliness can be ascribed to the 
fact that he was simply himself. Saintliness is a biographic adjective. The saint is a 
doctus tempore suo, educated in the training school of his own circumstances, and 
since life is larger than logic (MP 18), nothing is more important to him than to 
be himself before all else, and to be at home within himself, as he himself provides 
the perspective from which he looks at and writes about the world.
When he states that his own contingent life precedes his philosophy, that 
philosophy is based on a person’s specific existence (MP 20), he does not view it 
as a mere theoretical finding. This can be seen in the autobiographic line that is 
evident throughout his work: I would like to start by introducing myself. I am a 
professor of philosophy (PP 1). I live in the Cape and I identify with the cultural 
tradition of the people who came here to establish a refreshment station for the 
crews of passing ships (FT 9). This is the soil from which I grew (KK 13). I was 
absent for a time, while I studied in Scotland, in the English world, where I hoped 
to expand my initial presumptuous rationalism (MP 16). Master Bowman’s 
integration of faith and reason (Sum 14–15; MP 16–17) caught me unawares and 
nowadays I work in a room where the shelves contain works by Augustine and 
Aquinas, and also the Upanishads. I have built myself a little house in the Kouga 
(KK 7–25) and sleep on a mattress that my grandfather had made for my father in 
the 1880s. But let me tell you about the delicious stew I cooked.4 I have to confess 
that I do have a pressure cooker in my kitchen and that I regularly use it (FT 94), 
etcetera. In his commentary on Augustine’s Confessions (ACCG 9), Versfeld states 
that to write an autobiography is to talk about yourself, by situating yourself in a 
specific time and place. In this specific time in history, and at this specific time in 
the world, I am not alone – my world is filled with constant references to other 
people (PP 6; TD 110) who have their own biographies; I interact with other 
people who share history with me. A genuine autobiography is not a story about a 
solitary homo incurvatus in se, the ego, detached from others, who narcissistically 
4 This is found throughout Food for Thought.
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admires himself. It is our story, told from my perspective; without others, I do 
not exist.5 Because I am a zoon politikon, a social and political animal, I have an 
autobiography to relate, a life that provides me with things that I can contemplate. 
Philosophers who are not themselves in this world, who cannot be at home among 
others, cannot be saintly.
For this reason one should expect Versfeld to frequently address his readers 
directly. His philosophy is not directed at humankind, but he speaks to you, my 
esteemed readers, because you are the only mode of existence of humanity (MP 
4). We should be continuously involved in conversations about our world, because 
it is through dialogue that we help each other to give birth to better perspectives 
on the truth. It should not be surprising that Versfeld’s inaugural address at the 
University of Cape Town (cf. SS or Persons, chapter 1) deals with the Socratic 
spirit, the spirit of dialogic obstetrics. This spirit took possession of Versfeld and 
it is right to see him, in his description of the original university, as an inspired 
guru seated on a tree trunk while conversing with his students (TD 109, which 
alludes to the Sitz im Leben from which the Upanishads derived their name).
At the same time, he states that the purpose of this conversation is not to 
exchange information. The philosopher’s search is a search for wisdom. Socrates 
had learnt from his mother (and we could all benefit from constantly ruminating 
on our mothers’ wisdom) that the midwife not only facilitates the process of 
creation, but also knows how to deal with people who are ill or have died; she is 
familiar with both the beginning and the end of life. As people who seek wisdom, 
we are also seeking the Truth about the beginning and ultimate end of things – the 
alpha and the omega (MP 10), the big Therefore to the Why? behind everything. 
That is wisdom. Note that Versfeld is really after Truth with a capital T. However, 
he does not pretend to have already obtained wisdom – the philosopher is a 
lover of wisdom. The professional philosopher is a professional amateur. The 
prerequisite for philosophical thinking is not to be uninvolved with and detached 
from the world about which one wants to think, but to rather embrace and love 
that world. Someone who loves, Versfeld says, wants to conform to the loved 
one; the one who loves always feels somewhat unworthy and inadequate towards 
what is loved and therefore aspires to overcome that shortcoming. Therefore, 
he comments: “No one is a good lover who has no capacity for adventure, and 
adventure rests on the faith that one will get somewhere. It is not so much a 
5 “We are saturated with others to our innermost recesses and exist, so to speak, in the mirrors 
which reflect us. We think therefore I am, and all thinking is ‘political.’ Sumus ergo cogito” 
(SS 3).
Martin Versfeld178
matter of getting the truth, as of being got by truth, and repressing the unworthy 
fear that one may be had by it.” (MP 8–9) That which we love, the purpose 
of wisdom’s search, is the relationship between us, the world and our fellow 
humans.
Since I have here again touched on the topic of our nature as social beings, I 
would like to say something about the role played by the community in the love of 
wisdom, which will further elucidate Versfeld’s view of philosophy. As mentioned 
earlier, the life of every person takes place within a community. We depend on the 
community for the meaning of our activities. Consider the following example: 
if I should ask a scientist to explain to me why objects fall towards the earth, he/
she would offer a scientific explanation. However, if I should ask: “Why would 
anyone ask such a question?” or “Why would you think that the way in which 
your question is answered is reasonable?”, the scientist would not be able to 
give me a scientific answer. The reasonable nature of science is the result of how 
science is embedded in a community. It is only when we get to know ourselves as 
a community that we can answer the question “Why is it reasonable to practise 
science?” (“Talking” 10–11) On one particular page (GA 8), Versfeld is ahead of 
both Kuhn and Gadamer when he offers the insight that our frame of thought 
develops within a community, and that our tradition of understanding enables 
us to understand the world. The community also helps us to understand what 
is reasonable, in other words equitable: “Pasteur’s conviction that fermentation 
is caused by microscopic organisms was a truly reasonable conviction; in my 
case it is a belief ” (GA 9). However, no one will object if we share Versfeld’s 
belief – he is reasonable, even though he is not a scientist. The point here is that 
scientific findings cannot be justified scientifically – they are reasonable due to 
the social existence of people, which precedes science; science can be understood 
as an activity of a human community (see also MP 20). This explains my earlier 
statement that life is larger than logic.
We could also look at this issue from another angle: physics makes judgements 
about matter. This statement is not a judgement about matter, therefore, it is not 
a judgement based on physics. Physics thus does not make judgements about 
physics judgements, but simply provides information on the basis of which 
this could be done (“Talking” 15–16). (This of course also applies to the other 
sciences.) What makes this interesting is the fact that such judgements about 
scientific judgements are historical events. However, history could also not be the 
final underlying reason for, or explanation of, that set of events that we recognise 
as scientific judgements. The historical judgement as such is a historical event 
and it is still necessary to answer the question: “Why history?” Neither science 
179Sanctus Marthinus laudator philosophicus – Or, sitting at the guru’s feet 
nor history can make judgements about themselves. Because science deals with 
the truth about things and history makes statements about the truth of events, 
we now have to look for a way of thinking that makes judgements about the 
truth of the truth, which could, in other words, be the consciousness of science 
and history. This way of thinking that can scrutinise itself is called metaphysics 
(“Talking” 17). Any attempt to define metaphysics from outside of metaphysics, 
or to discard it from the outside as a valid form of knowledge, can – as Versfeld 
claims – be compared to singing in Gregorian chant a proof that music does not 
exist (“Talking” 7).
The question that now arises is whether I should not apply the earlier 
grounding of the reasonableness of science to metaphysics, for does life not also 
precede metaphysics? Versfeld would not agree, and this is exactly the point he 
wishes to make: this self-reflexive reasoning already is the living reasoning of 
a specific, self-observing, living human being. It would be impossible to move 
further away from the Absolute Spirit. Versfeld’s metaphysics is thought by a man 
with a name, a life story and an address – a man who stands grinning at a specific 
spot in his kitchen while chewing a knobbly carrot.
Two things mentioned in the previous paragraph deserve further attention. 
The first is Versfeld’s fundamental conviction that the Socratic words of wisdom 
(“Talking” 17; MP 19; Persons 2; Sum 15, and many more), “know yourself ” and 
“I know that I know nothing”, constitute the basis of all knowledge. However, this 
basis of ignorant self-knowledge is not an undoubtable foundation. Descartes’s 
cogito, which is the pacemaker of the modern heartbeat, represents an attempt to 
use self-knowledge – the knowledge that I exist – to remove all uncertainty; it 
is the starting block for explaining all mysteries. By contrast, Augustine’s si fallor 
sum6 (which is usually related to cogito) speaks the same language as Socrates: it 
discards scepticism, but welcomes the mystery that is reason (“Talking” 18–19) 
– factus eram mihi ipse magna questio.7 The person posing the question is the 
question: 
The mysteriousness of reason itself was the fundamental fact with which 
reason had to cope, a wonder at our confrontation with the abyssus 
humanae naturae, which is at the root of our physical investigations 
themselves, and thus lies at the root of that very science by the false 
idolisation of which we so often endeavour to destroy the mystery of 
6 This is the argument according to which one cannot doubt the fact that one thinks you are 
– even if I am mistaken, I exist.
7 I became an enormous enigma to myself.
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the human nature of the scientist himself. (MP 20; see also FT 89 and 
Sum 22 in particular) 
It is this vast unknown, ignorance, nescience (or what should one call it?) inside 
me that opens me up to outward questions. Mystery and reason are inextricably 
bound together (MP 20). Compelled by the mystery of our being, we do 
everything in our power to think through the big Why?, and a truly comprehensive 
philosophy always takes us back to the mystery that the things cannot be thought 
comprehensively by our reason (RM 47). The ultimate Therefore, the reason for 
the Why? beyond which we can ask no questions, is God. God is his own self-
sufficient reason.8 This is the answer provided by Thomas, who reminds us that, 
despite all the volumes of his Summae, we cannot grasp God through reason.
The saint of Aquino brings us to the second thing that I still needed to 
explain: the knobbly carrot. The idea that metaphysics is the pastime of people 
with an interest in concepts that are abstract and beyond time is incorrect. Rather, 
the metaphysicist attempts to rely on general concepts to make contact with 
concrete, specific things (MP 12), and in this regard we will benefit from rereading 
Marcel – the man who spent his time keeping a diary of the metaphysical.9 The 
first question asked by metaphysics – “Why is there something and not rather 
just nothing?” – stems from the basis of remarkable tangible things. Thomas’s 
proofs of the existence of God are a posteriori (RM 63): they are based on his 
amazement about the existence of particular things in the world. In common 
language one could say that if there were no knobbly carrots and no grinning 
elderly men, Thomas’s proofs of God’s existence would not fly. It is not surprising 
that Thomas, who had to remove a crescent-shaped section from his dining 
table to accommodate the particular shape of his stomach, was one of Versfeld’s 
favourite interlocutors. Descartes’s God is clare et distincte, Versfeld’s is hic et 
nunc, close at hand.
If the metaphysical is tangible and close at hand only in specific instances, 
in the here and now, we can understand why Versfeld is so happy to apply to 
himself the criticism of Callicles when he remarked to Socrates: “You constantly 
talk about food and drink and doctors and nonsense: I do not speak of those 
8 Versfeld explains how he had arrived at this conclusion: “I was thus led, by my wish to defend 
reason, and by ways which I need not dwell on here, to affirm the existence of God, who was 
his own sufficient reason, whose being was his own intelligibility, and in whose mystery alone 
was the foundation of our rationality to be found. In short, no mystery then no clarity, no 
God then no reason. Thus alone could I have that confidence in my reason, the loss of which 
Socrates deplored as the greatest of evils” (MP 21).
9 Cf. Gabriel Marcel’s Journal Métaphysique (Paris: Gallimard, 1927).
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things”.10 His constant return to Whitehead’s remark that “it requires a great mind 
to take an interest in the obvious”11 is by no means superficial. Even when Versfeld 
writes practical suggestions for mountaineers, he does not replace his comfortable 
slippers with hiking shoes; we recognise his voice when he advises prospective 
climbers to pack the following: “[…] a writing pad, a pencil, and a book of 
poetry is also recommended. May be you are overcome by a sudden romantic 
incident – or decide to make your will”.12 This association of poetry with one’s 
presence in nature, and with life and death, is not coincidental. His descriptions 
of plants, workspaces, stones, brinjals, pencils, lavatories, hats, Christmas trees and 
cinnamon clearly reflect the poet’s keen powers of observation. The philosopher 
who wants to get beyond the exactness of the scientist’s metricating, domineering 
approach to the world needs to learn another type of exactness from the poet:
Wisdom is the capacity to see things in their totality, where by 
“totality” we mean not a vague togetherness but the concrete fullness 
which challenges the mind with the opulence of its meaning. Hence 
the philosopher shares with the poet an absorption in the articulation 
of existence, expressing itself in the unique voice by which each tree and 
stone and blade of grass proclaims itself to be this and to be lovable. 
(MP 13 and also see TD 106; PP 4, 93; KK 17–18; GA 15–23, and 
many more)
Versfeld is a poet – in the sense of the Greek word poiesis, which refers to the 
making or creating of things13 – and his philosophy is a song of praise to the One 
who started all the creating, the One who sings the carmen universi. (For this 
reason Versfeld’s essays should be read aloud, preferably with a mouthful of food.) 
Like the philosophy of Augustine, his philosophical narratio is simultaneously 
laudatio,14 because of his love for the superfluous mottledness of the world. The 
world is so much more than just a closed system of essential functions to which 
dreadful decorations have been added ad nauseam. Unlike Sartre, God did not 
puke on the orchids15 – He laughed while ex nihilo, from nothing, He playfully 
10 For example, PP 1; and SS 6.
11 For example, PP 1.
12 Versfeld and De Klerk, Die berge van die Boland, 164.
13 Another of Versfeld’s favourite references. See PP 93, and many more.
14 As in Augustine, see Sum 112.
15 Versfeld detested Sartre’s (the reference is to the latter’s La nausée) loathing for the unnecessary 
detail spawned by what Sartre considered a functional reality. Sartre’s view is as far removed 
from Versfeld’s emphasis on the here and now as Hegel’s idealism.
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and joyfully created a world filled with voluptuous, colourful things.16 Everything 
is redundant, superfluous – it doesn’t have to be there, yet it is, and therefore we 
are free to accept it as a gift. People too, are of course totally redundant (FT 93). 
This is the basis of our love for one another, which is, in turn, the exact place 
where we find God (FT 21).
The human being was also created from nothing and we exist thanks to 
God, in whose image we were created. Versfeld’s understanding of the human 
being as imago Dei is Thomistic: because of the analogia entis – the idea that 
our characteristics are analogous with the ways in which God exists – we are 
able to know something about God, know Him in a way that reminds us that in 
many languages of antiquity “to know” also had a sexual meaning. I have already 
mentioned that just like love, wisdom is an act of intimate creativity. It therefore 
makes sense that God, who is Wisdom and Love, accommodates us by presenting 
Himself as a gift to us at a specific time and place in history. Probably Versfeld’s 
favourite biblical text was from Luke’s Gospel, where it is told that Jesus was born 
in an open cave and placed in a manger at the time when Caesar Augustus reigned 
over the Roman Empire and Cirenius was the governor of Syria, etc.17 God’s 
punctual incarnation here and now in Bethlehem is the climax of His reaching 
out to humankind. He arrives on time because Jahwe is who He is18 – He meets 
us in history, because love means making time for someone (TD 112, FT 95). 
Thomas’s quod Deus est, quod Deus est aeternus, quod Deus est sua aeternitas19 is 
the title of the carmen universi, God’s love song sung for us.20
Versfeld regards Augustine’s ability to reconcile the biblical concept of a 
God of history with Greek thought as one of his rare insights.21 As is so often 
the case, Versfeld walks the same road as Augustine – and therefore also runs 
into the same problems. The major question that arises from this view is how 
16 Cf. FT 90, BU 121 with reference to Proverbs 8:27–31; PP 92, and others.
17 Cf. Luke 2:1–2; KK 19, and others.
18 Cf. Exodus 3:14, referred to in Sum 104; also see KK 21.
19 That God is, that God is eternal, that God is His own eternity (SS 6, and many others).
20 In this paragraph I have included almost all the elements of what Versfeld regarded as the 
core of the Christian faith, or at any rate as he saw it in 1954: “What is that belief ? That a 
God, whose essence is to be, created, that is, gave being to, a Universe, which had no shred 
of being before the creative act, and that when nature had defected from Him, He restored 
and more than restored it, by taking upon Himself the nature of a man with all its fleshly and 
local accidents” (PO 240).
21 See, for example, Sum 88: “[…] however much Augustine may owe to Greek and, especially, 
to Platonic philosophy, he is spiritually a Semite. The God of Augustine is the God of the 
Old and New Testaments, who is the God of history.”
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one can somehow arrive at an understanding of the specific suffering of people 
in the here and now. This is such a prominent problem in our century, perhaps 
more than ever before, since the dark twentieth century is a barbaric period. It 
is therefore disappointing that Versfeld often ignores it – just when we would 
expect him to deal with it. Here I would like to mention a few examples: I am 
still searching for his interpretation of Augustine’s heavy-handed dealing with 
the Donatist. If a giant meteorite had collided with Earth and wiped out all the 
dinosaurs, was the carmen universi’s percussion not too loud? And if Lisbon is 
destroyed by an earthquake, I have to confess that my master totally missed the 
point when he remarked that “[e]veryone has the world that he is and deserves. 
If it appears ghastly, the ghastliness was injected by us” (TD 110; similarly PP 
5). This comment is particularly lamentable against the background of South 
African political history.
However, I do not want to create the impression that he was ignorant 
regarding what was happening around him in the country – in fact, his essays 
are peppered with references to the sociopolitical burning points of the time.22 
Apart from the general criticism of apartheid (1972 – Sum 68), nation and race 
(1968 – KK 8), racial classification (1971 – SS 4) and capitalism (1971 – SS 8), 
he levelled specific criticism at the Separate Amenities Act (1962 – RM 104) 
and the District Six affair (1985 – NA 23), for example. Having thus far spoken 
about Versfeld with so much appreciation, I now have to give him the benefit of 
the doubt. There is, in any case, no doubt that he was thoroughly aware of the 
problem.23
What does this tell us? I could speculate that Versfeld might have been 
so grateful for his own life that he would have regarded it as dishonest to, in 
a manner of speaking, climb out of his own life to talk about things that were 
not part of that life. Besides, philosophy cannot be expected to provide answers 
to all questions, and he would have commended me for getting cornered in 
this mystery of the human situation as flentes et gementes in hac lacrimarum 
22 Readers who are not familiar with South African sociopolitical history may want to consult, 
as background to the points that follow: Deborah Posel, “The apartheid project, 1948–1970,” 
in Robert Ross, Anne Kelk Mager, and Bill Nasson (eds.), The Cambridge history of South 
Africa. Volume 2: 1885–1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 319–368; 
Keith Hart and Vishnu Padayachee, “A history of South African capitalism in national and 
global perspective,” Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 81/82 (2013): 
55–85; and Leonard Thompson, A history of South Africa, revised fourth edition, by Lynn 
Berat (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014). 
23 For example, FT 10. I will leave it to someone else to undertake a thorough study of this topic.
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valle,24 weeping and moaning in this vale of tears. Obviously the mystery of my 
own being, the world and God will always lead to new questions. Thoughtful, 
ongoing conversations with others about these things constitute a form of therapy 
(“Talking” 12). This belief, which Versfeld adopted from one of Plato’s dialogues, 
resonates with the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Moreover, Versfeld makes at least two interesting suggestions for how to deal 
with this problem. First, he encourages us to be constantly amazed by the beauty 
that surrounds us, because God created the Tao to be beautiful. This happy but 
sometimes tragic approach to life coincides with flow of the Tao, which cannot 
be encompassed, because it is created anew by God every moment (FT 11–12). 
The second suggestion was influenced by Augustine (Sum 111–112) and is based 
on the understanding that people who are free to act in any way they want to are 
the ones who, through the sins they commit, release the powers of evil into the 
world. The fruit of sin is death – actual death, such as the death lamented in Psalm 
88. This Psalm is important because the Jewish poet, who did not believe in the 
immortality of the soul, described with poetic precision the horror of death. In 
this regard, Versfeld continues: 
The Bible does not present us with a philosophy of immortality, but with 
a religion of resurrection. We cannot appreciate the central position of 
the preaching of the resurrection by the apostles, nor the thrilling joy of 
the Easter liturgy, unless we see it against this black background of sin 
and death. (Sum 112) 
This asks for a corresponding way of life in which one bears one’s cross because, 
as Versfeld believes, this is the only way in which to make sense of history and of 
your own life story, here and now.25 However, when talking about the cross, it is 
necessary to include another remark made by the same man: “I was once moved to 
say that the Redemption is excruciatingly funny” (PP 92). The crux of the matter 
is that true religion has to admit to its strangeness. For now, however, I will not 
discuss the mystery of this paradox any further.
24 Quoted in NA 17.
25 “[B]earing one’s cross, which is Christ’s cross, is the only way to make sense of history, and 
of one’s own history, and transforming what is perhaps the humdrum necessity of here and 
now into an eternal moment significant for the future of mankind” (Sum 119).
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Dear reader, forgive me for not being able to say everything about God 
here, but I do hope that the foretaste will arouse your interest. The last aspect, 
and perhaps the most prominent of Versfeld’s views on reality, at which I will 
here take a closer look, is the removal of the division between transcendence 
and immanence through incarnation.26 This theme repeatedly appears in a 
kaleidoscope of different forms: the secular is the miraculous (FT 89); the 
ordinary is the extraordinary (PP 1); paradise is the place where you are at home, 
and the pearly gate is your own garden gate (NA 23); God is present in the 
performance of our everyday tasks (FT 20); slicing bread is a prayer (ACCG 9); 
your spiritual life is your normal life, your lifestyle (ACCG 10); it is impossible to 
see where nature ends and grace begins (GA 32); a unity exists between rationality 
and mysticism (following Socrates, SS 4, and following Aquinas, RM 44); when 
you talk to God, you are talking to the world (KK 8); you are a priest when you 
roast a leg of mutton, and you have to kneel when you light the fire (TD 109); 
and so forth. The unity that exists between these apparent opposites asks the 
lovers of wisdom to follow a suitable approach to their journeys of discovery in 
life, to refrain from searching for their ideal self somewhere else, to simply be 
themselves and to love themselves exactly where they are, because philosophy is 
“knowledge in via”.27 Spiritual life does not consist of withdrawal from the world, 
but rather that you have to embrace it and dwell in it, because it is only when 
you are at home within yourself that you can offer hospitality to others (ACCG 
10 and KK 8). In brief, make sure that you love and then do whatever you like. 
You don’t get to know a tree by learning off by heart its definition, but by tasting 
its fruit.
It is not surprising that Versfeld savours the fact that the Latin word for 
wisdom, sapientia, is derived from the word sapere, meaning to taste (PP 7). If 
Augustine was the doctor charitatis, Versfeld was the doctor gastronomicae. Food 
and related things provide the core around which we can gather to partake in his 
philosophy – the students of this guru seated on a tree trunk sit around a friendly 
fire on which a tasty stew is simmering. And even if the guru is not simply a 
Thomist in his thinking, he will still proclaim himself to be a Thomist cook. All 
good cooks are Thomists: 
26 I have questioned this interpretation in Chapter 3, §6.3 and I have given a revised 
interpretation. Versfeld also summarises the two aspects of Christian metaphysics as (1) an 
understanding of God, the highest Actuality, which He is, and (2) the incarnation as the 
prime example of how God moved closer to humankind in history (RM 48).
27 “Talking” 9, i.e., gathered only during and through the course of a search.
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In assembling his ingredients he brings together the variety of the 
sensible world, and combines them in a manner which respects the 
principle of identity. This is mutton: let it remain mutton; these were 
olives: fiant olivae. Cooking is creation and I do not believe that God 
made a hash of the world.28 
It is also Thomas who points out that, rather than being a type of knowledge, 
religious observation is a type of tasting, or a kind of loving (GA 28). Therefore 
the philosopher, the poet and the cook all practise the same things. Plato’s 
Symposion is a song of praise to love.
Just like the poet and the philosopher/theologian, the cook is also ideally 
situated to observe and participate in the interaction between people and the 
world. People and the world create each other (TD 110–111, and others): the 
world makes it possible for us to exist and we are what we eat (der Mensch ist was 
er isst, as Feuerbach said), because we are dependent on our environment for our 
spiritual-physical existence; our lives are shaped by that which is at our disposal. 
However, we also eat our world using our senses and our mouths; with our teeth 
and hands we change the environment in a way that demonstrates the things 
that are important to us: vineyards, farmlands covered with maize, grain silos, 
power stations, canning factories, roads, shops and eventually weapons factories 
– everything planned to provide food.
The fire under the pot is therefore the beginning of science and technology. 
The trouble really started when technology appeared on the scene, because, 
Versfeld argues, technology represents an attempt to gain control over things by 
objectifying and measuring them so that they can be known and their importance 
can be calculated. The idea of metrication in a cookbook would be, to Versfeld, 
as ridiculous as having to get to know his wife by studying an anatomy textbook.
The problem with technology is that it can be compared to when you are 
plagued by a mouse and end up with your fingers clamped between the teeth 
of the mousetrap. This problem was identified many years ago by Chuang-tzu, 
who concluded that the person who attempts to dominate things ends up being 
dominated by them (TD 114–115; PP 10, where the poet is quoted). Love is 
the opposite of domination. Love takes time, but technology is in too much of a 
hurry to have time to love, because for it time is money. This is the origin of the 
view of nature held by popular Darwinism (FT 91–92): nature is engaged in a 
battle to eliminate unnecessary abundance and generosity to ensure the survival of 
28 MP 4. The principle of identity is guaranteed by God, who is who He is. A broader exposition 
of this topic will have to follow at another time.
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the strongest egos, measured against optimal functioning and usefulness. If I can 
succeed in mimicking this battle in my kitchen, I will be a technological winner, 
and I will be an even greater achiever if I can succeed in taking in the correct 
number of kilojoules and the right vitamins, and using other mechanisms that 
drive success and facilitate functioning.
But if I take time to stir my soup, I will recognise the vegetables in the pot 
for what they are: a never-ending dance of abundant things. Their Creator 
is unpredictable, because love is spontaneously creative (FT 92). Once we 
understand this, we will enjoy our food in a way that celebrates the fact that God 
did not regard it as robbery29 when he became bread and wine. When we think 
about food, we will inevitably arrive at questions relevant for life and death, 
especially if we think too long, and the question about whether the centrality of 
the abyssus humanae naturae in Versfeld’s thinking is the source of his appetite 
remains unanswered. The philosopher is a vulture.30 He understood that the body 
of a philosopher is important and I will not be convinced that he had to learn this 
from Thomas, even though Versfeld was a smaller philosopher.
It is, of course, with our bodies that we are present to each other. To receive 
someone’s body is to receive the whole person. Hospitality is the home of Versfeld’s 
ethics as his home is the centre of both his inward and outward interactions. 
People can only be hospitable if they have a home into which they have already 
received themselves with hospitality. Self-love is the precondition for neighbourly 
love (ACCG 9; NA 23; KK 7–9). The house, your home, is the place from where 
you study the world, from where you go out to work and rummage around 
in the world. However, like the seven dwarfs, one always has to return home, 
undertake a venture into the “interior”, see what one has in one’s workroom (who 
knows what you might find there?) and attempt to clear up some of the chaos 
(NA 16; KK 47).
Versfeld’s style is evidence of such a situation in life. His philosophy is a 
journey to discover the world, which starts with a venture into the interior.31 
Having arrived there, he then receives guests from every distant corner of the 
written universe: from the wise men of the Upanishads to Plato, from Lao Tzu 
to Augustine, Aquinas and Descartes, Newman and Leipoldt (Sartre and Hobbes 
are sent to the kitchen, where they may have tinned food, and Hegel is free to go 
and externalise his ideas about food in the outside lavatory). Everyone is made 
29 Cf. Philippians 2:6
30 NA 46–49. This theme opens Chapter 10 (below).
31 MP 2 and the title of chapter 3 of MP, which was borrowed from the title of a book written 
by Laurens van der Post.
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to feel thoroughly welcome at his symposium. He enjoys talking about their 
previous meetings and generously gives them all the credit due to them – Versfeld 
had a very thick Bible, indeed. It is not always easy (and perhaps intentionally 
so) to distinguish Versfeld’s opinion from that of, for example, Aquinas (which 
explains why he typified his thinking as Gothic and analogous). Elsewhere, 
however, I get the feeling that Versfeld treats his interlocutors as though he 
himself were a little boy who is eating only the icing and leaving the cake. Have 
you ever heard him comment on Augustine’s essay on fasting? And Aquinas 
would have a hard time trying to recognise his Summa contra Gentiles as a guide 
for converting heathens by teaching them to clean carrots properly (FT 20), and 
if Feuerbach says der Mensch ist was er isst, we have to join Versfeld in picking off 
the icing sugar if we want to share his understanding. If I were to accuse him of 
setting his sails to the wind, he would probably remind me that the wind blows 
wherever it wants to blow.
For this reason, Versfeld also cannot be dogmatic or construct systems (MP 
2–3) (the wind does not blow systematically; the closest he gets to this is The 
Perennial Order), but he rather relies on reflection, with which he tries to open 
the doors to the truth (MP 6). He admits that he gives priority to relating things 
to one another, allowing them to talk to each other, rather than to undo them 
through analysis.32 This stems from his steadfast loyalty to concrete detail – he 
describes how his father had taught him to sharpen a pencil (KK 40–41) with 
the same care with which the sharpening is to be carried out.
Sometimes his claim that his texts are clear33 has to be taken at some places 
with a pinch of salt. However, he has to be obscure and somewhat incoherent – he 
is, after all, attempting to render reality.34 The way he generally writes his essays 
without subsections or clear units, and repeatedly, through the years, attempts 
to articulate some or other amazing issue, is evidence of his approach to reality – 
which has to be repeatedly viewed from different limited, non-final perspectives, 
because reality is not final. It is a reality in which he stands at the centre, since it 
is his life; what he says about The Mirror of Philosophers applies to all his work: “I 
want to present a book which is philosophical precisely in being autobiographical, 
and somewhat disjointed because I am a human being, interested in being, and 
32 “[…] connecting in my thinking has priority over analysis. I am impressed with the relation 
of all things to each other, that is, with the fact of communication” (FT 3–4).
33 Those for which he likes to take credit, at least. See PP 1, and others.
34 I have to admit that although his essays are generally easy to understand, they are sometimes 
complicated by obscure references and allusions. A person who is not familiar with Hopkins’s 
“Pied Beauty” would, for instance, miss something in “Cooking the marvellous” (FT 89–93).
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somewhat involved in my own. Only thus can I hope to achieve an objective unity 
of presentation” (MP 2).
But did I not start with Versfeld’s life? At present,35 when we would have been 
celebrating his ninetieth birthday, I would like to give him, speaking from the 
other side, from God’s City, an opportunity to invite us to come closer:
I realise that I’m getting on in years. The day will come when I will 
have to leave everything behind and depart from the room of the world. 
To prepare for this, one should get rid of a few things now. To detach 
yourself from things is sound, old advice. If you do not do this, they may 
leave of their own, which could be hurtful. If you also throw the Bible 
in the basket with the rest, it could prove that you have learnt its most 
intimate lesson. Should you arrive at the gates of heaven clutching your 
Bible in both hands, you may not be able to ring the bell. We approach 
the new life with open hands. (NA 17)
What Versfeld says about the Bible is of course equally valid for his own work 
and, dear reader, if you have not done it yet, I would like to ask you to do the 
same with my essay.






WHAT IS  L IVING AND WHAT IS 
DEAD OF THE PHILOSOPHY  
OF MARTIN VERSFELD? 
– OR,  THE PHILOSOPHER READ BY A VULTURE
“The Philosopher as Vulture” 
(title of an essay, NA 2nd ed. 67–71)
It may seem curious to choose as heading for this last chapter a book title from 
idealist philosophy that Versfeld so energetically critiqued – namely, Benedetto 
Croce’s What Is Living and What is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel.1 However, 
it makes sense if one presents it as a kind of counterpart to Versfeld’s first 
philosophical text, his MA thesis, which was on Croce.2 In any case, the title 
fits quite well with what I intend with this last chapter: a somewhat messy task 
captured in the subtitle. Again, for the author who prided himself in mindful 
cooking, it must have taken some courage to liken a philosopher to a scavenger. 
But indeed, like vultures that arrive after the event to quarrel over bits and pieces 
of rotten remainders, so one of the tasks of philosophers is to do the same with 
whatever the accidents of history leave behind for them.
In this post scriptum, which is also a post-mortem, I will not dish up a lavish 
five-course meal. I will fully assume the role of the vulture by pecking at a number 
1 This is the title of the translation: Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What is Dead of the 
Philosophy of Hegel, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan, 1915).
2 I have not been able to obtain this thesis and cannot confirm that a copy of it still exists. 
One should also note Versfeld’s remark: “I did an MA thesis on Croce, of whose thought I 
remember nothing at all” (Sum 13).
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of issues that those reflecting on Versfeld’s thought will have to digest. They are 
all mutually related and all touch in one way or another the core of his work.
1. Augustine: Ventriloquism or interpretation as 
independent thought?
A curious tension which Versfeld willingly assumed is between affirming the 
“perennial order”3 – as he dared to call it earlier on – and a sensitivity for 
contingency which is captured in his insistence on time, history and biography. 
But even this tension was subject to change. In Chapter 3 we saw that the 
critique of early modern rationalism, his allegiance with a few important authors, 
the importance of history, political critique, certain theological themes, the 
anthropological mystery, and the call to a cultivate one’s generous self are quite 
stable features. But the changes in this general framework are as revealing of 
what the name “Versfeld” should evoke. This point reaches to the heart of his 
work – let me illustrate it in his reading of Augustine and in his aesthetics/ethics 
of generosity.
When Versfeld wrote his last book, St Augustine’s Confessions and City of 
God, he often reformulated and even copied arguments from two earlier texts, A 
Guide to the City of God4 and Rondom die Middeleeue (On the Middle Ages).5 This 
makes it possible to trace a shift in Versfeld’s general appraisal of Augustine. If he 
initially hailed Augustine as a major foundational author of Western civilisation, 
whose writings provide valuable stimulation for the present-day reader (cf. RM 
chapter 1), Versfeld later opines that “If the fault of Western Christianity has 
been an excess of philosophising and theologising, Augustine is certainly a guilty 
party” (ACCG 25). And Augustine made a substantial contribution to “exclusivist 
Catholicity” through his “biblical literalism” (ACCG 100). Still, he would redeem 
3 But see his comment in MP 85.
4 This book is still cited as an authoritative reference by Christoph Horn in “Augustinus, 
De Civitate Dei (ca. 413–427),” in Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Ein Handbuch, ed. 
Manfred Brocker (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 2012, 4th edition), 62–77, here 77.
5 The 116 pages of ACCG are divided into thirty short chapters (plus an “Introduction”). 
Of these, chapters I and II correspond largely with the first chapter of RM and chapters 
VI–XXVIII (except X and XVII) cover essentially GCG chapter II to the first half of chapter 
VIII. In short, if I see correctly, the Introduction and chapters IV, V, X, XVII, XIX and XX 
(about 28 pages) of ACCG are new. 
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Augustine by transforming him into a mystic. Mystics, according to Versfeld, are 
people who have experiences of the Truth and although the Truth is unspeakable, 
they respond to these experiences by “erecting thousands of verbal signposts”, 
pointing us to “the centre”. If Augustine was talkative – as mystics tend to be 
(ACCG 25) – then it was because his mystic, transrational experience quickened 
his reason and, one should add, his tongue (ACCG 25).
Already in the early commentaries, Versfeld discussed the Augustinian idea 
of a trinitarian universe (cf. GCG 22–24; PO 242; Persons 104), a central tenet 
of which is the idea of the world as held together by God’s love. But in a new 
insertion in ACCG (55–57), Versfeld calls on Chuang-tzu to shed different 
light on this creative power: “Chuang-Tzu holds: To organise is to destroy. Just 
as all beliefs must be unbelieved, so all organisations must be disorganised. This 
is the function of the mystics, and that is why they are disliked by politicians, 
positivists, planners and ecclesiastics” (ACCG 55). The Eastern sage wins out 
against Versfeld’s most beloved theologican and ecclesiastic!6 Furthermore, 
the reference to Chuang-tzu is quite typical for the new reading of Augustine. 
Without abandoning his own Christian orientation, whatever domineering view 
it may have had7 is replaced by curiosity about the possible exchanges between 
intellectual and religious traditions.8 Curiously, while the later Versfeld is no 
less “materialist” than the earlier Versfeld (cf. PP 2), one does not find in St 
Augustine’s Confessions and City of God Versfeld’s earlier indication of where to 
look for salvation for the weaknesses of Augustine’s historical thinking: “Modern 
Augustinianism still has a great work to do in exploring [its] empirical bearing. 
An Augustinianism which has learnt from Marx has a future” (GCG 70).
On the level of cultural critique, a shift is evident too. Is Augustine’s life 
story not the quintessential conversion from a life of frivolous bodily pleasures 
to Christian austerity? One may get this impression from Versfeld’s rendering 
in Rondom die Middeleeue (and indeed from Augustine’s Confessions itself !). 
But in St Augustine’s Confessions and City of God, Versfeld shifts the emphasis in 
Augustine’s autobiography, and thereby gives this conversion story a delightful 
cultural-critical twist:
6 And one can gauge the dimension of this victory by recalling a passage from The Mirror of 
Philosophers where Versfeld enlists Augustine to critique the devastation of individual and 
social disorder (cf. MP 291–293).
7 The strongest formulation thereof is perhaps MP 98–99. However, I am not convinced that 
this passage can be upheld in the light of Versfeld’s own philosophy at the time.
8 The limits of this openness in Versfeld’s published work have been outlined very precisely by 
Kobus Krüger in Chapter 6 of this book.
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But let us get all this in perspective. Augustine was neither a fool nor a 
rake. He had become a responsible and very able professor in the arts, 
he had firm friendships with highly placed people, and he had formed 
a stable connection with a woman who bore him a son, Adeodatus 
(Godgiven) for whom he had the deepest affection, and he could 
attract young people to him in love and respect. Let us be clear about 
this. Augustine’s conversion was not a conversion from lurid vice. By 
ordinary worldly academic standards he had done very well, and 
perhaps the real significance of his conversion is that it was a conversion 
from the ordinary decencies of which we are all rather proud. His 
conversion was from the city of this world, in which we are all striving 
to make ourselves comfortable. In fact he had done well enough to feel 
confident that he could cut a figure in Rome, so he joined the brain 
drain. (ACCG 20)
This rereading of Augustine is a second attempt to out-augustinianise Augustine. 
And the change of perspective is not trivial. Instead of presenting Augustine as 
the exemplar of abnegation, Versfeld reframes the issue as that of a critical stance 
towards the status quo. Augustine’s story of conversion is then not an initiation 
into a life of conventional middle-class conservatism, but becomes a challenge, in 
the first place, to those who benefit from bourgeois life, a challenge to someone 
like Versfeld himself or his peers – or to the kind of person who would likely 
read his book!
The meanders in his own reception of the Church Father illustrates his 
conviction that awareness of a tradition is not to be confused with historical 
determinism.9 But at the same time, the reader has to remain careful about this 
reception which, although erudite and considered, strives at independent thought 
rather than objective exegesis. Ventriloquism may well be a philosophical art. 
In matters of receiving Augustine, there is then not just one Versfeld and this 
should predispose his readers to find this plurality elsewhere too.10 And thus the 
perennial order was slowly shifting.
9 “Tradition is an enduring technique/technology [tegniek] of renewal” (Wat is kontemporêr? 
1) he writes, and in a slightly reworked version of the same passage: “To do something new, 
and to help to renew the tradition by which we live is an essential manifestation of the creative 
spirit” (Persons 66).
10 A weak point of my 1999 article (now Chapter 9 of this book) was not to have taken this 
fully into account.
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2. Plurality
At numerous places in this book we have come across the remarkable fact that this 
author, who knew himself to be rooted in a tradition, welcomed insights from 
foreign traditions. Not only did he have an open mind on this matter, but he 
actively studied and promoted the study of other forms of wisdom. One should 
not underestimate the significance of these facts. And yet, one cannot sidestep 
the question: what about the absence of African philosophy in his work? Both his 
insistence on the locality of philosophy and his critique of imperial and apartheid 
politics point to the need to engage with the modes of thinking of this continent.
This absence has to be stated and regretted. Yet, the matter is a bit more 
complex. Written, published and distributed literature in which the authors 
present the content as “African philosophy” emerged slowly after the Second 
World War. By the mid 1960s, interesting debates seriously questioned the 
philosophical claim of these first works, while relaunching the case for philosophy 
of, or in, Africa in different ways. In the 1970s, and even into the 1980s, African 
scholars were still debating the existence of African philosophy.11 Now let us 
recall that Versfeld retired in 1972. If one then bears in mind the speed at which 
academic publications and trends spread in an era before the internet, one has to 
be careful not to exaggerate the practical overlap between the writings of early 
African philosophers and that of Versfeld.
The critical question thus has to be reformulated: how much should one 
expect of the philosopher in the years after his retirement? Or, before that time, 
what knowledge could one have expected of him to have of Africanist intellectual 
work in a broader sense? In this way one could decide “whether the content 
of [his] philosophy squares with the historical existence of that philosophy” 
(MP 83). And then there remains a host of questions that can be generated in 
comparing his philosophy with themes from African philosophy, for instance, 
the significance of tradition, the situatedness of thought, place, embodiment, 
and cultural and political critique.
11 Earlier overviews are quite telling – see for instance Tshiamalenga Ntumba, “Die Philosophie 
in der aktuellen Situation Afrikas,” Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 33, no. 3 (1979): 
428–433; or V.Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa. Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of 
Knowledge (Bloomington: Indianapolis University Press, 1988), chapter 5.
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3. Something or nothing?
In his more metaphysical moments, Versfeld defined philosophy by the question: 
why is there something rather than nothing? (PO 17; 20; MP 13, 20).12 Through 
long, carefully constructed argumentation, he could arrive at dealing with this 
most general and abstract of questions, by attention to the minute, contingent 
detail of one’s own incarnate being. And the way in which he does so enables him 
to turn this body, with its extensions of clothes, houses, landscapes, people and 
histories, into a point of orientation for understanding contemporary culture 
and politics. It is not a detached metaphysics, but one that strives to be thorough 
and encompassing.
But what obliges us to start with that question? Consider Cléophas Nketo 
Lumba’s question: why is there nothing, rather than something?13 This inversion 
is not really intended as an alternative approach to metaphysics. It aims to recentre 
the question of the reason why things are as they are. The question does not aspire 
to metaphysical generality. However, it has a major claim to critical force. The 
“nothing” in his question is what the title of his book captures as “the hunger 
[faim] without end [fin] in Africa”. The extreme hardships that people suffer in a 
world where something could be done about it, serve no end, have no aim, and 
are thus arbitrary. And because there is ultimately no sufficient reason for this 
situation, this question contains critical force: there is no justification for the 
nothing that prevails, where there should be something.
I will not play the arbiter here. Two views, two approaches, many similarities. 
But in the end, a major difference to how we understand the task of philosophy.
12 Cf. Leibniz’s classical formulation: “now we must rise to metaphysics, by making use of the 
great principle, […] that nothing takes place without sufficient reason […]. Assuming this 
principle, the first question we have the right to ask will be, why is there something rather than 
nothing? Furthermore, assuming that things must exist, we must be able to give a reason for 
why they must exist in this way, and not otherwise”. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Principles 
of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” (1714), in Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Roger 
Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1989), 206–213, citation 209–210.
13 Cléophas Nketo Lumba, La faim sans fin en Afrique (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2015).
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4. Close to the earth?
If one thing has to be singled out by which Versfeld impressed his contemporaries, 
it was his celebration of the mundane. Often it is called with a curious Afrikaans 
adjective, aards, literally “earthly” or “earthy”, but not in the English sense.14 It 
evokes being down-to-earth, being modest, appreciating the simple things, being 
practical, grounded. Associated with it are generosity, gratitude, hospitality. 
Blasé, lofty, arrogant, lavish, trendy, abstract, complicated, greedy or uncongenial 
people are not aards. In agreement with this appraisal, Kantinka Heyns and 
Chris Barnard entitled their documentary: Martin Versfeld. Man van klip en klei 
(Martin Versfeld. Man of Stone and Clay). This title indeed takes over a book title 
of the philosopher: Klip en klei (Stone and Clay) – probably the publication by 
which this “earthy” reputation was generated for the first time. And fair enough, 
since the 1970s numerous texts confirm this impression: Food for Thought, Pots 
and Poetry and Die neukery met die appelboom containing the most obvious 
examples.
But may I ask, on what is this posture or “feeling” or “sense”15 found in his 
work based? To do justice to the complexities involved in this question, my 
thousand-page response would start with a reconstruction of the intricate detail 
of Versfeld’s early metaphysics, and then compare it term-by-term with his later 
aesthetics and ethics, just as carefully unravelled. However, I can anticipate the 
outcome of such a fascinating study in less than a thousand words. To do so, let us 
turn to an earlier, more austere book, The Perennial Order.16 Pardon the abundant 
citations, but I need to exhibit the evidence.
In an attempt to capture the central tenet of mediaeval Catholic culture, 
Versfeld describes it as “an age whose genius was the integration of all things in God, 
and whose prepossession was with the concept of unity” (PO 205).17 Nevertheless, 
14 Cf. PO 4: “[…] philosophers, like poets, must stick to the earth”.
15 I cite this term on purpose, from PO 211, 212.
16 The illustrative points are harvested from chapter 14, “Medieval Catholic Culture” (PO 
205–223), but they can easily be found elsewhere in the book and in Versfeld’s writings from 
the 1950s and 1960s.
17 Cf. “This conception of the unity of truth and indeed the unity of culture rests on the 
conception of the unity of being. […] every particular creature, being also in God’s image, has 
an order and unity of its own which reflects in a degree or manner proportionate to its status 
the nature of its divine author” (PO 217). This idea already played a major role in GA as we 
saw in Chapter 3 §5. Allow me to observe that, for a philosopher, a nice thing about speaking 
about mediaeval culture is that one can introduce all kinds of theological concepts without 
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he warns his readers against “the danger of unduly idealizing the actual” (PO 206). 
Note that although Versfeld wants to get to the bottom of the metaphysics that he 
believes underlies this culture, his view is not simply epistemological, but rather 
cultural (i.e., concerning a form of life) or, in other words, practical.
This culture has its Greco-Roman roots, sure, but one would miss the central 
significance of its historical view on life and society if one bypasses the Hebrew 
source. This tapping from Jewish historical sensitivity is a precondition for 
spreading the doctrine of a historical incarnation of God. The doctrine of divine 
incarnation, in turn, instilled in “Europe a sense of the value and significance of 
flesh” (PO 207), and had concomitant effects on broader culture.
Far from a mere doctrine, the idea of God’s incarnation results in “a 
transvaluation of all historical values, so that the things of time and the actions 
of men receive as it were an eternal dimension” (PO 207).18 Versfeld’s reference 
to Nietzsche is evident, but we are at the antipode of a devaluation of earthly life 
that Nietzsche liked to impute to Christianity.19 Quite the contrary: “Catholicism 
[…] give[s] a profound significance to sensible and contingent things” (PO 208). 
Human life, in all its detail is contingent, mortal – “history [or time itself ] is to 
be regarded as the procession of creatures to the vision of the face of God” (PO 
208, 217 for the insertion).
This transvaluation of values imbues reality with a “sacramental sense”, 
according to which historical events are “visible signs of invisible things” (PO 
209). And he can support this with reference to Aquinas. Aesthetic creations are 
just a specific instantiation of a more general truth: “Works of art are reminders 
that the Universe itself is the work of art of a God who did not disdain the flesh 
of man as a medium for this own incarnation” (PO 215). Hence, everything 
has a “twofold reference”: to God and to other creatures of the same unitary 
world. Accordingly, each being “reflects not only God but the order of the whole 
universe to the degree of which it is capable” (PO 218). From this follows not an 
oppressive totality, but a firm confirmation of “the infinite variety of creation” 
(PO 219). And from the prevalence of these ideas emerged “a civilisation which 
regarded the procession of creatures in its infinite but ordered diversity, as an 
analogue of the creativity of God” (PO 222).
having to justify them, since their historical occurrence serves as justification. Nevertheless, 
at a point the historian has to commit.
18 This is not yet the “analogical spark” that I discussed in Chapters 3, §6.3 and Chapter 9, but 
we are getting close to it.
19 That is, according to Versfeld, not Nietzsche – see again Chapter 4, where Paul van Tongeren 
discusses the tensions between these two philosophies.
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These are salient aspects of what Versfeld calls “the perennial value of 
Incarnational Culture”. One measures the importance of this claim by the fact 
that it is the only place in The Perennial Order where the word “perennial” is 
used.20 This order may have its internal coherence and must be informed by real-
life experience and scholarly work. Still one would have liked more elaboration 
on the tensions, contradictions, difficulties, unexamined assumptions that I 
suppose all cultures carry with them… But for present purposes, this is beside the 
point. I have highlighted these dimensions of the perennial order as reinterpreted 
and transmitted by mediaeval culture, according to Versfeld, with the aim of 
demonstrating how they could be identified in his later texts. But just before we 
get there, a last crucial point: these highlighted elements are integrated in a vast 
discussion covering aspects of the doctrine of the Mass, the Pope, the Church 
structure, St Mary, cathedral architecture, the completion of (human) nature by 
divine grace, papal views on art, scholastic education, mediaeval law, the saints, 
and so on. These form the natural habitat of the colourful birds I have thus far 
spotted in The Perennial Order.
Let us recapitulate this constellation of ideas with a string of key terms: God, 
history, the significance of the sensible and contingent, human contingency and 
mortality, creation as God’s work of art, incarnation, the sacramental sense and 
a unitary world. And then, behold Food for Thought,21 a booklet whose subtitle 
informs us that it is A Philosopher’s Cookbook. This title is an insignia of Versfeld’s 
“earthliness”. On the back cover of my edition is a photo of the author, sitting on a 
log in a countryside environment with a half-loaf of bread beside him and a knife 
in his hand, presumably to prepare something for a pot that may be on a fire in 
front of him, beyond the frame. His mouth slightly open, the corner of his eye 
somewhat wrinkled as he concentrates on slicing – one has the impression that 
he is having a good time. And above the photo, the appreciative comment, not of 
any theologian, but of one André P. Brink: “Food for Thought […] is a cookbook 
as well as a book of profound wisdom and great delight […] [that] transcends our 
customary systems of thought to become an enquiry into human values”. True, I 
20 I can recall only one other occurrence (PO 41), but there it clearly has a negative meaning: 
the term denotes the recurrent materialistic monism or spiritualistic monism, both of which 
Versfeld explicitly rejects on the same page.
21 Again this book is chosen as an example – my argument could be expanded with a myriad of 
other texts. This is certainly not his only or first text on food: see MP 4–5; KK chapter 2; PP 
chapter 1; Marthinus Versfeld, “Wyn en wysheid,” in Wyn en wysheid. Vier sienings met foto’s 
deur Chris Jansen, edited by Marthinus Versfeld, Merwe Scholtz, and I.L. de Villiers (Cape 
Town: Tafelberg, 1978), 2–15, for instance.
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do not know by which systems Brink was accustomed to think. But I wonder if 
he measured what was at work in the author’s wise mind and delightful enquiries. 
Let us see, bearing our string of key terms in mind.
In a way, God is omnipresent in this book, but often Versfeld writes in such 
a way that those who do not believe in such a Being may well consider it “just 
a way of speaking”. Nobody will think that Versfeld challenges contemporary 
astrophysics when he entitles chapter 2 “The Universe Is the Soup of God”, hence 
one may also take the use of “God” as mere metaphor. Or if he exclaims, “For God’s 
sake don’t throw a commonwealth of meat and vegetables into the pot and clamp 
the lid on in order to have time to look over the agenda for the next meeting” (FT 
95), God seems to be just an interjection. Or when he claims that “God did not, 
like Sartre, kotch over the orchids” (FT 90), one knows that his point is about 
Sartre’s La nausée (cf. FT 89–90). When in other places “God” can be nobody 
else than the Lord of Christianity, the reader may pass it off as figurative talk. 
Versfeld also understands why many of his contemporaries prefer to dodge the 
literal meaning: “So far, I haven’t had much to say about God. Indeed, he seems 
to be conspicuous by his absence, precisely because twentieth-century man feels 
himself to be so deeply in the soup” (FT 10). In short, starting with God is perhaps 
not the right entry to this book even if one cannot miss Him along the road.22
Reaching what Versfeld tries to get at is, it seems, as simple as opening one’s 
eyes. He opens the lid of his cooking pot and observes how 
the bits and pieces in our soup pot are performing arabesques on the 
surface as the water boils. […] Certainly there is an order there, an 
inscape, something like the beating of the sea on the rocks, or a swift 
eddy in a stream or the wind in the willows. These occurrences are 
asymmetrical and playful, each moment unique in its “suchness.” By 
their very transience they are eternal […] (FT 11) 
The only thing that is eternal is transience itself, just like the only thing general 
is particularity itself.23 In other words, “At very moment there is a new creation, 
22 Versfeld knew well that he could not – perhaps should not – take God’s existence for granted. 
Cf. his own reference to the questions raised by Darwin’s theory of evolution (FT 89).
23 We may recall Versfeld’s claim that “I want to speak as a South African [i.e. someone in 
particular – E.W.], because only thus have I anything to say of any general interest” (MP 3). 
See also Persons 15: “There is a Hassidic story which tells that when Rabbi Noah succeeded 
his father, Rabbi Mordechai, his disciples noted that he did not always do as his father had, 
and asked him about it. ‘I act’ he replied ‘exactly as my father did. He never imitated others, 
and neither do I.’” Ruth Versfeld’s biographical notes in Chapter 1 flesh out this point.
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an indication of the surge of the Tao” (FT 11)24 – but here the term “creation” 
floats ambiguously between phenomena observed in nature and human artistic 
creation. And the emergence of newness, of particularity as transience, can 
be accommodated by nothing other than a radically historically minded 
understanding of reality. Thus, by peering into a soup we are initiated into an 
aesthetics of the sensible and contingent – in nature, in art, in human life – and 
situated in a whole history of transient events.
But there is something terribly wrong with what I write: the blandness 
which neglects something essential, something like the enthusiasm and joy for 
what is there. My formal prose cannot do justice to this aesthetic sense Versfeld 
communicates, his joy and passion expressed in flowering forms of discourse 
(discussed in Chapter 2, §3). Be that as it may, it is in this passion for what is that 
Sartre and Versfeld part ways: “Sartre represents this godless universe as gooey 
and obscene, exuding a sort of nauseous plasma” (FT 90). To Versfeld this is 
simply descriptively implausible: how can one open the lid of the pot of soup, or 
look at a gladiolus, or study the people around you and become aware of nothing 
but increasingly boring instances of nauseous plasma (“hash” as he would say 
elsewhere)? And if natural phenomena are studied in such a way that they are 
simply reduced to functions of the system, how could one satisfactorily account 
for the amazement and wonder which sets such study in motion in the first 
place? Rather, Versfeld recommends that we simply recognise how touched we 
are by the beauty of things: “Things are superfluous: they overflow” (FT 90). Our 
aesthetic sensitivity invigorates our senses and prevents us from functionalistic 
reductions – “As for the orchids? Sheer fun and droll generosity – and pleasure 
in the unique” (FT 90). From this perspective “What is fundamental in reality is 
not self-preservation but generosity” (FT 92), and “the very universe is one great 
convivium blazing with joy” (FT 21).
Human contingency and mortality is nothing but a specific case of this 
superfluous abundance of uniqueness. People are “so utterly superfluous and 
24 And once absolute particularity has led us to generality, one could comment on history: 
“God is in history and orders things well because they are fluent and not repetitive” (FT 
11). This transition to God can be made in different ways. In MP, long before FT, Versfeld 
allowed himself the following diversion: “Hash is a peculiar English monstrosity […]. The 
blasphemy of hash consists in reducing to an anonymous goo what once had a character of 
its own. […] Cooking is creation, and I do not believe that God made a hash of the world” 
(MP 4). Even so, we have to be careful in the conclusions we draw, because he could pursue: 
“[t]he first condemnation of hash with which I am acquainted is in the Maitri Upanishad 
(6.9) […]” (MP 5 and see the whole passage that follows from this citation), evidently not 
requiring accreditation by the Christian God.
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dispensable that [they are] lovable and will never be dispensed with” (FT 93). 
Thus, for both nature and people, the aesthetically accessible superfluity opens 
to an ethics of care for what is perishable.
This raises a question we need to remark upon in passing. Elsewhere I have 
already pointed out the regrettable fact that Versfeld did not have much to say 
about natural disasters – something his thought on natural beauty really calls 
for (a point already touched upon in Chapter 9). However, evil generated by 
humans did not evade his attention. Tyrants do not let things be (FT 12), they 
destroy the particular by dominating generality, they force society into planned 
order of utility: “We have heard totalitarian regimes praised for having created 
order – neat rows of soldiers, police with automatics, and gas ovens to tidy away 
the rubbish; strong governments that keep the pots of discontent from boiling 
over” (FT 11). In this way the disquiet about political reality is never far from the 
exuberance about the beauty of life; his aesthetics open to politics.
But back to the point. It would be a major mistake to think that these ideas 
limit us to the confines of the individual’s mind or heart. That is another virtue 
of approaching this constellation of ideas from the point of cooking: one can 
hardly question that “partaking of food is the partaking of reality” (FT 18). 
In fact, Versfeld illustrates the interconnectedness of things by a little piece of 
autobiographical contextualisation:25
Living as I do in Cape Town, I may be said to owe my origin and location 
to soup. The settlement of the Cape by the Dutch was prompted by 
the need for a station for victualling and refreshment on the long and 
scurvy voyage to the Spice Islands. Seamen landing in Table Bay would 
find themselves in a botanist’s paradise, and the precursors of the great 
botanists of subsequent generations were the men gathering herbs 
and weeds to concoct, perhaps with a bit of salt pork or fish from a 
teeming coast, a healing soup against the ravages of scurvy. Cooking 
and medication were, in those days, very closely related […]. (FT 9)
And we may continue with a passage from another book:
That we shape the landscape with our teeth is something of which we 
can convince ourselves by going to any good viewpoint in an agricultural 
region like the Western Cape. The arable has been entirely worked over 
25 I remind the reader of the importance of (auto)biography – i.e. the narration of each 
particular, mysterious, human life as discussed in Chapter 2, §2.
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to produce food. You will see great areas under vines, others covered 
by deciduous fruit-trees, and others under grains and pulses. You see 
numerous farmhouses and labourers’ cottages, roads for the transport 
of produce, large factories and co-ops where the produce is converted 
into wines or tinned foods. Thus both the landscape and the cultural 
history of the Cape are tied up with the food-producing and food-
consuming activities and habits of its inhabitants. (PP 6–7; similarly 
already in KK 29)
But for now, the point is that food and cooking help us understand the unity 
of things – or at least, this is Versfeld’s claim. And the combination of the 
interconnectedness of things and his aesthetics of superfluity lead to radical 
conclusions: “Life is exuberant. And each of these lives is wonderful. […] every 
life is a miracle” (FT 48). In short, “The secular is the miraculous” (FT 89). There 
cannot be something like mere food any more, hence the cook is “the priest of 
mutual arising” (FT 12). Where this is ignored, it should provoke our suspicion 
– Versfeld states in all seriousness that “[t]he possibility of living on American 
bread is not unrelated to the question of living with Americans” (FT 84). 
Where this unity of the secular and the miraculous is fully recognised, 
it calls for our celebratory26 participation: “Festivities, then, celebrate among 
other things the divinity of food” (FT 24). What prevents the reader from 
understanding that all food incarnates the Divine? Not Versfeld! He rather evokes 
a Zen story of a man of Zen who was visited by a monk who said he came 
from the Monastery of Spiritual Light. The man of Zen replied: “In the 
day we have sunlight and at night lamplight. What is spiritual light?” 
When the monk could not answer, he said: “Sunlight, lamplight.” 
That is the right point of view if you believe in the Incarnation. What 
is spiritual bread? The loaf in the oven. (FT 25, my emphasis; similarly 
ACCG 9–10) 
In response to the generous world you may exclaim “Glory to God for dappled 
things” (FT 90) as Versfeld did, praising the Creator for his work of art in the 
26 Celebration does not mean disposing of lavish dishes, even though at some places in the book, 
Versfeld himself creates this impression. But his considered opinion is this: “Wherever you 
have celebrations in this spirit you have festivities. A festivity does not necessitate all sorts 
of gorgeous food. You can celebrate on bread and cheese if you hold them in your heart. It 
is far more essential for the heart to overflow than the dishes. Let that be your superfluity” 
(FT 25).
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words of Hopkins.27 But in the aesthetic view of the world he tries to open, words 
are redundant – “Prayer is cutting bread” (ACCG 9). Thus we have a sacramental 
sense of the world, albeit in pianissimo.
So we come to the end of this comparison: Versfeld’s later aesthetics of a 
generous reality (exemplified in Food for Thought) corresponds on all the basic 
points with his early rendering of mediaeval theological metaphysics (exemplified 
by The Perennial Order). In all fairness, Versfeld explicitly rejected the idea 
of a return to the Middle Ages.28 In the procession of all creatures there is no 
turning backwards. Also, it would be invalid to construe this overlap as Versfeld’s 
assumption that he could simply confirm the Catholic convictions present 
among his readers (he knew very well that for many, perhaps most, he could not 
count on this). My point is neither a confirmation nor a questioning of Versfeld’s 
constellation of ideas, but rather a demonstration of the repetition thereof in two 
apparently heterogeneous bodies of thought.29 This repetition implies a relation 
of dependency of the latter texts on the former.
The unavoidable conclusion is that the assumed and even real proximity 
to the earth expressed in Versfeld’s later work is built on top of a mediaeval 
metaphysics and theology. This begs the question whether the celebration of 
nature, food and art can stand on its own legs? Or, if the basis fell out, because 
people cannot be convinced of its validity, does it change anything? Or if this 
aesthetics does need some basis, what kind of performance could support it in a 
“post-metaphysical” context?30 Perhaps a mobilisation of the army of rhetorical 
27 But see FT 19: “The Upanishad ends with the line: ‘Such is the mystic doctrine.’ It is called a 
mystic doctrine because he who is established on food is one with ultimate reality, therefore 
is Brahman and hence no different from this manifold universe, the source of whose dynamic 
is the sustenance it receives from Brahman as the source of all growth, and nourishment, 
therefore, as Food.” 
Besides, there are other ways to connect poetically with Versfeld’s thought – as is 
exemplified by the poems of Van Niekerk and Krog in this volume.
28 “I do not attempt to defend the Middle Ages in this book. To me this expression is meaningless. 
I do not ask of anybody to return to the Middle Ages either. This is impossible in practice and 
in any case we live out of a tradition” (RM preface).
29 I do not see a sudden break – antecedents of the later thought abound in the earlier. For the 
sake of measuring the distance and proximity, I merely selected and contrasted the antipodes 
of his work.
30 A classical formulation of the problem is Jürgen Habermas’s Postmetaphysical Thinking: 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 1992). This is not to ignore 
the alternative view, defended by Versfeld, that metaphysics cannot be avoided. See Versfeld, 
“Talking Metaphysics. Also see Pierre Aubenque, Faut-il déconstruire la métaphysique? (Paris: 
PUF, 2009).
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devices could do it. But then, are we sure that this is not what Versfeld had been 
doing all along – at least in parts of his later work? Finally, I think Versfeld may 
have retorted by pointing us in exactly the opposite direction. If all of these 
questions are valid, should this not rather motivate one to continue the very 
reappraisal of mediaeval thought he started in his early work: on the one hand 
to dismantle the persistent image of its lofty abstractness and on the other to 
reconsider the mediaeval argumentative practices?
In the next points I want to examine how one is to make oneself at home in 
a world of generosity.
5. Land in Klip en klei – You said, “the obvious”?
Versfeld gladly subscribed to Whitehead’s claim that “it requires a great mind 
to take an interest in the obvious” (PP 1; likewise PO 92; Persons 17). On a 
certain level, this is indisputable: what has acquired the transparency of everyday 
familiarity can become stimulating food for thought; there is nothing too low 
for the philosophical mind. No phenomenologist would have differed. And yet, 
there is something irksome when one takes this adjective of the “obvious” into 
other contexts of Versfeld’s thought, as he seems to invite us to do. I will do so 
with a second look at the book that arguably most contributed to his positive 
reception and reputation as a master of the small things, Klip en klei (Stone and 
Clay). To me this is his most ambiguous book.
Klip en klei covers a wide range of subjects, but one may consider them all 
focused on the question of the first chapter: how to make yourself at home in a 
generous world? My hesitation does not concern the ruminations about building, 
gardening, angling, furniture, the sea, hunting, carpentry, etc. that fill the pages 
of this book. Rather, I would like to raise two objections to the overall thrust of 
the book.
The first issue concerns the conditions for taking an interest in these obvious 
things. The experiences reflected upon in this book practices by which one could 
want to make oneself at home. Not a set of general prescriptions, but a spirit or a 
style. It is certainly viewed as Versfeld’s response to nature’s largesse. In this sense, 
it has the dimension of an ethics of permanent celebration. But this celebration 
is not overindulgence; it is rather an ethics of discretion. I do not object to this. 
I will come back to the virtues of such an ethics. For now, the question is what 
made this ethics, in the way Versfeld advocated it, possible?
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The backdrop of his whole discourse is a milieu of farm and country life, 
of suburban homes and accessibility to the seas surrounding Cape Town. The 
cultural side of this milieu includes reference to rustic traditions,31 popular 
practices, a quite paternalistic view of family life32 and holiday activities outside of 
the city. And he remains critical of all sorts of dangers lurking in the celebration of 
this culture.33 Indeed, one should not fail to notice that the book ends, in apparent 
breach of the preceding eight chapters, with a critical reflection on patriotism. 
But what I am trying to get at is his apparent ignorance of what had made all of 
his cherished experiences possible. Having some savings money available is part 
of it, but the core is: land ownership. Or at the very least, lawful access to land 
and the use of it.
I certainly do not reproach Versfeld for having made the best of what he 
had, especially if one bears in mind the modest conditions of his own childhood 
(cf. KK 49). The question is not if he knew how to be grateful (which is, by the 
way, a good synonym for taking an interest in the obvious). The question is if he 
included in his reflection on these things the fact that it was all but obvious that 
this particular individual would have ownership and access to those particular 
pieces of land.
This absence becomes conspicuous once one notices the number of references 
to the history of conquest and discriminatory land dispossession in his text. His 
uncle “was a captain of the burgers of Caledon in the Gcaleka war” (KK 66). 
Of Verdoemeniskloof he says that it was “one of the last strongholds of the old 
Bushmen” (KK 71). He evokes oral traces of previous inhabitants of the region 
(“Fingo’s” and “Bushmen”, KK 72). If this is the case, how is it possible that 
reflection on the violent history that deprived the majority of his South African 
contemporaries of land ownership and access to natural regions simply is not part 
of the book? Or was it that he took so much interest in the obvious, that he did 
not notice in this case, that such experiences were nothing but obvious to those 
people who could just lament the fact that as far as land is concerned “there is 
nothing rather than something”?
One has to be quite precise in formulating this issue. This is not a book by 
an ignorant or indifferent cultural conservative. Versfeld explicitly rejects both 
of the forms of political legitimation from which people – white people – drew 
31 Cf. for instance “boeretannies”, “volksresepte”, “voorslagriempies […] sny”, etc.
32 See KK 31 for the father as head of the family.
33 E.g., “Wat ’n volkshuis is, sal ons nie weet totdat ons uitvind wat ’n volk is nie en dit weet ons 
nie” (KK 14).
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to justify land ownership: liberalism and nationalist romanticism.34 He critiques 
Christians who miss the rightful place of the problem of nutrition in their own 
spiritual orientation (KK 29). He evokes in shorthand his decades-old critique of 
imperialism and adds to it his critique of slavery (KK 32). He mocks nationalist 
immigration and identity politics.35 Racially structured labour hierarchies receive 
no mercy in his judgement (cf. KK 44–45). And he remains as explicit as ever 
in his condemnation of racism (KK 8, 114–115). In other words, the point of 
critique I raise is quite in the spirit of his own text; in fact, he even opens the 
way to such a critique when he exhorts his readers to mind the “washmaid” who 
is responsible for the clothing in which they carry out their daily activities (KK 
122). Neglect her (and everyone else who make the life you know possible) and 
this will warp your view on reality. In the extension of this exhortation is the call 
to mind the historical conditions by which people have come in the position (and 
the laws by which they maintained a privileged access) to enjoy the sea, to hike 
the mountains or to gather rocks for building a cottage.36 That is my first point.
This leads us to my second objection. A lot of the experiences on which 
Versfeld reflected in this book took place at the family holiday cottage he built 
on a piece of land in the Kouga, very far from their residence in Cape Town. For 
all the remarkable things Versfeld wrote about dwelling and homecoming, he is 
astonishingly silent about the fact that he owned two homes. Whether owning 
a second residence can be justified is simply not my question here; in principle, 
I wish that pleasure for all those who wish to enjoy it. My point is that Versfeld’s 
philosophising about homes and homeliness essentially speaks about one home – 
the second one makes for a very strange intrusion in the coherence of what he says.
Take this citation as a first example: “Your home situates you in the world. 
It gives you an address, somewhere where people can address you” (KK 9). But 
what now with the second house, the one which is not his domicilium citandi et 
34 He explicitly rejects nationalist racism as an illegitimate generalisation (KK 114). But for the 
same reason he was reluctant about liberalism (despite his early adherence to it): it is a “race-
ism” of the general human race and for that reason has difficulties with theorising human 
particularity. These views extend ideas developed in MP 102.
35 He asks ironically: “Why don’t we encourage more Italian immigrants? They are so 
authentically Afrikaans, and so many Afrikaners are so inauthentic” (KK 36).
36 Again, from another text one can infer that Versfeld was not unaware of the issues I refer to: 
“It does not need much imagination to see that the phenomenology of spatial experience may 
make a valuable contribution to the study of politics, relevant to phenomena like colonisation, 
flight from one’s country, forcible shifting of population, and the urge to explore outer space” 
(Persons 76). The Afrikaans original of this text (Wat is kontemporêr? 12) was published in 
1966, two years before Klip en klei.
Martin Versfeld208
executandi? If the meaning of life consists in coming home,37 if the gate to your 
home is the gate of heaven (NA 23), if it is sane to be all here rather than all there 
(NA 21), then the mere existence of a second residence becomes a strange thing 
and the celebration of it in serious conflict with the philosophy of the home. 
Whence could the family holiday cottage draw all its sung virtues, if the family 
had already made themselves at home in a suburb of the big city?
Furthermore, this second major objection may meet the first one. Versfeld 
claims, quite correctly to my mind, that one’s home has an impact on the 
perspective one can adopt on the world (KK 9, cf. Chapter 5, §1 on looking for 
the truth from where we are; Wat is kontemporêr? 17 on this principle, and 18–19 
on architecture and construction). And he even glosses: “If you own only an ax, 
then the world will be to you something that has to be felled” (KK 9). The relevant 
question is: how does the fact of owning not an axe, but a home and being at home 
in two homes – the first apparently not sufficing – impact the owner’s perspective 
on reality? Would one not have expected of Versfeld to write somewhere in one 
of his autobiographical excursions that he was one of those people who owned 
both a suburban Cape Town home and a cottage in the countryside, and that this 
surely had to have an impact on the way he looked at the world? Nothing would 
have been more coherent for an author who teaches that “an author has to come to 
insight about his/her outlook and then give expression to this insight” (KK 25).
Allow me a few final comments. When it comes to ethics of discretion, 
Versfeld is superb. He is quite gifted for commenting on the material basis of 
his own wisdom, but he does so selectively. This strength and weakness have 
implications beyond personal ethics for the political side of social interaction. 
One thing is to assess these points retrospectively; another is to know how to 
deal with the same questions in contemporary society. One could capture the 
problem by paraphrasing Adorno: is it possible to live a life of justice in an unjust 
world? Here one has to reject both the Pollyanna-like voluntarism which ignores 
the limits of human action and the sceptic resignation on which the status quo 
thrives. Whatever needs to be done, I guess a good starting point is always an 
awareness of reality with which I have characterised Versfeld’s thought, namely 
“gratitude”.38 And true recognition for what one has should prompt one to give 
recognition to others.
37 Cf. again Hennie Rossouw, “Die kuns van die lewe is om tuis te kom”.
38 Not unrelated is his recounting of a hiking expedition in Lesotho, when he and his companion 
were caught in bad weather, and received two day’s of hospitality from very poor locals (KK 
85).
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6. Ecology: The logos on our common home
When St Francis talks about “brother sun”, the fraternal attachment 
is a superior detachment because the sun properly focused is 
seen to be a creature of God, primarily God’s because all 
creatures, the ten thousand things, are God’s, given to us, 
and therefore ours because fundamentally they are not ours, 
so that we can at any moment give them back with open hands. 
(OS 2nd ed.)
There is a commonplace in the critique of modernity that holds that God’s 
instruction in the Genesis narrative to Adam and Eve to rule over creation served 
as the religious licence to subjugate and destroy nature. You will find nothing 
of this in Versfeld.39 His view of nature is indeed informed by a metaphysics of 
creation, but with a completely different perspective: 
[…] in the course of my reflections I have come to believe in what I 
may call the fundamental generosity of Being. This is a pretty universal 
belief, and in the Christian West it takes the form of a metaphysic of 
creation for which God is Being, Being identical with Goodness. Now 
the good is diffusivum sui, that is, it radiates itself because of a radical 
generosity. (PP 29) 
We have seen this idea at work in Versfeld’s aesthetics. But he also developed the 
implications of this view for ecology. Whatever one may think of his metaphysical 
perspective, there is no denying the extreme contemporary relevance of the 
conclusions he drew on the environment. Let us outline at least the basic points.
The correlate of Versfeld’s view of nature as an overflowing generosity is his 
critique of the modernist view on nature. This is the vision of nature itself as a 
capitalist setup in which only the most ruthless entrepreneurs survive, always 
at the expense of others (NA 2nd ed. 80–81; FT 92). How far contemporary 
scientific work on the theory of evolution allows one to question this image is 
not clear to me. However, at the very least one may accept caution against viewing 
nature as a system of exploitation and domination (PP 6), and the justification 
of human imitation of this order that it may imply.
39 See also his critique of Descartes’s idea of humans as the masters and owners of nature in Wat 
is kontemporêr? 27, 30.
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But Versfeld calls not only for a critical mindset. He also offers an alternative 
view on all reality – rocks, plants, animals, humans – as being gratuitous, before 
they are useful (cf. PP 24). Such a perspective on reality does not allow one 
to consider humans as owners of nature. Rather, humans are, as much as the 
natural environment, part of a generous radiance in which human ownership 
is only a recently emerged derivative. Ownership, with its correlates of use 
and consumption, remain therefore constructed on a basis from which its real 
meaning derives and which can be mobilised to critique excesses in the use 
of nature.
This is no moralistic precept. There are no owners, indeed, no humans at 
all, without an intricate web of relations by which nature allows them to be. The 
fact that nature is shaped by human intervention (after all, we live from farm 
produce, not from the trees of paradise) does not fundamentally change this 
fact. And since the human right to be is not primary, but preceded by nature on 
which we depend, one can understand Versfeld’s radical question about where 
the right of humans to exist at all, derives from; indeed, he even asks where 
anything whatsoever derives that right from (NA 2nd ed. 51). Here, his point is 
of course first of all metaphysical, rather than political or legal. Before all else our 
reflection should be oriented by the inexplicable gratuitousness of being to which 
whomever wants to claim a right, owes his/her being. Versfeld’s conviction is that 
if we miss this point, we miss the original source of value in reality, and violence, 
exploitation, abuse and destruction will follow. This is one of the reasons why the 
question “why is there something rather than nothing?” (cf. §3, above) has great 
importance beyond the confines of metaphysics.
But then there comes a point at which reflection on rights is quite appropriate. 
And not only rights of humans but also the rights of animals, plants and rocks.40 
This formulation is probably not devoid of provocation, but it does evoke a 
legitimate point, which is a reformulation of the old principle of justice: to 
each his or her due (NA 2nd ed. 56). But Versfeld appropriates this principle 
without exclusive restriction to humans. Other beings have their “rights” in this 
sense too, albeit relative rights (PP 21). Relative in two ways: different kinds of 
beings have rights that correspond to their kind of being (to plants less is due 
than to humans, but not nothing), and relative in the sense that reflection on 
rights has to consider each entity in its relation to others (what is due to each 
element can be established only through reflection on the whole environment in 
which it is situated). Relation is, then, a key idea, but one may also call it system, 
40 See e.g., the essay entitled “On the Rights of Man and the Rights of Rocks,” PP 14–28.
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environment or ecology. Two major consequences follow from this ecological 
understanding of value and ethics.
First, thinking about the rights of nature stands in relation to human reality, 
but is not a mere extension of human needs or values.41 The “rights discourse” 
practised by Versfeld in this context does not take rights in the strict sense as fixed 
legal protections independent of context. The point is to sensitise his readers 
about what is really valuable, and hence the threat or exploitation of which is 
truly serious, no matter if it is human or nature. Besides, if I see correctly, such a 
view of rights does not exclude the possibility for rights in the strict legal sense 
applicable to interhuman exchanges – here they are conceivable as an acceptable 
“special case” based on the broader understanding of what is due to each.
Second, Versfeld confirms the mutual implication between human–human 
relations and human–nature relations.42 One cannot think about the one without 
taking the other into consideration. Admittedly, one cannot evade the fact that 
our only way to think about all of this is in an anthropomorphic way. Versfeld is 
the first to grant this. As we saw in Chapter 5, we search for truth from where and 
what we are. Affirming the full implication of this point, Versfeld assumes that 
all other creatures see reality in their creaturomophic43 way (NA 2nd ed. 23–24). 
This means that our anthropomorphic approach to reality is all right, provided 
we don’t elevate this inevitability to anthropocentrism. Here, anthropocentrism 
entails that everything human is the sole domain of what is possibly valuable 
and non-human reality, having no such potential for value generation, has to be 
disposable for human usage.
The relations of mutual implication between human–human relations 
and human–nature relations go in two directions. On the one hand, what 
humans do to their environment has an impact on humans (NA 2nd ed. 22, 50). 
Exploitation of nature and exploitation of humans go hand in hand (PP 22). On 
the other hand, the ways we arrange our social relations will have impacts on the 
environment, both natural and human-made (NA 2nd ed. 24). Careful attention 
to these interrelations will quickly show that Versfeld’s is no naive view on human 
reality and nature. His writings in this respect demonstrate an acute awareness of 
the “thirst” (NA 2nd ed. 23) of both nature and human life – that is, their fragility 
and need of care. One could draw the practical implications from these insights 
41 See for instance “The basis of nature conservation is a vision of nature as superfluous, and 
therefore generous because created in eternal generosity” (FT 92).
42 This idea was already developed in GA 129 and 88.
43 He uses the neologism “goggamorfies” (NA 2nd ed. 24), i.e., “buggomorphic” for the view 
insects have on reality.
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on two levels. On the political level it calls for action in which the protection of 
the natural environment and of people is always planned and striven for together. 
This is completely in sync with what is nowadays called environmental justice, 
but the vision is much broader. On a more personal, ethical level, one may point 
out that the “ethics of discretion” present in Klip en klei and Die buitelewe gains 
a lot of credibility as responses to this call for care.
We have come quite far from the original metaphysical assumptions. Here we 
have an outline of a social and political ecology. Even this brief outline suffices to 
claim that this is a very living part of Versfeld’s philosophy.
7. On subtle critique
In Chapter 2 (§6) I characterised Versfeld’s thought as politically sensitive, 
as infused with political concerns, without containing substantial political 
theorising or commentary. He engaged with an array of political issues of his 
time, but more often than not in the form of fragments integrated into larger 
social-critical or generally philosophical studies. Sometimes his critique is quite 
subtle and I wish to demonstrate why it could be worthwhile to examine at least 
one such instance more closely.
Versfeld’s coordination of large-scale critique of Western civilisation and 
detail of apartheid discrimination is nowhere better illustrated than in an 
apparent passing remark in Rondom die Middeleeue. It is 1962 and Versfeld 
writes to introduce the Afrikaans reader to the “Mediaeval spirit” (RM preface). 
Why should they take an interest in the Middle Ages at all? Because this is the 
era when the West’s “intellectual character traits” (RM 1) developed. If the West 
has something worth transmitting to the present, a study of this period will help 
to appreciate what it is. But how to access this huge period? Significantly, Versfeld 
proposes, that the primary entry to the Western intellectual heritage is not 
through the Greeks, or Jesus of Nazareth, or the politico-religious compromise 
of Constantine, but through Augustine. He combined Athens and Jerusalem, he 
gave the authoritative formulation of the Christian faith for the early mediaeval 
period, his Confessions represent the discovery of “personality” (RM 3) and of 
autobiography, his conversion therefore stands for the conversion of the ancient 
(Western) world (cf. RM 4). It is hard to assign a more crucial role to one person 
than Versfeld does with Augustine in the development of Western civilisation. 
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You, inheritor of Western culture, you want to call yourself civilised? Well, you 
fool yourself if you bypass Augustine! Versfeld’s argument is more complex, but 
that is at least the schema of it. And then Versfeld simply adds: “For us, South 
Africans, it is inspiring to remember that Augustine stems from Africa and it is a 
healthy fact to ponder that, due to his complexion, it would not even have been 
possible to converse with him in a train wagon”.44 Versfeld does not elaborate this 
any further. However, from that point, one cannot stop the dominos from falling: 
such was the political setup in South Africa that it could stand by Augustine only 
at the expense of pure hypocrisy. Or otherwise, those who followed the logic of 
racial separation of train wagons in a consistent way (that means of apartheid 
legislation in general) would have to discard Augustine and in doing so reveal 
themselves as lacking the civilisation they boasted to represent. More generally, 
by banning blackness from Afrikanerdom, the “torchbearers of civilisation” to 
the “dark continent” deprived themselves of the very flame they claimed to carry.
One could say that, for Versfeld, there was indeed something dark in Africa. 
Not the a priori darkness that many of his contemporaries attributed to African 
cultures. Rather, the darkness of the abyss of human nature in every human being 
(RM 3). But exploration of this “dark continent” can help one to make precious 
– if uncomfortable – discoveries, among which, that of one’s own complicity in 
injustice.
For our understanding of Versfeld, it is certainly no trivial matter to recall 
here the importance of Augustine for his own thought. Augustine’s idea of the 
abyssus humanae naturae is at the core of Versfeld’s anthropology: the South 
African drew ample inspiration from the City of God in his political analysis 
and a good number of his studies are devoted to Augustine. In this sense, it is 
entirely reasonable to place Versfeld’s work under the symbol of an ever-deepening 
conversation with a black man on a train.
But even if all of this is granted, one may want to object: is this argument not 
simply too delicate to have any punch? Most likely. And if this is so, one has to 
question the value of such subtle critique. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile standing 
still at the dilemma Versfeld faced. One should not forget that by 1962 Versfeld 
had already his uncompromising and vocal critique of exploitation, violence and 
racism in Oor gode en afgode behind him (see Chapter 3, §3.3). Having tried that, 
would it not have helped (Versfeld could ask) to try another strategy of aiming at 
44 “Vir ons Suid-Afrikaners is dit besielend om te onthou dat Augustinus ook uit Afrika stam, 
en dis ’n gesonde feit om te bepeins dat ons weens sy gelaatskleur nie eens saam in ’n treinwa 
sou kon gesels nie” (RM 4). Here Versfeld refers to the racial separations in force in public 
transport in South Africa at that time.
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a more specific target? Assuming that this was Versfeld’s strategy, one could argue 
that the more indirect approach did not dilute his point: the subtlety thereof 
is part of the point. For is Versfeld not calling on his compatriots to reconsider 
their tradition? Is he not challenging the cultural supremacists with reference to 
the very object of their presumed superiority, namely the intellectual tradition 
at the heart of which lies the art of subtilitas legendi? Hence, for those of his 
intellectual contemporaries for whom such subtlety carried no weight, one has to 
acknowledge that they had already extinguished part of the flame of civilisation 
that they claimed to bear. After all – and one may well suspect an irony here – “it 
is proper to the civilised person to come to selfconsciousness and not to disregard 
the tradition out of which s/he lives” (RM 93).
But one can derive another point of contemporary value by ruminating on 
Versfeld’s reading of Augustine. Let us be clear about what Augustine-as-African 
represents for him. Augustine combined his knowledge of Platonism, his love 
for Virgil and his Christian convictions. In this sense, he does not represent 
traditional African thought. But neither does he simply represent Western 
thought and culture, because the synthesis with which he is synonymous was 
partly created by him. Versfeld’s point is not that Augustine takes the central 
place in Western civilisation because he was already Western, or because he 
was an African. Neither is his centrality due to his incarnating human being 
in general. He became the figure of excellence he was by making the best of 
the contingent historical situation in which he lived. Augustine was a human 
being, a particular one. This is not a point about the African roots of European 
civilisation, as epitomised in the work of Cheikh Anta Diop. It is by another 
strategy that Versfeld, evoking Augustine’s “race” at the crucial junction of 
Western history, strives to undermine the “clash of institutionalised forms of 
ignorance”.45 Surely the continuous concern of purifying one’s tradition from 
racist bias is an essential part of opening up to the wisdom of other intellectual 
traditions, and of promoting their sociopolitical recognition? This openness is 
also a condition of the dialogue and invention by which one may live out of one’s 
own traditions.
45 Mohammed Arkoun, “Clarifier le passé pour construire le futur,” Confluences. Méditerranée 
16 (1995–1996): 17–30, here 19. 
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8. Ambiguities of anthropology
The least one can say is that anthropology has become a difficult and precarious 
enterprise. This holds no less for the more philosophical version than for 
anthropology in the stricter disciplinary sense. For more than half a century 
scholarly discourse about humans – in their generality or particularity – has been 
subjected to severe and certainly necessary critique. Time and time again the 
same problems are brought to light: what is presented as insight into universal 
anthropological traits turn out be paternalistic, sexist or ethnocentric prejudice; 
what claims to be understanding of anthropological diversity is unmasked as 
essentialising, ahistorical deformations. In both cases, the knowledge, power and 
economic interests of such discourses arouse suspicion and indignation. One 
cannot avoid the question of how to deal with this problem in an author for 
whom anthropology was “first philosophy”.46
True enough, Versfeld’s count among the more sophisticated approaches: 
first, he takes as central the mystery of human existence (rather than his own 
scientific confidence); second, his claim to have anything of universal value to say 
passes through the explicit recognition of his own particularity (cf. MP 3) and 
that of others;47 third, although limited (as argued above), there is a sustained 
and serious attempt to expose himself to insights from the cultural other. If this 
suffices to warrant a careful reading of his anthropology, it certainly does not 
exempt him from critical scrutiny.
While acknowledging the shameful history and problematic present of 
(philosophical) anthropology, I cannot see how one can simply avoid it. And 
this for at least three reasons. First, there are human beings. As long as this is the 
case and as long as we bother to think, this fact imposes itself with tenacity to 
our reflection. Second, those academics who do not simply assume the flawless 
authority of their own cultural tradition, or of their personal religious faith, 
have a hard time in ethics. Personally, I have not yet been able to figure out how 
a relativist aestheticisation of matters ethical will lead us to nihilism-overcoming 
insights. And with these alternatives discredited, we are running out of options of 
justification for our ethical claims. One remaining option is to consider history as a 
project whereby people set themselves objectives that they have to realise through 
46 See Chapter 2, § 2 and Chapter 5, § 2.
47 Cf. “Human nature is the same in the thirteenth and the twentieth century, in Peking and in 
Cape Town. But no two persons are the same” (Persons 17).
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a long process of cultural learning. The critiques of modernity confront this 
option with substantial resistance. The only other option is by way of reflection on 
what flourishing human life may entail. A hugely problematic enterprise, as I have 
stated. But I cannot see how one can simply abolish it. Third, at the same time, all 
critique of anthropology, even the most subtle and sophisticated, is a performative 
act which presupposes the ability of understanding and even mobilisation in 
response to it.48 This is not a weakness; it is simply unavoidable. This means that 
even the harshest critique depends in its practice on anthropological assumptions 
of compatibility, mutual understanding, the possibility of creating “third spaces”49 
of commonality. If our belief in this point is abolished, we remain face to face 
with others like animals of different species, bleating and barking at each other 
in incomprehensible noises.50
Even this short plea in favour of anthropological study (in Versfeld’s line or 
not) does not absolve us from prudence in anthropological claims. As far as I am 
concerned, we can simply continue to advance our best possible ideas. But then 
always with the understanding that they remain provisional – the best we can do 
until the other corrects us. Uncertainty is not necessarily an intellectual weakness.
48 Cf. Martin Saar, “Genealogische Kritik,” in Was ist Kritik?, ed. Rahel Jaeggi and Tilo Wesche 
(Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), 221–246.
49 Cf. Bernhard Waldenfels, Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden (Frankfurt-am-
Main: Suhrkamp, 2010), 110–111.
50 Cf. Ernst Wolff, “Adam Small’s Shade of Black Consciousness,” in Philosophy on the Border. 
Decoloniality and the Shudder of the Origin, ed. Leonard Praeg (Pietermaritzburg: UKZN 
Press, 2019), 112–147, here 125–126 and Ernst Wolff, Between Daily Routine and Violent 





His contribution is mainly based on the fact that he was mentally 
gifted and I have to acknowledge that it is a bit presumptuous 
to want to write about him. 
(RM 1, Versfeld on Augustine)
Perhaps it has even been self-flattering to liken myself to a vulture in the subtitle 
of this chapter. Maybe I have rather been more of a blowfly (brommer), like 
Versfeld said of some reviewers, since “they live from what they have not created 
themselves” (KK 26). Still, blowflies are no different from philosophers, insofar 
as they look at their world from where and what they are. As much as I strove 
for precision and fairness, this “conclusion” documents only what Versfeld looks 
like when studied with my composite eyes. That this contains many of my own 
ideas and convictions is inevitable. In writing about what is living and what is 
dead in Versfeld, my end was not to draw up the definitive assessment as if to 
make up other readers’ minds for them. Rather by dialoguing with Versfeld, I am 
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